

THE SOVIET SPIES

RICHARD HIRSCH

The Soviet Spies

THE STORY OF RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE
IN NORTH AMERICA

by
RICHARD HIRSCH

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Colonel Hirsch served during the war with the Military Intelligence Division of the U. S. War Department General Staff. As a professional writer on law enforcement and crime problems for the past fourteen years, he is particularly qualified by background and experience to compile this record of Soviet espionage activities in North America. The views and beliefs expressed herein are his own and are not to be construed as reflecting the official opinions of the U. S. War Department.

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To My Wife

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FOREWORD

IT WAS Igor Sergeievitch Gouzenko who revealed the existence of a widespread conspiracy to obtain secret official information respecting the military potential of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and to convey such information to the Government of the U.S.S.R. At eight o'clock on the evening of September 5, 1945, he left the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with one hundred documents belonging to the officially accredited Soviet diplomatic representatives. In so doing, he betrayed his government, his superiors, and his oath of office. As wards of the Canadian Government, Gouzenko and his family are now being accorded the close protection of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Gouzenko made possible the exposure of various persons who were engaged in betraying their oaths of office, their superiors, and the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. From the long-range viewpoint the significance of these multiple betrayals lies in the fact that they were from Communism to Democracy and from Democracy to Communism. Such actions establish a pattern which in the future may take place with increasing frequency. A unique reflection on sociological forces at work in the world today is the ease with which Soviet representatives were able to persuade the self-admitted Communists and secret adherents of the Communist Party to sell out their country.

At the same time, the recent defections of the Gouzenkos, the Kravchenkos, and the Alekseevs, joining the Barmines and Krivitskys of other decades, pose a problem for the Kremlin planners which they cannot be sure of solving.

In its essentials the story of the spies shows what happens when a conspiratorial technique, first developed to promote an underground struggle against tyranny, is transplanted to a free democratic society where, in the words of the Canadian Royal Commission of Enquiry, it has "shown itself to be singularly inappropriate."

From the record of its operations, the spy ring offers many lessons.

One is that the Western Democracies are going to require more continuous counter-espionage alertness than has been found necessary in the past. Furthermore such alertness may require legal reforms which will prevent democratic processes from being bulwarks for totalitarian agents. How to strike at such spies without imperiling the hard-won rights of the plain and decent citizen is another matter. It will not be easy—yet perhaps other countries as well have something to learn from the Canadian usage of a Royal Commission of Enquiry, able to effect full and pitiless publicity with powers stopping short of prosecution.

One lesson which must be learned is that counter-espionage cannot be confused with anti-Soviet sentiment. Counter-espionage is a precise and painstaking enterprise, and a general persecution of communist sympathisers only results in queuing up candidates for subversion in front of Soviet offices.

To combat the planned infiltration of secret communists into positions of public trust will require a delicate sense of proportion and timing. But the widest possible public awareness of how such a conspiracy is organised, and how it operates, should be a first step toward nullifying its effectiveness where it may be found to exist.

Chapter One

THE BETRAYAL OF THE U.S.S.R.

FOR almost a generation the biggest excitement that Ottawa ever saw occurred on the night the Parliament buildings burned down, and that was thirty years ago. More like Washington in this respect than London, the Canadian capital has as its primary business the business of government, and government means traffic in paper work and rules and regulations of long standing. With the towers and spires of the public buildings crowning the bluff overlooking the Ottawa River, the city has an air of detached scholastic calm that seems all but unshakable.

Yet in the late summer of 1945 events were taking place which were destined to shatter not only the official tranquillity of the Dominion capital, but that of others as well.

At 285 Charlotte Street there was a three-story red-brick building with a sloping slate roof and high white porches, of a type favoured by solid citizens in the late nineteenth century, when large homes housed large families. Early in 1942 it had been taken over as diplomatic headquarters of the Soviet Embassy. The main portion of the house was used for Ambassador G. N. Zarubin and his staff, while the rear wing, formerly the kitchen and servants' quarters, had iron bars and steel shutters at the windows and was closed off from the rest of the building by double steel doors. This was the cypher section, where the highly technical tasks of encoding and decoding the secret dispatches to Moscow were performed.

For security's sake each of the five sections of the Embassy maintained its own code and had its own separate clerk in a sealed-off room. For example, the Military Section, headed by Colonel Nicolai Zabotin, whose offices were in another section of town at 14 Range Road, had one Igor Gouzenko stationed in its code room to handle the communications which went directly to the Director of Military Intelligence in Moscow. Similarly, the N.K.V.D., latterly the M.V.D., the secret

police successor to the OGPU and the Cheka, had its own means of sending messages to Moscow. So did the Ambassador, the Commercial Attaché, and the Chief of the Political Section, who dealt in Communist Party affairs.

In Room 12 on the second floor, cypher clerk Igor Sergeievitch Gouzenko had charge of all of the important documents relating to Soviet Military Intelligence in Canada. The code books which he used almost hourly were placed in a sealed sack every night, and were locked in the big steel safes along with the daily cable files to Moscow and the diaries of the Military Attaché.

Gouzenko, a grave-eyed, serious young man of twenty-five, had been hand-picked for this highly responsible job. As a lieutenant in the Red Army he had undergone a long period of special training before being sent to Ottawa. Although he was not a Communist Party member, he had been a member of the Komsomol, or Young Communist League, and was a graduate of a special intelligence school conducted by the General Staff of the Red Army. He had seen front service, too—a long year of action in 1942, including the winter campaigns before Moscow. Finally, after a tour at the Main Intelligence Division of the Red Army, where his past behaviour, his political attitudes, and his reliability were subjected to exhaustive enquiry by the secret police, he was cleared for service abroad and was sent to Canada in June, 1943.

He had taken his wife with him—tall, dark-haired Svetlana Borisovna. They had come by air, via the polar route from Siberia, Alaska, and northern Canada. Soon after their arrival in Ottawa, their son, Andrei, had been born. They had a small flat at 511 Somerset Street, facing a park. The neighbours thought very highly of the young couple; they were courteous and dignified, and on the rare occasions on which they entertained they made the rounds of adjoining apartments on the following day to apologise for any disturbance they might have caused.

When he was sent out from Russia it was with the understanding that he was to be abroad for two to three years. However, in September, 1944, a little more than a year after his arrival in Canada, a cable was sent from Moscow requesting his return. Colonel Zabotin, his chief, replied that he could not be spared and nothing was heard of the matter until August, 1945. Then definite instructions came from Moscow that Gouzenko, his wife, and child must return.

With the habitual tense look of a man under iron discipline, Gouzenko's appearance gave no clue to his inward struggle. Life in Canada had made a very strong impression, an impression utterly different from what he had been led to expect. Later he was to make a detailed statement on his feelings. No matter in what light they are viewed, one thing was clear: he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union.

Burning in his memory were the words of Colonel Zabotin, the Soviet Military Attaché, who, at a mid-August staff conference at his Range Road headquarters, had said, "Yesterday they were allies, today neighbours, tomorrow they will be our enemies."

As code clerk he was in a position to see the detailed operations of an espionage system which was being directed against a country whose way of life he was learning to respect and admire.

During the month of August and the early part of September, 1945, he worked at fever pitch, certain that his contemplated betrayal of his own government would ultimately benefit the free peoples of the world. In the safe and in the code sacks he earmarked certain key documents. Some were cables, some were diaries. When torn scraps of paper were handed to him for burning, he saved these, too. Altogether they made a packet of considerable bulk. But by taking them away from the Embassy a few pieces at a time and hiding them beneath the dishes and inside the pots and pans in his kitchen, he hoped to avoid detection.

At eight o'clock on the evening of September 5, 1946, he prepared to leave the Embassy for the last time.

He had saved the bulkiest documents for the end. They made his pockets bulge beneath his topcoat, and he ran the risk of being stopped by the door guard, who was a member of the N.K.V.D. secret police.

When he locked up his office, he handed over his code bag to the chief of the coding division. The latter, suspecting nothing, affixed his own seals to the flaps and placed the bag in a special safe.

Gouzenko started for the door. It was not a long walk, and he had followed the same path past the closed doors of the other rooms for over two years without a second thought. But that night, burdened as he was by the knowledge of what he had done, and what yet remained, the hallway must have appeared to stretch to infinity, and the stairs without end. Before he realised it he was face to face with Gouzev, the doorman. The latter's cold professional eye must have taken in every

detail of the code clerk's appearance before he finally nodded and allowed him to pass.

In the street, Gouzenko walked away without a backward glance. Lost amongst the evening strollers, it is doubtful if his spare figure could have attracted any attention. Yet of all the individuals on the North American continent that evening none had more significant information to impart.

Carefully he had thought out his task. His intention was to reveal the Soviet plan to establish in Canada an espionage base for use against the Dominion, Great Britain, and the United States. To back up his assertions he had one hundred documents. In return he would ask the Canadian Government to protect his wife and child. For himself, he later related, he thought that before his mission was completed he stood an excellent chance of getting killed.¹

With steady strides he headed for Queen Street and the offices of the *Ottawa Journal*. It was then almost nine o'clock and the building vibrated with the roar of the giant presses preparing the early morning edition. At the information desk he asked to see the editor.

"The editor is not in," he was told. "You can see one of his assistants."

To the latter Gouzenko explained that he had just left the Soviet Embassy and that he had information of the utmost importance, not only to the people of Canada, but to the peace and stability of the world. From a coat pocket he took some pink and blue flimsy sheets which were covered with Russian typescript. "I have many documents," he said. "They should be studied by you."

Their talk went on for almost an hour. So fantastic was Gouzenko's story, and so strange was his collection of documents, that the newspaperman who interviewed him was completely at a loss.

Finally he said, "If you have information about spies, you'd better go to the police. They are the people to handle that sort of thing, not a newspaper."

¹ According to the Criminal Code of the U.S.S.R. (Official Text with Amendments up to September 1, 1943, Moscow, 1943), "Refusal of a citizen of the U.S.S.R. or of an official of a state institution or organisation of the U.S.S.R. active abroad, to return within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. at the suggestion of organs of state authority, is regarded as going over to the camp of enemies of the working class and the peasantry, and is classified as treason." Persons refusing to return are "declared outside the law." Punishment entails "(a) confiscation of all property of the guilty person, (b) shooting of the guilty person within twenty-four hours after the establishment of his identity."

It was then almost ten o'clock. Gouzenko realised that not until noon of the next day would his non-appearance at the Embassy arouse any suspicions. Accordingly, he decided to go home, have a night's rest, and start out fresh the following morning.

He arrived home at about ten thirty, and kissed his wife tenderly.

"I've done it," he said, "but there's nothing to worry about for the present."

"Are you sure you were not followed?"

"Yes—besides there was no reason to suspect me."

"But tomorrow . . .?" Svetlana Gouzenko left the sentence unfinished.

"Tomorrow we must be very careful." He spoke the words slowly, as if their importance could not be overemphasised.

Together they talked over what must be done. He took the documents from his pockets beneath his shirt, and rolled them up into a tight packet. Other papers he took from beneath the dishes in the kitchen cupboard where they had previously been concealed, and that night he slept with them beneath his pillow.

The next morning, September 6, was clear and cool. In the sharp blue of the sky the stately Parliament towers dominated the city, and toward this centre of governmental authority the Gouzenkos, man, wife, and child, hastened.

Their first stop was at the newspaper office where he had been rebuffed the previous night. Again he was told to report to the police. "But this is too important," he insisted. "It's a matter for the Government of Canada itself."

"Then go to the Ministry of Justice," he was told. "Speak to those people about it."

The Justice Building on Wellington Street is a tall, chateau-type structure, honeycombed with offices. Eventually, Gouzenko found himself in the anteroom of the Crown Attorney, Raoul Mercier.²

² Apparently Gouzenko also appealed for help to the Minister of Justice himself, for on March 19, 1946, the Rt. Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent told the House of Commons: "On the morning of September 6, he [Gouzenko] came to my secretary and asked for an interview. Being unknown to my secretary and as is the practice he was asked to state what his business was. When afterwards I was informed as to what his business was I immediately said I could not receive an official from a friendly Embassy bearing tales of the kind he had described to my secretary. It was only after he was brought in contact with the police through the ordinary course of police work that they were permitted to listen to his story and take notes from him." (House of Commons Debates, March 19, 1946. Pages 91, 97.)

Here he spoke to Mrs. Fernande Joubarne, secretary to Mr. Mercier, explaining what he had done and what he proposed to do. He had his wife open her handbag in which the documents now reposed.

"Everything is here," he said, "including secret information on the atomic bomb. You must tell your Government about this."

"The Crown Attorney is in court at the moment," said Mrs. Joubarne, "but I will try to put you in touch with the proper people."

The channels and protocol of bureaucracy are rigid and unvarying, but a determined secretary can in emergency assume the moral, if not the actual, authority of her chief. Thanks to Mrs. Joubarne's perseverance phones began to ring from one office to another until finally the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, was apprised of the matter. Robertson, appreciating at once the sensational possibilities inherent in any such revelations as Gouzenko promised to disclose, decided to seek instructions from the Prime Minister.

Reaching the Prime Minister on the morning of September 6 could not have been more unfortunate from the standpoint of timing. It was the day set for the opening of a new session of Parliament, when the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod would knock three times on the door of the House of Commons, and with traditional pageantry the Prime Minister and his associates would proceed to the Senate Chamber and return to choose a Speaker. It was a ceremony inherited from the Mother of Parliaments and deviation was unthinkable.

At eleven o'clock the Commons were seated in their chamber. The Clerk and the Clerk Assistant were at their large table in the centre. It remained only for Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to enter and the ceremonies to begin. The doughty veteran of Canadian politics was in a cloakroom off the main floor when an aide came up, whispered a few words into his ear. Mackenzie King looked at his watch, raised his eyebrows, but went to the telephone. It was Undersecretary Robertson. He said that he had a matter which only the Prime Minister could decide. A young man had come from the Russian Embassy to the Minister of Justice with documents which he said would disclose a situation threatening the safety of Canada. The documents were reported to have been removed from the vaults of the Soviet Embassy. What was to be done?

Mackenzie King must have tried to look beyond the excitement

of the moment to foresee some of the pitfalls and dangers which might lie ahead. As he later explained to the House of Commons: "I replied that I thought this was a case where we could not be too careful or too cautious; that this man represented that he had come from the Russian Embassy; that we could not say whether the documents he had in his possession were fabrications or not; that we did not know what his own state of mind might be, or how responsible he was; that we knew nothing of the circumstances which had caused him to leave the Embassy and come to the Government and that I thought he should be told to go back to the Embassy with the papers that he had in his possession."³

When the Prime Minister finally entered the House, the Honourable Members may have noticed that he seemed preoccupied. Not for many months were they to know what had caused his delayed appearance, or the thoughts that were going through his mind.

Meanwhile the Gouzenkos waited. Since he was with both parents together during the daytime, little Andrei probably thought that it was a holiday of some sort. He was busy making friends with Mrs. Joubarne and the stenographers in the Crown Attorney's office when the message came from the Undersecretary for External Affairs:

"The Prime Minister has advised to get rid of those people at once."

³ House of Commons Debates, Monday, March 18, 1946. Page 48.

Chapter Two

THE NEIGHBOURS

MRS. JOUBARNE was a loyal public servant. She was also a human being. When Mrs. Gouzenko began to cry softly and hug her child to her bosom, she realised what it would mean if the code clerk and his family were to be turned back to the Embassy.

Accordingly, after consulting with Crown Attorney Raoul Mercier, she began to make a series of telephone calls. She kept at it until late afternoon. Everywhere it was the same story—Gouzenko and his documents were too hot to handle. One by one the government offices began to close for the day and finally Mrs. Joubarne was forced to admit failure.

Gouzenko thanked her. "You have been so kind—you were the only one who would talk to us," he said. "We will never forget you."

Then they left the Justice Building. Although Gouzenko knew that his absence must have raised an alarm at the Embassy, he decided to bring his wife and child back to Somerset Street.

They went into the house by the back entrance. When they reached their flat Gouzenko stepped to the window. Concealing himself in the shadow, he looked toward the park across the street. Seated on a bench opposite he saw what he had feared—two men wearing loose-fitting brown trenchcoats and hats with brims too small for their high cheekbones and square faces. They sat with their hands in their pockets and looked up toward his windows.

As he watched they put their heads together. Then one got up and came across the street.

The code clerk stepped back, motioned for silence. Footsteps were heard in the corridor, and a moment later there was a knock on the door.

"Gouzenko—*otcroite dwer*. [Open the door.]" It was Under-lieutenant Lavrientev of the Embassy staff.

Both the cypher clerk and his wife held their breath. Little Andrei

had run across the floor toward a toy teddy bear. He tripped, stumbled against the door.

Gouzenko picked up the child, went to the kitchen of his flat, and out of the back door leading to the rear balcony shared in common with Apartment 5 on the second floor.

Here were seated an R.C.A.F. sergeant and his wife. The man was smoking a pipe and reading the evening paper, while his wife was sewing.

"Excuse me," interrupted Gouzenko. "May I speak with you?"

The sergeant looked up in surprise. There was something about Gouzenko's appearance that told him this was no ordinary social call.

"Sure, man. What is it?"

"Please to take my little boy with you tonight—something maybe happen to my wife and me."

"What's going to happen?"

"Get killed," was the laconic reply.

"So about that time," the sergeant related later, "I figured that maybe we should go inside. We went into our flat and he said he figured that the Russians were going to try to kill him and his wife. He wanted to be sure that somebody would look after his little boy if anything should happen to them.

"After a bit of a conference my wife and I decided that we didn't want to see him stuck with nobody to look after him."

Meanwhile Underlieutenant Lavrientev must have been sorely puzzled. He had heard sounds of movement inside the flat, yet no one had answered his knock. Only a flimsy brass tumbler and thin veneer panel separated him—an official of the U.S.S.R.—from the code clerk and his family. Yet his instructions had said nothing about breaking down doors. He had merely been told to watch for Gouzenko and report back to the Embassy if and when he or his family were seen. He left the floor, went downstairs, and began to circle the house from the rear to see if Gouzenko had gone out through the back entrance.

Gouzenko and the R.C.A.F. sergeant were standing on the balcony when they saw Lavrientev walking down the lane. The code clerk paled. "There he is," he whispered. "Perhaps you had better take my wife in your apartment as well."

As they were talking a motherly-looking housewife who lived in Apartment 6 on the same floor appeared. Hearing the story, she said,

"I am alone in my flat. I have plenty of room for all of your family, including yourself, Mr. Gouzenko. I will be very happy to give you shelter as long as you require it."

"That settles it," said the sergeant. "You go along with her. I'll get my bike and go for the police. Those fellows will not dare break into the house of a Canadian citizen."

That was at seven o'clock. At half-past seven, Constables Tom Walsh and J. B. McCullough responded to the call.

In Apartment 6 they found Gouzenko, his wife, and child. The code clerk identified himself as a member of the Soviet Embassy staff, said that he had information of extreme importance to the Canadian Government, and requested protection.

The constables listened without committing themselves. They assured him, however, that they would watch the block of flats.

"Keep the light on in the bathroom. We can see it from the park. If you need us, put out the light."

Then they went to a concealed position in the park.

In Apartment 6, Mrs. Gouzenko prepared their child for bed. Her husband sat in a living-room chair listening for a sound of movement in the corridor outside.

At ten o'clock his hostess urged him to lie down on the couch and get some sleep. He thanked her but said that he thought it would be better if he remained awake. "Something will happen tonight. I know those people too well. I am sure they are planning a raid."

With each passing hour his alertness sharpened. He could picture only too clearly what was happening at the Embassy—all lights burning, the code rooms in a turmoil, the staff trying to discover if anything was missing from the files. The code name for the N.K.V.D. was "the Neighbours." He wondered particularly what their reaction would be.

As it was, four men left the embassy at eleven o'clock. They were Vitali G. Pavlov, Second Secretary and Consul and secret head of the N.K.V.D. in Canada; Lieutenant Colonel Rogov, Military Air Attaché of the Red Air Force; Lieutenant Angelov; and Alexander Farafotnov, a cypher clerk who occupied the office next door to Gouzenko, and who had specialised in N.K.V.D. communications. As they crossed the pavement to their car they looked like a guard detail, minus the prisoner in the centre.

At eleven-thirty they were at 511 Somerset Street. They went at

once to Gouzenko's flat, knocked on the door. The R.C.A.F. sergeant in Apartment 4 thought that it was the police returning for a further inquiry. He opened his door and looked out.

Seeing the three men in plain clothes and one in uniform with Red Star insignia, he realised his error. Before he could close his door, however, one of the men ran up to him.

"Where is Gouzenko?"

The R.C.A.F. sergeant gave him a blank look. "You got me, buddy," he said, and shut the door tight.

There was a conference in the hall, and the four men started to leave. They went downstairs; then they came back with a rush. They knocked once on Apartment 4, put their shoulders to the door, and pushed. The lock gave way with a snap.

From Apartment 6 Gouzenko watched the proceedings through the keyhole. He got up, went to the bathroom, switched out the light.

In the park the police constables caught the signal. They ran to the block of flats and went up the stairs at the double. In Apartment 4 they found all of the lights on and all of the closet doors open. Pavlov was in one and Colonel Rogov was in another.

"What are you people doing here?" demanded Walsh.

Pavlov motioned his companions to be quiet. He produced a card identifying himself as the Soviet Second Secretary. He said that all present were members of the Embassy staff, who were looking for certain official papers.

"The man who owns this flat has left town, but we have his permission to enter and get what we need."

Walsh pointed to the broken lock, part of which still lay on the floor. "For people that have permission to enter a flat you certainly chose a funny way to get in." He picked up the lock from the floor. "This doesn't look as if it had been done with a key. You must have used a bit of pressure to get in. From what I've seen of the door you didn't open it with your fingers."

Pavlov shrugged. "We lost the key," he replied. "There is something in here which we have to get. This is Soviet property, and we can do as we wish. You will please leave."

The constables shook their heads. "Not until an inspector arrives," they replied.

Detective Inspector Duncan Macdonald, a rugged, ruddy-cheeked man, arrived within a quarter of an hour after Walsh called head-

quarters. After sizing up the situation he asked Pavlov and the others to accompany him to the police station.

Pavlov claimed diplomatic immunity for himself, his associates, and the flat. He refused to budge. The inspector, realising that he had stumbled on what he later called a "delicate" situation, told Walsh and McCullough to remain while he went to headquarters to clarify the diplomatic status.

When he had gone, Consul Pavlov held a conference with his group. After further poking about in the closets he decided to call it a night. The police made no effort to detain them, and they went back to the Soviet Embassy. What happened there has not been disclosed.

For the rest of the night the Gouzenkos remained in Apartment 6 under the watchful care of the city police. Toward dawn there was another caller at Apartment 4. He knocked and tried the door but the police had padlocked it, and after a while he went away. Shortly after daybreak on September 7, the Gouzenkos and their documents were moved from Somerset Street to the headquarters of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Since the Prime Minister had already turned down the code clerk's original offer, Commissioner S. T. Wood personally notified Mackenzie King of the events of the preceding evening and the protection being accorded by his force.

Again the Prime Minister pointed out the need for proceeding with caution. "I felt that the situation with which we were confronted could not be viewed too circumspectly. I felt that we must make sure what type of person Gouzenko was, and what the motive was that prompted his action. . . . One had to consider other nations as well as one's own before taking a step that might be considered premature."¹

The enquiry proceeded in the order outlined by the Prime Minister. Gouzenko told Commissioner Wood and his Deputy, H. A. Gagnon, that he would be glad to explain his decision to leave the Soviet Embassy. His statement is reproduced below for whatever light it may shed on his motives:

I, Igor Gouzenko, wish to make the following statement of my own will:

Having arrived in Canada two years ago I was surprised

¹ House of Commons Debates, March 18, 1946. Pages 48, 50.

during the first days by the complete freedom of the individual which exists in Canada but does not exist in Russia. The false representations about the democratic countries which are increasingly propagated in Russia were dissipated daily, as no lying propaganda can stand up against facts.

During two years of life in Canada, I saw evidence of what a free people can do. What the Canadian people have accomplished and are accomplishing here under conditions of complete freedom the Russian people, under the conditions of the Soviet regime of violence and suppression of all freedom, cannot accomplish even at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, blood, and tears.

The last elections which took place recently in Canada especially surprised me. In comparison with them the system of elections in Russia appears as a mockery of the conception of free elections. For example, the fact that in elections in the Soviet Union one candidate is put forward, so that the possibilities of choice are eliminated, speaks for itself.

While creating a false picture of the conditions of life in these countries, the Soviet Government at the same time is taking all measures to prevent the peoples of democratic countries from knowing about the conditions of life in Russia. The facts about the brutal suppression of the freedom of speech, the mockery of the real religious feelings of the people, cannot penetrate into the democratic countries.

Having imposed its communist regime on the people, the Government of the Soviet Union asserts that the Russian people have, as it were, their own particular understanding of freedom and democracy, different from that which prevails among the peoples of the western democracies. *This is a lie.** The Russian people have the same understanding of freedom as all the peoples of the world. However, the Russian people cannot realise their dream of freedom and a democratic government on account of cruel terror and persecution.

Holding forth at international conferences with voluble statements about peace and security, the Soviet Government is simultaneously preparing secretly for the third world war. To meet this war, the Soviet Government is creating in demo-

* Underlined in original document.

cratic countries, including Canada, a *fifth column* * in the organisation of which even the diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Government take part.

The announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern was probably the greatest farce of the Communists in recent years. Only the name was liquidated, with the object of reassuring the public opinion in the democratic countries. Actually the Comintern exists and continues its work, because the Soviet leaders have never relinquished the idea of establishing a communist dictatorship throughout the world.

Taking into account least of all that this advantageous idea will cost millions of Russian lives, the Communists are engendering hatred in the Russian people toward everything foreign.

To many Soviet people here abroad, *it is clear that the Communist Party in democratic countries has changed long ago from a political party into an agency net of the Soviet Government, into a fifth column in these countries to meet a war,** into an instrument in the hands of the Soviet Government for creating artificial unrest, provocation, etc., etc.

Through numerous party agitators the Soviet Government stirs up the Russian people in every possible way against the peoples of the democratic countries, preparing the ground for the third world war.

During my residence in Canada I have seen how the Canadian people and their Government, sincerely wishing to help the Soviet people, sent supplies to the Soviet Union, collected money for the welfare of the Russian people, sacrificing the lives of their sons in the delivery of these supplies across the ocean, and instead of gratitude for the help rendered, the Soviet Government is developing espionage activity in Canada, preparing to deliver a stab in the back of Canada—all this without the knowledge of the Russian people.

Convinced that such double-faced politics of the Soviet Government toward the democratic countries do not conform with the interests of the Russian people and endanger the security of civilisation, I decided to break away from the Soviet regime and to announce my decision openly.

I am glad that I found the strength within myself to take

this step and to warn Canada and the other democratic countries of the danger which hangs over them.

(signed) GOUZENKO.

I have read the foregoing translation which was made from my original statement in Russian, and have found it to be correct.

October 10, 1945

(signed) GOUZENKO.

In conversation with the Commissioners, Gouzenko added that in the Embassy the fact that the Soviet Union was preparing for a third world war was freely discussed. He said that there were two schools of thought on the matter. Those who were not really tied in with the Communist Party feared another world war. Those who were ardent members of the Party and its subsidiary organisations really wished for it because they considered it to be a part of the process leading to a general world upheaval resulting in the establishment of Communism.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Embassy was not idle. To the Canadian Department of External Affairs it addressed a note, dated September 7.

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Canada presents its compliments and has the honour to inform the Department of External Affairs of the following:

A colleague of the Embassy, Igor Sergeievitch Gouzenko, living at 511 Somerset Street, failed to report for work at the proper time on the 6th September.

In connection with this and for the purpose of clarifying the reasons for the failure of I. Gouzenko's reporting for work Consul V. G. Pavlov and two other colleagues of the Embassy visited the apartment of I. Gouzenko at 11:30 on the 6th September.

When Mr. Pavlov knocked at the door of Gouzenko's apartment no one answered. After this the apartment was opened by the above-mentioned colleagues of the Embassy with Gouzenko's duplicate key, when it was discovered that neither Gouzenko, nor his wife, Svetlana Borisovna Gouzenko, nor their son Andrei, were in the apartment.

It was later established that I. Gouzenko had robbed some

money belonging to the Embassy and had hidden himself together with his family.

At the time when Consul Pavlov and two other colleagues of the Embassy were in Gouzenko's apartment, i.e., about 11:30 p.m., Constable Walsh of the Ottawa City Police appeared together with another policeman and tried in a rude manner to detain the diplomatic colleagues of the Embassy, in spite of the explanations given by Consul Pavlov and the showing of diplomatic cards.

As a result of the protest expressed by Mr. Pavlov, Walsh called Inspector of the City Police Macdonald, who appeared at the Gouzenko apartment in fifteen minutes, and also in a rude manner demanded that Consul V. G. Pavlov and the other diplomatic colleagues of the Embassy go with him to the police station, refusing to recognise the diplomatic card shown by Consul Pavlov.

Upon the refusal of Mr. V. G. Pavlov to go to the police station, Mr. Macdonald went away, leaving a policeman in the Gouzenko apartment with the colleagues of the Embassy, for the alleged purpose of finding out who it was who had notified the police of the forced entry into the Gouzenko apartment.

Consul V. G. Pavlov and the other two colleagues of the Embassy, after waiting for Mr. MacDonald to return for 15 minutes, left, having locked the Gouzenko apartment.

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. asks the Department of External Affairs to take urgent measures to seek and arrest I. Gouzenko and to hand him over for deportation as a capital criminal who has stolen money belonging to the Embassy.

In addition the Embassy brings to the attention of the Department of External Affairs the rude treatment accorded to the diplomatic colleagues of the Embassy by Constable Walsh and Inspector of the City Police Macdonald, and expresses its confidence that the Department will investigate this incident and will make those guilty answerable for their actions.

The Embassy asks the Department that it should be informed of action taken in relation to the above.

Ottawa, 7th September, 1945.

The Department of External Affairs was very much interested in that note, especially the portion designating Gouzenko as a "capital criminal who has stolen money belonging to the Embassy." In its reply, the Department asked for particulars concerning the funds and their theft. The Embassy made no answer. Instead, on September 14, it sent a second note. Pitched to a higher degree of urgency, it read:

Confirming its communication in the Note No. 35 of September 7, of the fact that Gouzenko had robbed public funds, the Embassy, upon instructions from the Government of the U.S.S.R., repeats its request to the Government of Canada to apprehend Gouzenko and his wife, and without trial to hand them over to the Embassy for deportation to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of Canada will fulfil its request.

By that time, however, matters had gone too far. The hundred documents were telling their story and the Government of Canada had no intention of handing Gouzenko over to anyone.

Chapter Three

"QUESTIONED" DOCUMENTS

THE documents brought by Gouzenko were of all colours, shapes, and sizes. One glance at them told the officials that the task of translating, sorting, and checking was going to be a large one. It was decided to set up a special headquarters on the outskirts of Ottawa at Rockcliffe Barracks, where there were unparalleled facilities for secrecy and rapid communication. An R.C.A.F. training field adjoined the property, and the barracks had its own hangars and runways. The innermost buildings were surrounded by a high steel fence. Since it was the training school for posts in eastern Canada, the place swarmed with red-coated Mounties at all hours.

Here the Anti-Espionage Squad, led by Inspector John Leopold, began to uncover a story of intrigue, conspiracy, and betrayal without equal in the history of the continent.

Leopold, an "unknown," dogged man of infinite patience, had made a career of undercover work and counter-espionage. After the fashion of the Mounties, as little as possible has appeared in print about him. He stood five feet five inches tall, with graying hair, brown eyes, high-bridged nose, and ruddy complexion. His ears were prominent, and he had a habit of tugging them when confronted with a knotty problem. During the days and nights that followed, his friends said that his ears began to resemble a beagle's.

Dozens of the papers were handwritten in Russian. Gouzenko claimed that they were the writings of Colonel Zabotin, the Military Attaché; Lieutenant Colonel Rogov, the Military Attaché for Air; and Lieutenant Colonel Motinov, the Assistant Military Attaché. Initially these papers were given the routine treatment accorded questioned documents and Inspector Leopold ordered his men to check the different homes where these officers had been entertained by Canadian friends. At one, a shooting lodge, a guest book was obtained.

It bore the title "Friends of Ours." In it were the signatures and thanks of various Canadian and foreign officials who had been guests. On October 15, 1944, Colonel Zabotin has signed his name, and on October 26 Rogov and Motinov penned a little line telling their host how much they had enjoyed his hospitality. A police handwriting expert compared the penmanship with the Embassy documents and stated flatly that Gouzenko had brought genuine writings of the three officials.

There were other tests as well. Gouzenko brought four pieces of ordinary notepaper containing what appeared to be a schoolchild's homework. They were in fact exact copies of secret telegrams which had originated in the office of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, and had been dispatched to the office of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. They were but a few weeks old, dated August 24, 25, and 31, and contained highly important information which was supposed to be known only to the British and Canadian Governments. The problem no longer was that of establishing the veracity of Gouzenko, but rather of protecting the innermost security channels of the Canadian Government. Unless this was done speedily not only Dominion secrets, but those which affected the security of the United States and Great Britain would be dangerously compromised.

As each document was translated, it was filed according to its subject. The titles themselves were ominous—Atomic Weapons, Radar, Secret Explosives, False Passports, Diplomatic Messages. Under the constant scrutiny of Inspector Leopold, the folder pertaining to atomic energy secrets was growing painfully thick. Yet until every item had been tabulated, no direct action could be initiated. It was a strange position for a hard-hitting law enforcement officer to find himself in and it was even stranger for the Canadian Government itself. In the thirty-three centuries of historically recorded espionage, such a carefully documented plot had never before been presented to the victim nation in one package. It was almost an embarrassment of riches. The list of codes names for secret agents alone ran to three printed pages. "Alek . . . Back . . . Badeau . . . Chester . . . Davie . . . Elli . . . Foster . . . Gray," and so on through the alphabet, went the cover designations for Russian, Canadian, British, and American citizens.

By September 21, Commissioner Wood of the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police was able to announce that the experts working with Inspector Leopold were ready to brief the Prime Minister at the latter's convenience.

Military staffs working under the rigorous pressure of active campaigns find that they require simple visual aids for the digesting of complicated military, political, and economic questions. In view of the complexity of the spy network, it was decided to resort to similar means to present the salient facts to Mr. Mackenzie King and his chief aides. Charts and diagrams were prepared, the files were indexed, and at the appointed time they were wheeled on portable stands into the room adjoining the Prime Minister's suite. Only a half dozen individuals at the very apex of the Canadian Government were permitted to enter.

When the Prime Minister was seated, the briefing officer stepped to a chart, and began:

"Your Excellency:—The evidence establishes that a network of under cover agents has been organised and developed for the purpose of obtaining secret and confidential information particularly from employees of departments and agencies of the Dominion Government and from the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada . . .

"These operations were carried on by certain members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa under direct instructions from Moscow."

The briefing officer's pointer moved to the top of the chart. "The person directly in charge of these operations was Colonel Zabotin, Military Attaché of the Embassy." The pointer moved one line lower. "He had as his active assistants in this work Lieutenant Colonel Motinov, Chief Assistant Military Attaché; Lieutenant Colonel Rogov, Assistant Military Attaché for Air; Major Sokolov of the staff of the Commercial Counselor of the Embassy; Lieutenant Angelov, one of the Secretaries of the Military Attaché, all of whom, as well as the agents whom they employed, were, in the interests of secrecy, known by undercover names.

"Each of the dossiers compiled by the staff of the Military Attaché with respect to the Canadian agents contains this significant question: 'Length of time in net?' We think that the word 'net' well describes the organisation."

The briefing officer stepped back while an assistant moved a second

chart into place. This outlined the “tasks” established for the spy ring. Once more the pointer began to move :

(1) As described in telegrams from “The Director” at Moscow addressed to Colonel Zabotin under his cover name of “Grant,” the specific programme of espionage concerned:

(a) The technological processes and methods employed by Canadians and the British for the production of explosives and chemical materials.

(b) Instructions as to which of the members of the Staff of the Military Attaché should contact particular Canadian agents and the suggestion of names of persons in the Department of National Defence for Naval Affairs who might act as agents.

(c) Information as to the transfer of the American troops from Europe to the United States and the Pacific, also the location of the Army Headquarters of the 9th Army, the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 13th Army Corps, the 18th Armoured Division, the 2nd, 4th, 8th, 28th, 30th, 44th, 45th, 104th Infantry Divisions, and the 13th Tank Division, together with the dates of their moves, the location of the Army Headquarters of the 8th and 16th Armoured Corps, the 29th and 89th Infantry Divisions, the 10th Tank Division, and the location of the Brazilian Infantry division . . . the location of the 1st Parachute Troops and the plans for their future use.

(d) Instructions to . . . obtain particulars as to the materials of which the atomic bomb is composed, its technological process and drawings.

(2) As described in writings under the hands of Zabotin, Motinov, and Rogov, during the period March to August, 1945, we find that they were ordered to :

(a) Obtain from the National Research Council models of developed radar sets, photographs, technical data, periodic reports characterising the radar work carried on by the Council and future developments planned by the Council.

(b) Particulars of the explosives establishment at Valcartier and its work, including the formulae of explosives and samples.

(c) A full report on the organisation and personnel of the National Research Council. . . .

(e) Documents from the library of the National Research Council so that they might be photographed, with the expressed intention of ultimately obtaining the whole of the library.

Mr. Mackenzie King and his aides must have recalled another dark hour during the winter of 1942 when the toll of mid-Atlantic shipping losses had echoed in the same room. Each knew the significance of the last statement—for the National Research Council was the custodian of atomic energy secrets.

Like a surgeon lecturing dispassionately before a group of colleagues, the briefing officer continued :

(f) Particulars as to the plant at Chalk River, Ontario, and the processing of uranium.

(g) A sample of uranium 235, with details as to the plant where it is produced.

(h) Specifications of the electro-projector of the "V" bomb. . . .

(j) Material on the American airplane radar locator type, navigation periscope.

(k) A list of Canadian Army Divisions which have returned from overseas and the names, or numbers, of divisions which have been reshaped. . . .

(m) Information from the Department of Munitions and Supply of various kinds relating to guns, shells, small arms, ammunition, arsenals, optical and radio appliances, automobiles and tanks, chemical warfare apparatus, and particulars of plants producing same.

(n) Information as to electronic shells used by the American Navy. . . .

(p) Information with regard to depth charges and double-charge shells.

(q) Telegrams passing into and out of the Department of External Affairs and the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

The briefing officer paused, added a word of caution. "It must not be assumed that this list is exhaustive. It merely illustrates the variety and scope of the operations." He was about to step aside when the Prime Minister caught his eye.

“May I ask to what extent these objectives have been achieved?”

The briefing officer kept his face wooden, his voice matter-of-fact.

“Sir, there were few failures.”

As the meaning of the reply sank in, the group of high government officials sat in silence.

“Am I to understand then that some of the details of the atomic weapon have been disclosed?” asked the Prime Minister.

The briefing officer stepped forward with a manila folder. “Here is the file, sir. The cables starting with Number 218 appear to cover that point. “Grant” is the cover name for Colonel Zabotin—everything else is self-explanatory.”

Mr. Mackenzie King adjusted his glasses, scanned the document.

To Grant

No. 10458

Reference No. 218

30.7.45

Try to get from Alek before departure detailed information on the progress of the work on uranium. Discuss with him: Does he think it expedient for our undertaking to stay on the spot; will he be able to do that or is it more useful for him and necessary to depart for London?

Director 28.7.45

“Who is ‘Alek’?” demanded the Prime Minister.

The briefing officer shrugged. “His identity has not yet been established, sir. Apparently he is a scientist very close to the centre of the work, otherwise he could not deliver the information reflected in the other cables. If you turn to Number 241, sir, you will see that for yourself.”

Number 241 was from “Grant” to Moscow. It read:

To the Director,

No. 241

Facts given by Alek:

(1) The test of the atomic bomb was conducted in New Mexico (with ‘49,’ ‘94-239’). The bomb dropped on Japan was made of uranium 235. It is known that the output of uranium 235 amounts to 400 grams daily at the magnetic separation plant at Clinton. The output of ‘49’ is likely to be two times greater (some graphite units are planned for 250 mega watts, i.e., 250 grams each day). The scientific research work in this field is scheduled to be published, but without the

technical details. The Americans already have a published book on this subject.

(2) Alek handed over to us a platinum with 162 micrograms of uranium 233 in the form of oxide in a thin lamina. We have had no news about the mail.

9.7.45

Grant.

“Apparently Moscow did not answer this cable, for on August 31, Colonel Zabotin sent Number 275 as a follow-up.”

To the Director

No. 275

I beg you to inform me to what extent have Alek's materials on the question of uranium satisfied you and our scientists. . . .

This is necessary for us to know in order that we may be able to set forth a number of tasks on this question to other clients.

31.8.45

Grant.

“There is other evidence,” continued the briefing officer, “which shows that he has delivered a glass tube containing U-235.”

“How long ago was this?”

“Only last month, sir. According to Gouzenko they were flown by special courier directly to Moscow. However, according to cable number 244 and Moscow's reply Alek should be in London on October 7 attempting to contact a Soviet representative there. I think you'll find 244 contains some very interesting clues.”

Cable 244 was dated three weeks previously, August 31. It was from “Grant” to Moscow.

To the Director:

We have worked out the conditions of a meeting with Alek in London. Alek will work in King's College, Strand. It will be possible to find him there through the telephone book.

Meetings: October 7, 17, 27 on the street in front of the British Museum. The time, 11 o'clock in the evening. Identification sign, a newspaper under the left arm. Password, Best regards to Mikel. He [Alek] cannot remain in Canada. At the beginning of September he must fly to London. Before his departure he will go to the uranium plant in the Petawawa district, where he will be for about two weeks. He promised, if

possible, to meet us before his departure. He said that he must come next year for a month to Canada. We handed over 500 dollars to him.

Grant.

Cable 11955, in reply, read:

To Grant

Reference No. 244

The arrangements worked out for the meeting are not satisfactory. I am informing you of new ones.

1. Place:

In front of the British Museum in London, on Great Russell Street, at the opposite side of the street, about Museum Street, from the side of Tottenham Court Road, repeat Tottenham Court Road, Alek walks from Tottenham Court Road, the contact man from the opposite side—Southampton Row.

2. Time:

As indicated by you, however, it would be more expedient to carry out the meeting at eight o'clock, if it should be convenient to Alek as at eleven o'clock it is too dark. As for the time, agree about it with Alek, and communicate the decision to me. In case the meeting should not take place in October, the time and day will be repeated in the following months.

3. Identification signs:

Alek will have under his left arm the newspaper "*Times*." The contact man will have in his left hand the magazine "*Picture Post*."

4. The password:

The contact man: "What is the shortest way to the Strand?" Alek: "Well, come along, I'm going that way." In the beginning of the business conversation, Alek says: "Best regards from Mikel."

Report on transmitting the conditions to Alek.

18.8

Director.

To the Prime Minister's group the messages must have seemed more appropriate to a cloak-and-dagger novelette than to the official

briefing room. Yet one thing was clear. In view of the secrecy surrounding the atomic weapon, the identification and apprehension of "Alek" was a matter of utmost urgency. Otherwise every security measure which had protected its development and manufacture might be utterly valueless.

Although it was apparent that "Alek" had left for London in early September, the mention of King's College, Strand, was a vital clue. Mr. Mackenzie King decided that the situation was of a nature which required personal consultations with President Truman and Mr. Clement Attlee.

"I felt it was my duty, regardless of what might come, to inform immediately the United States and Great Britain of what had been disclosed and to let those countries know of my Government's intention to have the matter investigated. I felt my first duty was to visit my immediate neighbour, the United States, and see the President personally." For, as he explained, "Information of this kind cannot be easily trusted to telegraphic communication."¹

On September 28, 1945, Mr. Mackenzie King, together with Mr. Norman Robertson and administrative aides Mr. W. D. Mathews and Mr. A. D. E. Handy, left Ottawa. On the following day there was a conference with President Truman in Washington. Here the broad outlines of the Soviet spy plot and its bearing on United States defence plans were discussed. That same night orders went out from the White House instructing Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to arrange for close liaison with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police during the critical days that were to follow.

Only then did the Canadian Prime Minister board the luxury liner *Queen Mary* at New York. To the press the trip appeared routine. Few newspapers even mentioned it. In the *New York Times* it received hardly more space than a recipe for meatless sausage: "To get first-hand information and to establish Canada's right to effective participation in decisions affecting the general ordering of the future peace, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced that he intended to start on an informal and if necessary extended visit to the United Kingdom and Western Europe."

It was almost midnight before the *Queen Mary* got under way. With a long warning blast she slid stern first into mid-Hudson where tugs nuzzled to swing her about. The captain, watching the procedure

¹ House of Commons Debates, March 18, 1946. Page 50.

silently from the bridge, looked to the wheelhouse, nodded. The engine-room telegraph jangled. Giant propellers began to churn their way forward. Thus began one of the strange journeys of history—that of a head of a Government personally crossing the Atlantic to trap a secret agent.

Chapter Four

ALEK

THE *Queen Mary* was due to dock at Southampton early on the morning of October 6, 1945. Some hours before, The Prime Minister of Canada and his party prepared to disembark. Their luggage was moved below decks to a spot near the bulkhead door. As the ranking diplomatic officials they would be the first to leave on their strange mission which allowed them but twenty-four hours to discover and, if possible, seize the spy known as "Alek" who was suspected of delivering atomic energy secrets to Soviet agents.

Yet the Prime Minister's place in the spotlight was such that he dared not hurry. To the British newshawks who swarmed aboard the ship he had to present an aspect of dignified, granitelike calm. His dispatch cases contained documents which later would blaze into banner headlines, but his task at the moment was to disclaim the importance of his trip.

How well he succeeded may be judged by the press report that he had "no special programme for the visit, but desired to talk things over with as many persons as possible."

The Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, was at Chequers, his 1500-acre country residence. Through diplomatic channels, Mr. Attlee had been advised only of the urgency, but not of the substance, of Mr. Mackenzie King's trip. Hence he invited him to come at once to the historic country seat. The precise nature of their conversations has not been disclosed, except for Mr. Mackenzie King's later statement that: "I told him what I thought he should be told immediately of what had been discovered."

That this included the "Alek" cables goes without saying.

When the King's First Minister calls for police assistance, it may be assumed that he does not have to go to the nearest station and complain to the sergeant. In this case, before many hours had passed, the Senior Commissioner of Scotland Yard, Sir Harold Scott, K.C.B.,

K.B.E., and his Deputy, Colonel the Hon. Sir Maurice Drummond, K.B.E., had hastened to Chequers.

To Lt. Col. Leonard Burt of the Special Branch of Scotland Yard they decided to give the mission of identifying "Alek" and supervising the clandestine meeting in front of the British Museum.

As he sat in his cubbyhole office Colonel Burt sent for Detective Inspector William Whitehead. Together they went over the clues presented by the Moscow cables.

One priceless bit of information was: "Alek will work in King's College, Strand."

"If he knows anything at all about atomic energy, the chances are that he is a physicist, so let us find out whether any of that particular faculty has been to Canada recently," said Burt.

When they left the greystone precincts of the "Yard," Burt and Whitehead found London under a pall of yellow-grey fog which obscured all but the shadowy outlines of the stately government buildings along Whitehall. It lent their figures the air of having stepped straight from the pages of Conan Doyle.

But they were real enough—Burt, a typical lean-jawed, thin-lipped army officer, and Whitehead, a burly, ruddy-cheeked veteran of Scotland Yard. Both felt the raw damp of the fog and turned up the collars of their topcoats as they headed along the glistening pavements toward the Strand and Somerset House. Here, in the east wing, was the Registrar's Office of King's College. First they obtained the faculty list for the physics department. Next, under the guise of checking on customs declarations, they sought to discover which of the dozen or so professors, lecturers, and associates had recently returned from Canada.

Since the faculty, like most of the government officials, had dispersed for the week-end, they were in for a round of long-distance telephoning before they finally caught up with the head of the physics department. The answer, when it came, was so casual that it was an anticlimax.

"That would be Doctor May," said the head of the department. "He's been working with the Atomic Energy Project in Montreal as a group leader."

Colonel Burt thumbed through the pages of the Faculty Register.

"Mackall . . . Mallory . . . May . . . Dr. Allan Nunn May, University Reader, Stafford Terrace, Kensington, Senior Member of Nuclear Physics Division, Tube Alloys Research."

Was this the "Alek" of the secret Moscow cables?

His picture in the university files showed him to be a short, bald-headed man with rather small eyes, metal-rimmed glasses, and moustache. That this mild-looking individual was in a position to threaten the security of the atom bomb seemed almost incredible.

Nevertheless, the next step was clear.

Hard by the busy shopping district of Kensington High Street was Stafford Terrace, an unpretentious quiet street of low houses, shade trees, and grass plots. Before night had fallen hidden eyes were in position to view the bespectacled physicist.

Arrangements were also made to cover the vicinity of the great building in Bloomsbury which, with its massive Ionic porticos, housed treasures of books, manuscripts, drawings, and relics of antiquity—the British Museum.

On Great Russell Street opposite its main entrance there are book-sellers of world-wide repute, as well as curio shops, tea-rooms, and general merchandising establishments. Since October 7 was a Sunday, all of these shops were closed. Toward eight o'clock in the evening there were a number of window shoppers and casual strollers who apparently just happened to be in the vicinity, but who actually were under orders from Scotland Yard.

According to the secret instructions from Moscow, "Alek" would walk along Great Russell Street from Tottenham Court Road, while the contact man would come from the opposite side—Southampton Row. "Alek" was to carry the *Times* under his left arm, while the contact man would hold *Picture Post* in his left hand.

As the time approached for the meeting, the detail watching Dr. Allan Nunn May could see him in an easy chair with pipe and slippers before the ground-floor window of his house. If he was concerned with anything more weighty than the book he was reading, he did not show it, for as the clock hand touched eight he still had made no move.

At Great Russell Street it was the same story. Aside from a few students hurrying into the reading rooms of the British Museum, there was no sign of strollers who carried newspapers in their left hand or who stopped to speak to each other.

Receiving the reports from the two groups, Colonel Burt realised that temporarily they had drawn a blank.

Once again the next move in the transatlantic cat-and-mouse game rested upon a decision in the highest government quarters. Could

the communications ban which had been imposed on the case since its inception be lifted long enough to send a cable to Ottawa for further clarification on Dr. May's activities?

The decision was that it could be done. Accordingly, from Scotland Yard the word was passed to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who were instructed to enquire how closely Dr. May's travels had fitted into the pattern outlined for "Alek" in Moscow's cable which had said, "At the beginning of September he must fly to London. Before his departure he will go to the uranium plant in the Petawawa district where he will be for about two weeks."

The Director of the Atomic Energy Project at Montreal and Chalk River, where the Petawawa plant was located, was Dr. John Douglas Cockroft, the Jacksonian Professor of Natural Philosophy at Cambridge, and a scientist of international repute. He was collaborating very closely with the Canadian scientists at the Montreal laboratory of the National Research Council, and had brought Dr. May from England to act as a group leader in Montreal.

Dr. Cockroft's records showed that Dr. May had not only made two visits to Petawawa, the first on August 16, 1945, and the second on September 3, but that in between he had made several trips to the nuclear research laboratories of the Manhattan Project at Chicago, Illinois, where he had engaged in experiments with United States scientists.

He had left for England within a few days after his September 3 trip to Petawawa, and as indicated in the cable was scheduled to return for a month's work the following year.

No other scientist had followed the same schedule, nor was any other scientist planning to return the following year!

The inference was plain.

In the United States the news that Dr. May was suspected of having trafficked with Soviet agents in atomic energy secrets reached the headquarters of the Manhattan Engineer District in the new War Department Building in Washington, D. C. Here it was brought immediately to the attention of Major General Leslie Richard Groves. From the inception of the atomic energy project he had held the threads of security control within his capable hands.

One of the fundamental principles of modern military intelligence is that personnel on secret projects are entitled to know only as much as they require to carry on their work.

As General Groves applied this principle to his paradoxical task of keeping the atom bomb "know-how" secret from the very scientists who were working toward it, the result was a compartmentation amongst the various groups attacking the problem.

Thus, months before the spring of 1945, when the National Research Council of Canada had proposed that Dr. Allan Nunn May be allowed to visit the United States for one month, the application had been placed before General Groves personally.

The first thing that the general did at that time was to send for the file on Dr. May. It contained the following information :

Dr. Allan Nunn May is a native-born English physicist of about 40 years of age. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Trinity College, Cambridge. He came to Canada some time in 1943, was employed in the British group in the Montreal laboratory of the National Research Council of Canada. On January 8, 1944, in the company of 12 other scientists from the National Research Council, Dr. May first visited the metallurgical laboratory of the University of Chicago. On April 13, 1944, May returned to the Chicago laboratory and stayed until April 27. He worked on experiments at the Argonne laboratory. He came to Chicago again on August 28, and stayed till September 1, conferring with officials of the Chicago laboratory on the construction and operation of the Argonne pile and the proposed Montreal pile.

His third visit occurred between September 25 and October 30, 1944. At that time he carried on extensive work in collaboration with other scientists in a highly secret and important new field. His work resulted in a research report in which he collaborated with an American scientist.

During his first two visits Dr. May stayed at a Chicago hotel. On his last visit he stayed at an Argonne dormitory, except for week-ends, which he spent with an American physicist, in the Chicago apartment of another American physicist who was temporarily out of town. He had few social contacts with other scientists, although he was generally well-liked by them. They have described him as a charming, shy little man with a dry sense of humour.¹

¹ Letter of Major General L. R. Groves to Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper. *Congressional Record*. U. S. Senate. March 19, 1946. Page 2454.

In General Groves' opinion a fourth visit by Dr. May in the United States ran counter to the security principles established in the Manhattan District, since it would allow Dr. May to become too closely acquainted with the results of widely separated projects. Accordingly the answer had gone back, a polite, but firm, "No."

Concerning this point, General Groves later stated:

He had been investigated for security purposes by the British Intelligence. That organisation had cleared him for access to any atomic energy work. It was not practicable, nor was it our custom, to look behind the approval of the British organisation as to the trustworthiness of any individual whom they had investigated. I am sure that they found no indication that he was not completely loyal and of unquestioned integrity. Although I had no reason to suspect him, I did not like to have him acquire a wide knowledge of our later developments. It is for this reason that in the spring of 1945 I declined to approve a proposed fourth visit of one month's duration. May never returned to the Chicago laboratory and never visited any other Manhattan District installation.²

If vital secrets in the field of atomic energy still rest secure, too much credit cannot be given to the sound decision of General Groves to bar Dr. May from further participation in work in the United States area. For as the Canadian Royal Commission of Enquiry has stated: "The Soviets failed to obtain details on the structure of the atomic bomb . . . only because there was no one in Canada who could tell them."

Meanwhile, in London, Dr. May continued to live under constant scrutiny. Every move he made from his house at Stafford Terrace to the Strand, to Shell-Mex House where he still carried out research in nuclear physics, was duly noted and recorded.

Once Colonel Burt saw him near the Victoria Embankment, hurrying along, his head bent, passing close to the doors of Scotland Yard itself. As weeks passed it was apparent that he was either making no effort to comply with the Moscow cables, or had been warned to make no move. But if the spymasters were in no hurry, Scotland Yard could match their patience with its own brand of dogged resolution.

² *Ibid.*

Chapter Five

NORA AND ELLI

IN THE INTERNATIONAL sphere Mr. Mackenzie King continued to explore the political implications of the documents with Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin.

With the meeting of the Big Four powers scheduled to start in London in December, they appreciated that premature disclosure of the spy plot might imperil any chance of harmony. It was the fairy tale of the emperor's new clothes. Although H. M. Government and the United States were officially aware of the espionage against them, they were to go into the Big Four conference as if nothing had happened.

So complex was the diplomatic approach to this problem that when Mr. Mackenzie King left England he called again at the White House in Washington. Mr. Attlee flew for twenty hours across the Atlantic in order to join in the talks with his principal atomic energy advisers, headed by Sir John Anderson.

In retrospect, this three-day meeting and Moscow's reaction are significant. While the three heads of government were meeting aboard the U.S. Naval yacht *Sequoia* anchored in mid-Potomac, the Soviets were celebrating the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Foreign Minister Molotov said:

"It is not possible at the present time for a technical secret of any great size to remain the exclusive possession of some one country or a narrow circle of countries. We will have atomic energy and many other things, too."

When Mr. Mackenzie King finally returned to Ottawa, he brought Mr. Attlee along to acquaint him at first hand with the newer factors in the case. He found that, during the interval, the strategy which he had outlined with Commissioner Wood of the R.C.M.P. before his departure was working better than had been expected.

The first concern of the investigators had been to avoid alarming Colonel Zabotin to the point where he would warn the Canadian

conspirators. Although the Military Attaché knew that some documents were missing, it was felt that he would be completely unaware that Gouzenko had brought the cable file which had been handed over to him months before for burning, and which was already carried on the books as having been destroyed.

Another factor on which the investigators were gambling was Zabotin's fear of reprisal from Moscow. Gouzenko had revealed that the spymaster was very sensitive on that score, and that upon receiving word that he had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Star he had breathed a sigh of relief and had said: "I have nothing to be afraid of now to go to Moscow."

Thus it was entirely possible that Colonel Zabotin, fearful of his own fate, was minimising the lost documents and was, in fact, reporting the incident as a "theft of funds," following the line indicated in the exchange of diplomatic telegrams.

At any rate, it was a matter of record that throughout the months of September, October, and November Colonel Zabotin and his associates acted as though nothing was amiss.

In this game of diplomatic manoeuvre, the Canadian Government was in possession of a Soviet cable dated August 25.

To the Director

264

The Economist has arrived. In a conversation with him I learned that his staff will consist of 97 persons. A part of the persons selected by him will be trained in the centre, but the staff was not fully selected. Davy will remain in the apparatus of the Economist on instructions of the boss. The establishment of the Economist will move to Montreal. In connection with the increase of our staffs it would not be bad to occupy the house of the Economist after their departure. The Economist promised to let me know in time. The boss of metro is also aspiring to occupy his house, although they have no particular need. Please support my proposal in the future, if it is made by me to you or to the Chief Director in a telegram. The house of the Economist is almost twice as large as ours.

25.8.45

Grant.

"The Economist," according to Gouzenko, was the cover name for Krotov, Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy. The "centre" was the code for Red Army Intelligence Headquarters.

It was clear that plans were afoot to bring in additional graduates of the Red Army spy school under the cover of commercial attachés.

The reference to Davy was also interesting. This was the code name for Major Sokolov, and it showed that Krotov was also to have this well-trained espionage agent on his staff.

No change in these plans took place even after Gouzenko disappeared from the Embassy. On August 28 the Soviet Ambassador, referred to in Cable 264 above as "the boss of metro," had pressed the Canadians for permission to open trade offices in Montreal or Toronto with diplomatic immunity. He urged the same matter again in October. It was thus evident that during the critical initial phases of the spy enquiry the Soviet representatives were unaware of how much was being revealed about their activities.

Accordingly, during the fall of 1945, considerable progress was made toward identifying the principals.

Among the hundred documents was a mailing list on which Colonel Zabotin had tabulated everything dispatched by him to Moscow on January 5, 1945. Inspector Leopold realised that it was the master key to the entire network, for it showed not only the type of information sent, but named the source.

Under the heading "List of Materials Sent" it contained seven columns. Each document was given a number which was put in the first column. Then followed the cover name of the agent, the place obtained, a description of the contents, number of pages, and security classification.

Number 175 on this list was credited to "Nora." It consisted of "copies, telegrams, questionnaires, and photos," dated November-December, with pages as: "telegrams 10, questionnaires 3, photos 11."

Gouzenko recalled that on September 5 he had put the telegrams into code from five sheets of notepaper written in English. He had been ordered to burn the notes, but instead had taken them from the safe and they were now in the possession of the Canadian Government.

These notes were copies of top-secret and secret cables received from England. Even today their contents are so important that they cannot be revealed. They concerned matters which belonged not exclusively to Canada, but which had been entrusted to Canada by other Governments. Unless the leak could be stopped, the entire diplomatic relationship of Canada and friendly states might be compromised.

Fortunately, Gouzenko had learned "Nora's" true name—Emma Woikin. Concerning this he testified :

A. All I know about Emma Woikin is that she first came—I do not know whether she came to the Embassy or not, but she became acquainted with Major Sokolov and very soon after they became friends and Major Sokolov proposed to Colonel Zabotin to develop her. This is the time when Milstein was in Ottawa, and they were together, Milstein, Sokolov, and Colonel Zabotin. They discussed how to develop her.

Q. You were present, were you?

A. Yes, I was in the room. They made the plan that he must be more friendly with her, invite her to visit him. Moscow said that it was a mistake to make visits in the home, better in a restaurant. Zabotin and Milstein answered, "This is crazy, the best way is in the home." Later, after they had gone to some meetings—she was doing water colour paintings, so she gave a painting to Sokolov and he gave some presents to her. They had friendly relations at that time, in the summer of 1944. In that time Sokolov suggested that he make her a proposal to work as agent, in October, 1944. However, he developed her much sooner. The first time they had such a conversation, Sokolov had Zabotin send to Moscow the contents of the conversation, that she thought she could perhaps work as a stenographer or some kind of clerk in the Commercial Counsellor's office. She had said that she liked Russia, that she wanted to help Russia. So Sokolov said, "You can help Russia much better if you remain where you are."

At the Canadian Ministry for External Affairs a check was made at the personnel office, and from the files the card on one Emma Woikin was produced. It listed her as an employee of the Cypher Division since February, 1944.

Her superiors knew her as a quiet, hard-working clerk who was never late or absent without good cause.

Her personal-history statement revealed that she had been born on December 30, 1920, at Blaine Lake, Saskatchewan, of Russian Doukhor parents. In 1943 she had applied for a position in the civil service and had passed the examination for Grade 1 stenographer. She spoke Russian as well as English, and on September 10, 1943, she

had been appointed to the Passport Division of the Department of External Affairs. Five months later, on February 25, 1944, she was placed in the Cypher Division, where she not only saw all of the diplomatic telegrams received and sent, but was familiar with the code system itself.

The counter-espionage detail compared her handwriting specimens with that on the note sheets brought by Gouzenko. They found that the same person had written both.

The next day, when Emma Woikin came to the office, her supervisor smiled at her sorrowfully.

"I'm afraid we're going to lose you," she said. "I've just received notice to transfer you back to Passports."

Emma Woikin's grey eyes seemed larger than usual. "What is the matter?" she asked, "Is my work not satisfactory?"

"Oh, no, nothing like that—I think they are short-handed at Passports, and they need an experienced girl like you."

In this manner the authorities hoped to plug the leak and, at the same time, conceal the extent of their knowledge. There were still too many agents whose identity was unknown to risk any move which might send them scurrying for cover.

Whether Emma Woikin realised that she was suspected of being the "Nora" of the documents was not apparent during the weeks that followed. She made no attempt to contact officials of the Soviet Embassy and confined herself to her government job and her part-time employment as a water colourist at a local photographer's shop.

It was in connection with her activities that Gouzenko disclosed an interesting espionage technique wherein a dentist's office had been used as a "*dubok*," or hiding place, for communications.

A. I learned from telegrams where one such *dubok* was, a place in a lavatory of a doctor.

Q. In Ottawa?

A. Yes, in Ottawa. That served as a place for handing over material.

Q. Do you know what doctor that was in Ottawa?

A. I understand from that telegram that this doctor lived on ——— Street. I do not remember his address.

Q. The doctor did not know it?

A. Of course not. In this particular case, I remember it

because it was quite a strange situation. One of the members of the Military Attaché's staff, Driver Gorshkov, one time was having his teeth fixed by this doctor.

Q. He was a dentist, then?

A. Dentist. At the same time one of the agents—I think it was Nora—was having her teeth fixed at the same place. Moscow found it convenient, therefore, that during this time the materials would be placed in the lavatory and after an hour or more Gorshkov would go and take the materials out of the lavatory. Their visits to the dentist or doctor would be explained by having their teeth attended to.

Later plainclothes investigators checked the dentist's appointment book and substantiated the story. Since the dentist had no inkling of the use to which his lavatory was being put, his identity has not been divulged by the Canadian Government.

While "Nora" was being sealed off, Inspector Leopold referred once more to the master key to the spy puzzle—the mailing list of January 5, 1945. Items No. 109 and 110 were marked "copy" and "abbreviated copy" of letters from the Canadian Ambassador at Moscow, Mr. Dana Wilgress, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, dated October 11 and November 3, 1944. Each of these letters was secret. "Elli" was credited as the source.

There was also an exchange of cables in which "Elli" was mentioned. The first, No. 248, showed that Colonel Zabotin had been reprimanded by Moscow for a slip which might have allowed "the boss of metro," i.e., Ambassador Zarubin, to gain knowledge of the network. It read:

To the Director

248

I was scolded for some kind of material which allegedly became known to metro. I beg you to advise me what material is concerned. I have informed the boss of metro on political, economic, and military questions in accordance with instructions given to me by the Chief Director and by Comrade Malenkov. The sources were never reported by me. Please instruct for the future. Am I to inform the Ambassador on questions concerning Canada which are received from sources. It seems to me that the boss of metro should be the best informed person.

Moscow replied as follows:

To Grant

Reference No. 248.

1. In telegram No. 8267 of June 20, you were given instructions on the inadmissibility of disclosing our agency network to the Ambassador.

The handing over to the Ambassador by you of the Wilgress report of 3.11.44 . . . in the very form in which it was received has uncovered the existence of our source on the object of Elli.

Furthermore, the translator of the Embassy got acquainted with the document, inasmuch as the document was in the local language.

2. With regard to urgent political and economic questions affecting the mutual relations of Canada and Great Britain with the U.S.S.R., you must keep the Ambassador informed, but indicating only that the source is authentic, without revealing to him either the source itself or the places from which the information was obtained.

3. The information should be handed over after it has already been prepared to this effect, deleting all passages which might disclose the secret source.

4. All questions on which you are informing the Ambassador, you are under obligation to bring to my attention. . . .

Director 21.8.

Apparently Zabotin had given the Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa the Wilgress letters and the Ambassador had had them translated into Russian by one of his own translators.

"This was contrary to Moscow's policy of keeping its espionage, diplomatic, commercial, and secret police activities secret, one from the other," explained Gouzenko. "For that reason Colonel Zabotin got his wrist slapped, as the Ambassador could then find out who Elli was."

"And who was she?" asked Inspector Leopold.

"Before I left the Embassy I had a look at her file which was being kept by the 'doorman' Lieutenant Gousev. Her name is Willsher—she works in the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom here in Ottawa."

The High Commissioner in Canada was Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, son of the former Labour Leader and Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald.

In view of the protocol involved, Deputy Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. H. A. Gagnon, who was acting as the link between the active investigators and the high government officials, personally took the matter up with the Undersecretary for External Affairs, Mr. Norman Robertson, who in turn notified Mr. MacDonald. The latter was shocked at the disclosure.

The only Willsher on his staff was Kathleen Mary Willsher, who, as Assistant Registrar since 1939, had access to all incoming and outgoing letters and telegrams and to all highly secret files.

In her early forties, she was quiet, soft-spoken, and looked more like a pleasant-faced school teacher than a secret agent. She had been in Canada with the High Commissioner's office since 1930. A graduate of the London School of Economics, she spoke French, German, and some Russian, and had been a dues-paying member of the Communist, or Labour-Progressive, Party of Canada since 1936.

Since the need for secrecy was still so great that she could not be questioned, she was put under surveillance, and the character of her work was gradually changed until she was no longer in position to obtain important information.

With "Alek," "Nora," and "Elli" under scrutiny, the inquiry turned to one of the master minds behind the entire plot—a man who had risen in public life to the halls of Parliament itself.

Chapter Six

MASTER-BETRAYER DEBOUZ

IT WAS ZABOTIN'S mailing list which provided a clue to the existence of "Debouz." Regarding him there was this entry:

<i>No.</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>From Where Obtained</i>	<i>Designation of the Material</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Pages</i>	<i>Marked</i>
108	Debouz	Notes	Decisions secret sessions of Parliament	no date	1	None

There had been a closed session of Parliament on November 25, 1944. It had dealt with the redeployment of Canadian forces following Germany's collapse. When Mr. Mackenzie King, who was being briefed daily on each new development in the case, realised that not even an executive session of the Canadian Parliament could be kept secret from the Soviet spy ring, his instructions were plain.

He told Commissioner Wood of the Mounted Police to find out without delay all he could about "Debouz."

Behind the closely guarded walls of Rockcliffe Barracks, the counter-espionage squad toiled night and day to untangle the clues in the hundred documents. An outsider coming upon the scene would have found little in the way of drama visible in the converted lecture rooms of the police training school. At this stage of the case, paper, not people, was the main concern—paper brought in by Gouzenko in the form of cables, reports, notebooks, and torn scraps.

An elaborate cross-index system had been set up to keep track of the numerous code names which were cropping up in the case. This involved the multi-copying of each document so that the clues under each name were brought together in one folder. Some folders seemed almost empty; others were straining at the metal binders.

Into the latter category fell the dossier on "Debouz."

Inspector Leopold felt a kinship with the craftsmen of old who painstakingly arranged bits of coloured stone and glass into a mosaic.

He, too, was assembling fragments, seeking to form a picture of one of the key agents. He tabbed the most significant documents. When he had finished, the following seemed to be the most promising:

The first was:

Cable 209

To the Director,

12.7.45

Debouz was re-elected for the second time as a member of the Federal Parliament. Thus from the Corporants there is one member. The first session meets on August 26. Grant.

The second—a single line from a notebook maintained by Lieutenant Colonel Rogov—was: “. . . Fred—Debouz—talked generally. . . .”

The third—from the torn pages of the notebook which Colonel Zabotin had given to Gouzenko to destroy by burning—was:

Fred—Director of Corporation. Previously worked at the Neighbours, up to 1924. In May-June, 1942, came with a proposal to help. Checked up on Fred through New York. The Neighbours proposed to make use of Fred.

The fourth, another reference from the torn notebook:

Contact in Washington with Debouz's person. To work out arrangements for a meeting and to telegraph. To give out 600 dollars. If Debouz should be unable to go to U.S.A., there should be a letter from him containing a request to assist the person delivering the letter.

The fifth, again from the torn scraps: “Fred's work—group in Montreal (activists).”

What was the meaning of all this double talk? Inspector Leopold asked that question of Gouzenko. Thanks to the latter's inside knowledge, the apparently unrelated fragments began to form a pattern.

Gouzenko explained that the word “Corporants” in the first item was the code word for the Communist Party.

The second showed that “Debouz” was also known as “Fred,” and the names were interchangeable.

The third, containing the phrase “Neighbours,” showed that “Fred” had apparently worked for the secret police as far back as 1924.

The fourth item revealed that “Debouz” had been entrusted with

a mission to the United States to make contact with an agent in Washington.

The fifth showed "Fred" as the head of an active group in Montreal.

With these facts the average Canadian newspaper reader could have hit upon the identity of "Debouz—Fred."

There was only one Communist member of Parliament. He was Fred Rose of Montreal, a short, peppery individual, bald except for a fringe of sandy hair and a pale blond moustache.

He was born in Poland in 1907, and came to Canada with his parents in 1920. He became a Canadian citizen in March, 1926, when his father was naturalised. At that time he described his occupation as electrician. In 1925 he joined the Young Communist League and was appointed National Secretary for that organisation in 1929. As such, he went to Russia for a course of instruction in 1930, where for a period of six months he served on the International Executive Committee of the Young Communist League. He became a member of the Communist Party of Canada in 1927 and was appointed to the Central Executive Committee of the Party in 1929.

He was arrested in Toronto in October, 1929, for disorderly conduct and sentenced to thirty days, and in 1931-32 was convicted of sedition, for which he served one year in the Bordeaux jail.

He was married at Montreal in 1931 to a girl of Ukrainian origin, and had one child, a daughter. He was a candidate for public office in the federal election of 1935 and in the Quebec provincial election of 1936, but was unsuccessful. In 1937 he was appointed to the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party, a secret service organisation which, according to Rose, has the duty of "ferreting out traitors, spies, and fascists who might have become members for ulterior purposes."

Although not openly identified with the unemployed relief strike of 1940, he was credited with organising and controlling it from the background through reliable Party members. About the same time, he was the author of two pamphlets, one 1940—*A Review*, in English, and the other in French, 1917-1940, both of which were anti-British in tone. Anticipating the ban which was placed on the Communist Party in June, 1940, Rose went underground. Except for a pamphlet, "Année Heureuse et Victorieuse," which was distributed in Montreal in January, 1942, and of which he was the co-signer along

with other prominent Communists, he was not heard of until he was arrested by the Mounted Police at Toronto on September 25, 1942. Interned in the Don jail, Toronto, his case was reviewed by an Advisory Committee of prominent Canadians, including Judge Roland Millar, Chairman, Professor G. N. Cochrane, and Mr. A. S. Simpson. In a report dated October 6, 1942, this Committee stated:

. . . the detenu claims that many former "misunderstandings" had been cleared from his mind when the war became a "just war" and that the pamphlet *Année Heureuse et Victorieuse* distributed in January, 1942, was designed to acquaint Canadians with the new policy of the Party.

Rose expressed the view that there was now a "political pot boiling" in Quebec, the tendency of which was Fascist and anti-British and he thought that if he were free to circulate amongst the workers of that Province he might be able to minimise its effect and thereby contribute to national unity.

Although the Committee was not impressed with his exaggerated opinion of his own importance and knowledge, we nevertheless are unanimously of the opinion that he will follow the Party line of supporting the war effort of Canada and that his liberation will no longer prejudice the safety of the State.

Accordingly, we recommend that he be released on the following conditions:

(1) That he do not participate in any propagandist or other activities of the Communist Party of Canada, or of any organisation over which the Communist Party exercises control, or of any other association, group, society, or organisation declared to be illegal under Section 39c of the Defence of Canada Regulations;

(2) That he report to the nearest detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at regular intervals of not less than once a month;

(3) That he subscribe to an undertaking to this effect.

In accordance with the terms of his release, Rose, on October 6, 1942, promised not to participate in activities of the Communist Party, agreed to report to the police, and further swore that he would strictly abstain "from communicating to anyone whomsoever any information concerning the existing war or the movement of troops or military

preparations . . . or the resources of Canada . . . or any Allied or associated power."

It may be worth noting that hardly had his signature dried than he violated both the letter and spirit of his promises.

A full outline of the manner in which his name ran through the complex fabric of espionage would require the reproduction of the files themselves. Not only had he played a key role in organizing a "B" group of agents in the National Research Council, but he was linked to ten others to whom he had given instruction and advice.

No move was made which might alert Fred Rose, M.P., to the fact that his dual role had been uncovered. He continued to appear in the House of Commons, to occupy his office in Room 639 of Parliament Building, and to reside in a cosy flat at 30 Beechwood Avenue with his wife and seven-year-old daughter.

His contacts were watched, and there was hardly a moment of the day or night when a plainclothesman did not know where he was or what he was doing.

During this phase the existence of the identity of the principal espionage groups which Rose had sponsored were brought to light.

It must be realised that, while Gouzenko had chosen the Embassy documents with what the Royal Commission termed "remarkable skill and judgment," he had never seen a single Canadian agent in the flesh. His whole viewpoint had been limited to paper records and he could never point to any one person and say: "This is the one called so-and-so in such-and-such a report." Always the investigators were forced to seek their clues in the documents themselves, a task of research which they mastered as well as a group of Ph.D.'s might have.

Chapter Seven

DEAR MOTHER AND FATHER

TO IDENTIFY and quarantine Fred Rose's "B" group of agents was next in the order of business. Since it was this group which had penetrated deeply into the National Research Council, custodian of atomic energy secrets, the matter was given a high priority.


Fortunately, Gouzenko had brought a complete dossier on the leader of "B" Group—David Gordon Lunan. The following registration card had been filled out in Rogov's hand:

1. Surname, given name, and patronym—Lieut. G. Lunan.
2. Pseudonym—"Back."
3. Length of time in net—from March, 1945.
4. Address—(a) Business: Sparks Street, "Canadian Affairs," Telephone 9-7621. (b) Home: 337 Elgin, Apartment 7, Telephone 5-17-20.
5. Place of work and duties—Editorial office of military journal, "Canadian Affairs." Works in capacity of correspondent.
6. Financial conditions—Receives around \$200 a month. Needs material help occasionally.

Biographical data—Born in Scotland in 1912. Is married. By education he is a journalist. Came to Canada in 1938. . . . He shows a great interest in the political life of Canada. He is well disposed to us. His job is not stable. . . . He does not want to remain in the Army. After the war he plans to work as a journalist in one or other of the periodicals published in Montreal or Toronto.

In the later phases of the enquiry Lunan, upon being questioned, told how he had become associated with the ring. He said that one morning when he arrived at his office he found on his desk an anonymous note inviting him to meet an unidentified person at a

corner of Rideau Street in Ottawa. He kept the appointment, and had a twenty-minute conversation with a stranger, who subsequently turned out to be Lieutenant Colonel Rogov. He did not give his name at the time, however, but told Lunan to refer to him in the future under the cover name of "Jan." He then handed Lunan a document typewritten in English which read as follows:



You only will know me (as Jan) but nobody else.

2. What we would like you to do: a. To characterise the scale and the works being carried out at National Research and also the scheme of this Department. b. To conduct the work of "Bacon," "Badeau," and "Bagley."

It is advisable to put the following tasks to them separately:

Bagley—to give the models of developed radio sets, its photographs, technical (data) facts, and for what purpose it is intended. Once in three months to write the reports in which to characterise the work of the Radio Department, to inform about the forthcoming tasks and what new kinds of models are going to be developed.

Bacon—to give the organisation and characters of Valtcartier Explosives Establishment's Direction, to write a report on the subject: "What kind of work is this organisation engaged in?" If possible to pass on the prescriptions (formulae) of explosives and its samples.

Badeau—to write the report: "What kind of work is his Department engaged in and what Departments it is in contact with (by work)?"

All the materials and documents to be passed by Bagley, Badeau, and Bacon have to be signed by their nicknames as stated above.

If your group have the documents which you will not be able to give us irrevocably, we shall photograph them and return back to you.

I beg you to instruct every man separately about conspiracy in our work.

In order not to keep their materials (documents) at your place, it is advisable that you receive all their materials (documents) the same day you have meeting with me.

To answer all the above questions we shall have the meeting on March 28. J.

P.S. After studying burn it.

Upon receiving this assignment, Lunan admitted that he had been very disturbed and for a week did nothing. He could hardly understand why he had been chosen for this particular work, but finally he recalled a meeting with Fred Rose. Concerning this he testified:

Q. Prior to receiving the message whom did you meet that you could connect with the message?

A. I did not connect anybody with it until having received it and then I connected a conversation I had had previously.

Q. With whom.

A. With Fred Rose.

Q. In what place?

A. I do not remember, but I rather think on a train.

Q. How many days before that, could you say?

A. A few days.

Q. What did Fred Rose tell you on the train?

A. He asked me what I was doing. I had just recently arrived in Ottawa and he asked me various questions about my work and my future and so on and then said that he had somebody that he thought I should meet. If I remember his phrase, he said he was a very interesting person.

Q. Was that all?

A. That is all.

Q. You went to the meeting because you associated that

note with the interview you had with Rose on the train previously?

A. I had associated it, yes.

Q. Because otherwise you would not have gone?

A. That is right.

Lunan, as he was frank to state, was a writer, not a technician, and he had some difficulty in transmitting Rogov's instructions and the replies received from the group. His first report, dated March 28, 1945, a few weeks after the street corner interview, described his problems. It began "Dear Mother and Father." Since it was later shown that he had written it on his own typewriter, it was probable that the heading had been used to allay suspicion in the event that anyone looked over his shoulder.

Like the other documents in the case, it is so revealing of espionage methods that it is reproduced in its entirety. In it will be seen how the Soviets were alerted to the Western Allies' efforts to solve atomic energy problems six months before Hiroshima.

Ottawa, March 28

Dear Mother and Father:

General approach to work. Your written instructions are understood and some preliminary work has been accomplished on the specific tasks set. It should be understood that neither Bacon, Bagley, nor Badeau are well known to me either personally or politically, nor I to them. Progress has been held up somewhat owing to one or the other of them being out of town and caution displayed by Badeau (a good thing probably) in checking into my credentials. With the exception of Bacon, who is enthusiastic and politically experienced, it would be unwise to approach them point blank with all the tasks assigned. They feel the need for taking abnormal precautions at their normal meetings (about once in two weeks), since they are definitely not labeled with any political affiliation. One or two have even opposed the introduction of new members to our group on the ground that it would endanger their own security. I therefore believe it wise to approach them carefully and not to advance too great an assignment to them at one time. Also, for the time being, not to characterise the work for what it is, but merely to let it be understood that it is work of a special

conspiratorial nature, without mentioning my connection with you. If I read your instructions correctly, you assumed that I would discuss the situation frankly with each separately. This I have not done. But I would like to discuss this aspect with you. Another slight resistance to be overcome is the strong sense of security about their work that these men have developed as war scientists.

We have experienced a little difficulty (which we shall, however, overcome, I believe), in making our initial arrangements to meet. There are several reasons for this. Bagley lives quite far out of town in the country and is dependent on train schedules. Badeau lives at the furthest end of Hull, working during the day out of town, and is out of reach at lunch times and other times convenient to me. My house is out of the question for meeting (and typing) purposes as I have two others living with me. We shall probably solve these difficulties as we gain practice in the work.

The following notes describe in detail progress made with each individual on the task set:

Badeau: Warmed up slowly to my requests and remained non-committal until he had checked independently on my bonafides. Once satisfied, he promised to cooperate. He is preparing a report on his department as requested, *also* a full report on the organisation and personnel, interlocking departments, etc., of N.D.C., plus any other information he thinks useful. These reports are promised to me for April 9. I am unable to get them any sooner.

Discussing the work of N.D.C. in general, Badeau informs me that the most secret work at present is on nuclear physics (bombardment of radio-active substances to produce energy). This is more hush-hush than radar and is being carried on at the University of Montreal and at McMaster University at Hamilton. Badeau thinks that government purchase of radium producing plant is connected with this research. In general he claims to know of no new developments in radar, except minor improvements in its application.

Bacon: I received an excellent report on Bacon and approached him more frankly than the others. He seems anxious to be of help. His attitude is that most of the so-called secret

work is a joke, and while it is officially on the secret list, those working on it can see no reason for secrecy. He undertook to provide the information requested on Valcartier. He suggested that I obtain it directly from his chief in my official capacity, but I advised him that this was not wise as I do not wish to show any official interest in this field until and unless we decide to do an article on it. He claims that there is no particular secrecy about the set-up, but I persuaded him to give me the whole report on the matter. I did not mention formulae and samples at this meeting, as I don't think Bacon is sufficiently impressed with the conspiratorial nature of the work as yet. But he is definitely keen and will be helpful. I shall see Bacon again on April 2 to hear about his report and to take up our request with him further. He travels a good deal which complicates our arrangements for the meeting.

Bagley: I have been unable to see him as yet. He has not been a very regular or enthusiastic supporter for several months, although he is now showing more enthusiasm. He lives in the country and his wife is antagonistic to his political participation. He strikes me as being somewhat naïve politically, and I shall take things slowly with him for a start. I plan to develop his acquaintance as much as possible and gain his confidence by collaborating on some scientific articles. Will report on him next time.

With regard to photographs and biographical notes on Bagley and others, Bacon and Badeau will provide them with their reports. I will supply Bagley's later. Bacon is a mathematics professor from Queen's University at Kingston, now a major in the army. Badeau is an electrical engineer who has worked in the engineering department of the Bell Telephone Company at Montreal. Fuller details later. Back.

There was a second report from Lunan dated April 17, 1945. It was typed in English and bore the hand-lettered Russian title of "Organisation Letter of 18.4.45." As a document it was revealing as the "Dear Mother and Father" letter. It read:

There is relatively little progress to report since last time because of a series of unfavourable circumstances which have made continuous liaison with my people impossible.

As you will have realised, I was out of town for several days last week and was unable to keep my appointment. Bacon was away from work for several days with a cold. It was inadvisable to see him at his home to discuss the matter with him, although I did visit him there once to receive a report from him. Badeau also made a trip to Toronto during the one week when I was in town and relatively free to see him, and for the following week he was detained late at the office (laboratory) working on a special rush experiment. The prospect for myself over the next few weeks isn't any brighter, unfortunately. The announcement of the elections, earlier than expected by us, has involved me in a great deal of rush work which will keep me in Montreal all next week. This work, of course, has to be given priority; but it means that the time available for seeing my people is severely cut into—especially when they might be busy on those times when I am free.

This is not a very bright picture for the progress of our work. But it is the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and it is only to be hoped that work will ease up soon. Incidentally, I suggest that Jan's call to my office was not strictly necessary, since we already had the arrangement that the meeting would take place three days later if for any reason either party failed to show up. However, it had this advantage, that it tested out the system of calling on the telephone, which was quite successful.

Reporting in general on the work done since last meeting:

Bacon has given considerable thought to my original requests and has given me the material for the attached report. He offers to fill in any details that may be asked for if he can. I have not had the opportunity to ask him about payment.

Badeau was very disturbed when I brought up the subject of payment. I think he felt it brought the subject of his work into a different (and more conspiratorial) focus. He was to think it over and let me know, but we have had no opportunity to meet since I was in Montreal in the interim. He is very slow in giving me any information, largely because he has no time to sit down and make a report. He offered me the printed report of the Research Council, but I assume that all this information is known or can be readily obtained from a

Government library. The latest report he could get was also considerably out of date. He reported to me in words the general details of his own work. He is in the radio engineering end of things, specialising in radar. Current work, on which there was an emergency rush last week, is in connection with a battle-ship radar device for use in the Pacific.

This is an extremely sensitive detecting device which has been successfully tried out on the East Coast. Present work is the designing and construction of a pilot model. Badeau has been largely responsible for this. Possibly there are specific questions which could be asked about this, as Badeau is a very difficult person to pin down to detail.

It has still been impossible to see Bagley and introduce him to his assignment. As I pointed out before, since I know very little of this person, it is my plan to become better acquainted with him and get some idea of his readiness for work of this kind. The time, however, has been quite beyond me as yet.

With regard to biographies: both Badeau and Bacon have promised to provide biographical notes. I was to have received these on Monday, but could not keep my appointments, being out of town. Will obtain them for next time. Badeau is married with 2 children—about 6 and 6 months old. He is about 33 years old and before joining the Research Council, worked in the Research Department of the Bell Telephone Company at Montreal. He is a graduate electrical engineer. Bacon is a man of about 35, married and with 2 children and a third on the way. He is a professor of mathematics at Queen's University, Kingston, and intends to go back to that work after the war. He is at present a major in the Artillery.

Bacon's report: Bacon has been personally responsible to a large extent for the preliminary work in connection with organising CARDE (Canadian Army Research Division, Explosives). This is an organisation which is in process of being created. It will have both civilian and military personnel, but will be administered by the army. It is intended to be integrated with the various arsenals in Canada—at least two of which will probably be maintained permanently after the war.

CARDE will contain the following:

A. *Pilot Explosives Plant*. This is being built by, and controlled by, National Research Council, but with army funds. The chemical branch of N.R.C. will have very little or nothing to do with it. It will have a large capacity and will be capable of experimental work with new explosives, both HE and propellants. It is not yet being operated; will be taken over by CARDE when completed. Probable director will be an Englishman, Harold J. Poole, who is now acting director. He is a permanent civil servant in the explosives field. Said to be slow as an organiser and executive, but a competent technician. Bacon believes that this plant can be of tremendous importance and can improve production methods to meet changing needs. Canadian raw material situation very good.

(Bacon gave some information on present explosives plants and their capacity. This is probably well known. Can produce information if desired.)

B. *Ballistics Laboratory*. Under direction of Dr. Laidler. This is the only part of the over-all project which is at present in operation. This section is working with the Department of Chemistry at Toronto University in experimenting with a variety of new propellants. They are using a new explosive DINA mixed with R.D.X. as a component in propellants. DINA is intended as an alternative to nitroglycerin. Americans are said to be very interested in one of these new propellants called "Albanite." This is a propellant containing DINA and picrite as an alternative to the standard British propellant containing nitroglycerin and picrite.

C. *Designs Branch*. This will be mostly for designing small ordnance and will include a pilot plant.

D. *Field Trials Wing*. This will do the work which is now being done at Suffield and Valcartier by the Inspection Board of United Kingdom and Canada. They have a good scientist and do a good job of analysing faults and difficulties of manufacture.

Eventually the organisation will consist of A, B, C, and D. Dr. Don Chase (an N.R.C. physicist) has already been appointed superintendent of CARDE. He will be responsible to the Director of Artillery (Colonel W. E. Van Steenberg) who is a biologist and who will in turn be responsible to the Master

General of Ordnance, Army. Eventually there will probably be a committee comprising representatives of the three services.

Bacon emphasises:

The importance of CARDE in controlling factory production.

The laying down of a skeleton armaments research centre which could be taken over by the British in the future if it became necessary. It could take on assignments, and now has some on which to work.

After this second report, Rogov obviously met Lunan on several occasions. On June 6, 1945, Rogov assigned to Lunan a list of "tasks" for his group. The original list, in Russian, has in the left column comments added later, with the dates on which the various tasks were completed. The next was as follows:

ASSIGNMENT No. 1

ASSIGNED TO THE GROUP BACK (RESEARCH)

ASSIGNED ON 8.6.45

Back:

Fulfilled 5.7.45

1. To write out material on "The election to the Federal Parliament and the pre-election struggle," showing the role and the significance of each party in this. To give the characteristics of each party, its political platform and who finances it and whose circles it represents.

Bacon:

On Points:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. He promised to obtain it for the next time. 2. Has no data whatsoever. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To give instructions or any other kind of material on electro-shells (V-bomb). 2. To write down what new research work is being carried on and what is the latest right now with respect to explosive materials and artillery armaments. |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Bagley:

Fulfilled 5.7.45

1. To establish closer contact and to obtain at least oral information.

Badeau:

On Points:

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Fulfilled 5.7.45 | 1. To obtain any material on the American aeroplane radio-locator of the type an/aps—10' and also on the radio navigation periscope. |
| 2. Partly fulfilled. | 2. To give more detailed information on the "Research Council" right down to the sections, their directors and what they are engaged in. |
| 3. Not fulfilled. | 3. To obtain the telephone directory of the "Research Council." |
| 4. Fulfilled 5.7.45 | 4. On the works Mrs. Smith-Durnford; A. D. Keys; and I. S. Foster. To give a general description, what kind of apparatuses they are; where they are used; what are their fundamental features. (See material No. 1 of Group Back.) |

Remarks:

The whole assignment must be fulfilled by 5.7.45.

Chapter Eight

THE BETRAYALS OF "B" GROUP

GORDON LUNAN was found to have been promoted to the rank of Acting Captain in the Canadian Army since the previous June, but he still worked as editor of the military journal *Canadian Affairs*. A tall, thin-faced individual, with a close-clipped moustache, he resembled in profile Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. Since he was merely a contact man and had no access to secret information in the course of his own work, it was felt that little would be served by changing his job on orders from above. Hence, he was merely put under surveillance.

There was no one by the name of Dornforth Smith known in the National Research Council, but there was a Durnford Smith, graduate of McGill University in mathematics and physics, who had been with the Bell Telephone Company in Montreal for five years previous to joining the Council. Since his work gave him access to secret records, it was arranged to place him in a spot where, for the time being at least, he would not acquire anything that might be detrimental to the interest of the Government.

Next to be shadowed was "Bagley"—Ned Mazerall, who was found to be Edward Wilfred Mazerall, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, and a member of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. He had worked for the Canadian Westinghouse Company and the Canadian Broadcasting Company, and in 1942 he had joined the National Research Council in the development of radar. A tall, broad-shouldered man with a large head and an unruly shock of hair, he was married to a well-known Canadian concert pianist. Last of the four "B's" was "Bacon," carried as Isidor Halperin. As in the case of "Dornforth" Smith, it was felt that an error in spelling had been made, for there was no "Isidor" Halperin in the position outlined. However, there was an Israel Halperin, Professor of Mathematics at Queens University, Kingston, Ontario. He had been a Captain in the Artillery, and had been promoted to Major in 1945. He

had specialised in explosives and new weapons at Canadian Army headquarters.

The first contact with him was later described by Lunan:

Q. Then whom did you see next, Bacon?

A. Yes.

Q. That is Halperin. How did you meet him?

A. I met him by phoning him at his office and making a luncheon appointment.

Q. Where?

A. At a hotel. I don't remember the name of it—some hotel in Ottawa.

Q. And how did you convey to him the request that had been made by Rogov?

A. I think I followed much the same line with him again; letting him interpret my words as he would. At the time, I thought that he understood them correctly. Later I had reason to feel that perhaps he did not, but he also wanted time to think about it.

Q. And eventually, like Smith, he gave you his acceptance and you had several meetings thereafter?

A. Yes.

Halperin was reported to be by far the most difficult of the group to work with. Lunan wrote that Halperin considered secret information to be a joke, and had reported on the Canadian Army Research and Development establishment (CARDE) and the Pilot Explosives plant, the ballistics laboratory, the Designs branch, and the Field Trials wing. There was a note written in Russian, which Gouzenko thought was in the handwriting of one of the Embassy interpreters named Levin. Apparently it was based on a written report made by Lunan of information given to him by Halperin, and it read:

Back's Group Mat. No. 1

Bacon: It has become very difficult to work with him, especially after my requests for Ur 235. He said that as far as he knows it is absolutely impossible to get it. Thus, for instance, he declared that perhaps it (Uran) is not available in sufficient quantity. Bacon explained to me the theory of nuclear energy,

which is probably known to you. He refuses to put down in writing anything and does not want to give a photograph or information on himself. I think that at present he has a fuller understanding of the essence of my requests and he has a particular dislike for them. With such a trend of thought as he has it is impossible to get anything from him except verbal descriptions, and I am not in a position to understand everything fully where it concerns technical details.

I asked him what is taken into consideration in the construction of the very large plant (Chalk River, near Petawawa, Ontario) in the general opinion the principle of production of which is based on the physical properties of the nucleus; with regard to his expression of opinion that it is impossible to get Uran 235. He replied that he does not know. He believed that the project is still in the experimental stage.

Then he described to me the general principles of the electronic shell and the bomb detonator, which are being produced in plants in the U.S.A. and Canada, and which is the reason for the accurate fire in destroying rocket projectiles (V-bombs). It has the form of a small transmitter of high frequency, the ray of which is reflected from the target. When the force of the reflected wave in the vibration of the radiated frequency reaches a definite strength, the charge is exploded electrically. I asked him if it would be possible to obtain instructions for it. He replied that it would be possible. I was not able to extract anything in any other way. In conclusion Bacon (took the position) announced that he will talk to me but he will not write anything at all, and I do not think that he is ready to begin work more deeply, as for example, to obtain samples. He says that he does not know anything about matters that are not already known to you.

“Bagley” or Mazerall later described to the Royal Commission Enquiry the way in which Lunan had first approached him.

A. The first conversation was a telephone conversation.

Q. He phoned you?

A. He phoned me.

Q. Were you at your house or at your office?

A. I think I was at my office.

Q. And on June 4 he phoned you?

A. I believe it would have been so. I have a mark on the calendar with his telephone number so I assume that was the date. He asked me if he could see me or have lunch with me, that he wanted to speak to me about something. I can't say definitely when I did see him; it was somewhere within a week of this date, and we had lunch, and then went for a drive in my car.

Q. You had lunch at the Chateau?

A. That is correct; in the cafeteria.

Q. That is after you had met him at these meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Of the study group?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you carry on?

A. We went for the drive in the car, and after some preliminary discussion he asked me if I would supply him with information.

Q. For whom?

A. For the Soviet Union.

Mazerall also testified concerning the report which he had written for Lunan:

Q. You knew perfectly well that you should not give that to Lunan?

A. Yes, I did, and as I say I could have given him more important reports which would have been more useful than this to them. While I certainly regret it very much, the fact is that this was the most innocuous report I could have put my hands on.

Q. And what was Lunan to do with these reports while they were in his possession?

A. Turn them over to representatives of the Soviet Union.

Q. To the representatives of the Soviet Union?

A. Yes.

According to Lunan's later testimony, Smith was the most co-operative agent in the research group.

Q. Which of the three, Mazerall, Halperin, and Smith, was the most cooperative on the whole in the organisation with which you were connected?

A. I would say that Smith was.

Q. Will you tell us how you carried on the conversation, how you broached the subject? What did you say?

A. I remember that I tried to feel him out.

Q. How would you do that?

A. I think I asked him first about his work, and at some point I know that I told him that I had met somebody and he—and I think you will understand what I say when I put it euphemistically that I let him take what meaning out of it he would—and I think it became clear to him the kind of proposition that I was making to him.

Q. What gave you that conviction?

A. Well, it was not immediately clear, because he said he would have to think it over. Subsequently, at another meeting with him—

Q. He wanted to think it over. Why? He must have understood the nature of it?

A. I suppose he was not immediately sure he wanted to do this.

Q. Was it put to him that the request was made to obtain from him information for the Soviet Union?

A. Not in the first instance. Subsequently I think he must—well, I am sure he must have understood me. First of all, I was not fully identified to him nor he to me. We were fencing with words, as it were, and I couldn't say at what particular stage of our conversation he understood exactly the nature of the proposition I was making to him.

Rogov had also written of Durnford Smith in his notebook:

Badeau asks for permission to change to work on uranium. There is a possibility either by being invited or by applying himself, but he warned that they are very careful in the selection of workers and that they are under strict observation.

Later on it was apparent that Colonel Rogov was so impressed with Smith's contributions that he decided to step out from behind his

cut-off man, Lunan, and meet Smith face to face. Lunan described the occasion:

Q. All right, tell us what took place when you arrived there; was Rogov there at the time arranged?

A. Within a few minutes.

Q. And what took place then?

A. The three of us got into a car.

Q. Had he [Rogov] a driver?

A. Yes, there was a driver.

Q. And tell us what took place then.

A. We then drove around. I was sitting in the front seat and Smith and Jan were in the back seat. They then proceeded to converse, and I had no part in the conversation. I sat in the front and smoked.

Q. But you heard it, I suppose?

A. No, I didn't; they were talking in a low tone. It is almost impossible to understand Jan under the circumstances in the back of a car. Smith I also found a rather difficult person to understand, by no means articulating clearly. In this case I had no conscious participation in the conversation, although I did hear an occasional phrase.

Q. From what you heard could you tell us what was the gist of the conversation?

A. They appeared to be talking about technical matters, electronic matters.

Q. Was either of them carrying a briefcase?

A. I think Smith was. As far as I know he characteristically carried a briefcase.

Q. Did you see him handing some documents to Rogov?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Then how long did that last?

A. I would say for perhaps forty-five minutes.

Q. During all that time you were touring around?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you come back to the same place?

A. No, we did not.

Q. You alighted from the car at the same time as Smith?

A. No.

Q. Before?

A. No, Smith got out first.

Q. And did he wait for you?

A. No, he did not.

Q. You kept on driving with Rogov?

A. That is right.

Q. Were you in uniform?

A. I think I was, yes.

Although Smith later could not recall the details of this interview with Rogov, there was a complete table in the Embassy file which attested to his meetings with Rogov and to the valuable information which was handed over.

Covering a period of approximately two months, it read:

COURSE OF MEETINGS

No. P.	<i>Substance of Meetings</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1.	5.7.45—The acquaintance meeting took place through Back. Makes a good impression. At the meeting behaved very cautiously, somewhat cowardly. Brought material for photographing on radio locators. Is desirous to work for us and promised to do everything possible.	
	Lives in Hull in a separate suburb. Requested to do photographic work by himself and contact with Bagley. See details in telegram of 6.7.45. Handed out 100 dollars; he took the money readily. In course of time he may become the head of a group.	
	No regular meeting fixed, contact will be maintained through Back.	
	Special assignment set forth (see annex).	
2.	18.8.45—Urgent meeting held respecting photographing. He has just returned from the U.S.A., brought nothing. He will bring for the next meeting his account of his journey in the U.S.A. and other materials in accordance with our directive. Is unable to photograph, he only has a camera and nothing else.	

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Regular meeting—25.8.45 } $T = 22.30$
Place—Hull | <i>Remarks</i> |
| 3. 25.8.45—Regular meeting, everything normal. Handed over a great amount of radio literature and various reports, about 10 books in all. He informs that he goes on a two-weeks' leave. | Was a torrential downpour, but he nevertheless came. Gave instructions not to come in the future in such weather; it is not natural. Handed out 100 dollars. |
| Tasks were assigned concerning radio materials and others (see Assignment No. 4). | |
| The meeting for the return of the material will take place on 26.8.45 at corner of Osgoode and Cumberland at 22.00. | |
| 4. 26.8.45—Meeting for returning the literature, everything normal. The regular meeting through Back. | |

We agreed concerning an urgent meeting: *Brent* to call on the telephone (home) 3-3870, after some conversation, he is at the end to say: "Mary sent her love for your children," this is to mean that the meeting will take place at 21.00 o'clock at corner of Berr and Ste. Marie. Badeau to walk down from Berr along Ste. Marie on the left side.

Even more ominous was Cable No. 266, from Zabotin to Moscow:

To the Director,

266

We have received from Badeau 17 top secret and secret documents (English, American, and Canadian) on the question of magnicoustics, radio-locators for field artillery; three secret scientific-research journals of the year 1945. Altogether about 700 pages. In the course of the day we were able to photograph all of the documents with the help of the Leica and the photofilter. In the next few days we will receive almost the same amount of documents for 3 to 5 hours and with one film we will not be able to cope with it. I consider it essential to examine the whole library of the Scientific Research Council.

Grant.

The scope of the last project was enough to disturb even Inspector Leopold, to whom no revelation of human frailty or greed ever seemed

surprising. Yet as he pondered the problem of what had caused the secret agents of "B" Group to act as they did, it was apparent that something far more insidious was at work than mere betrayal for pay. Rather, their behaviour seemed the end-product of a planned program of psychological development which gradually accustomed them to work in an atmosphere of conspiracy. In this work they were not alone, for in Montreal there existed a second group of agents working for the same masters.

Chapter Nine

THE PROFESSOR

THE LEAD that started the investigators on the trail of the first of Fred Rose's Montreal agents was an extract from Colonel Zabotin's notebook, in which he described the espionage system he had inherited upon his arrival in Ottawa in 1943.

Fred's Work
Professor

Group in Montreal (activists)

Frenchman. Noted chemist, about 40 years of age. Works in McGill University, Montreal. Is the best of the specialists on VV on the American Continent. Gives full information on explosives and chemical plants. Very rich. He is afraid to work. (Gave the formula of R.D.X. . . .)

R.D.X. was a contraction for Research Department Explosive. Through the cooperation of United States, Canadian, and British scientists a new method had been perfected for its large-scale production. This method was classified as secret during the war, and information concerning it was held to a limited number of persons. The work in Canada was performed by a Committee on Explosives, and its sub-committee on Research and Development, in the National Research Council. Dr. J. H. Ross was chairman of this sub-committee and working directly under him was Dr. Raymond Boyer of McGill University.

Most of the R.D.X. progress reports were written by Boyer himself, who was the outstanding Canadian authority on the chemistry of explosives. All were stamped secret.

It was at this point that Gouzenko supplied the missing link.

Q. Is "Professor" a cover name?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know to whom that refers?

A. In this case that applies to Professor Boyer of McGill University.

Q. How did you know that? Where did you get that information?

A. Usually this agent was referred to as "The Professor" only, but on one occasion there was a discussion about the atomic bomb and the professor's name came up in the discussion. Colonel Zabotin mentioned Professor Boyer.

Further, Gouzenko said:

Q. The reference here to sums of money being sent—in the documents which have already been put in here before the Commission there are references to the payments of moneys to various agents. You have seen these, have you not?

A. That is right.

Q. And that only deals with payments of which we have a record in the documents here. Were other payments made to agents from time to time?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. And did you at any time see the records of those payments?

A. I coded the telegrams in which accounts of those payments were made.

Q. Did you ever have anything to do with making payments to any agents?

A. No.

Q. That went through "Grant"?

A. "Grant" had charge of the operative funds, which he handed to Motinov for payment. Motinov was responsible for the agency work.

Q. So that on certain telegrams that we have seen up to now we see that certain payments have been made to certain agents; but it is to your knowledge that other payments have been made?

A. That is right.

Q. To persons already mentioned?

A. It is hard to remember. Each agent received money from the contact man who met him.

Q. So do you mean to say that they were all paid?

A. As far as I know they would all receive money, with the exception of such a man as "The Professor," who was very rich and did not need money.

Boyer was a tall, dark-haired individual with deep-set eyes and a superficial resemblance to fellow Canadian Raymond Massey. He had been born in Montreal, and in 1930 had graduated from McGill University with the degree of B.Sc., receiving his Ph.D. in chemistry in 1935. Following this he had done postgraduate work at Harvard, Vienna, and Paris, returning to Canada in 1937. Until the outbreak of the war he did not work for a living.

In the fall of 1939 he offered his services to the Canadian Government and suggested that he be sent to Russia to find out the Soviets' attitude toward the war. The offer was not accepted. In June, 1940, he called on the head of the Chemistry Department at McGill, who advised him to go to the University of Toronto where research into explosives had started. He did so and worked without salary, paying his own expenses. In September he returned to McGill where he developed a method of preparing R.D.X. in a way that had never before been attempted. As a result of his experiments, a plant to manufacture R.D.X. was commenced outside Shawinigan Falls in 1941, and in the spring of 1942 production was begun by the St. Maurice Chemical Company.

Boyer, with remarkable frankness, later testified how he had been drawn by Fred Rose into communicating complete information on R.D.X.

Q. I should like to go a little more fully with you into your relations with Fred Rose, and certain conversations you had with him at which certain of the things you were working on were discussed. Will you tell me how the first of these occasions arose, please, and when?

A. I am not sure when. I think it was early in 1943.

Q. And how did he approach you?

A. He telephoned me and asked me to go to his apartment, and asked me to reveal to him what we were doing in R.D.X. I told him we had worked out a new process; what materials went into the reaction; mind you, I am not sure that this is the

first time I had those conversations with him, but I also told him all the ways in which R.D.X. was used.

Q. And did you understand from him at that time that he was asking for this information and why?

A. Yes.

Q. You were willing to give the information you did give to Mr. Rose, knowing that it would be transmitted by him to the Russians?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, when he broached this subject to you on that first occasion, when he definitely asked for information, did it come to you as a surprise?

A. Yes.

Q. But you did give it to him on that first occasion?

A. Yes.

Q. You were handing over to somebody who was obviously an emissary of the Russians information which your oath of secrecy forbade you to give?

A. That is correct.

Even more remarkable was Dr. Boyer's statement concerning the reason why he had been tapped for his role:

Q. It has also been made to appear before us that other persons who were giving secret information, either directly to the Russians or for transmission to the Russians during the last few years, were either Communists or had definite communist leanings. It would seem apparent that when Rose asked you for information as to the work you were engaged in that he did that because he knew you for some considerable time. Would that be a fair deduction?

A. Well, I have known him since 1938.

Q. Not only have you known him, but you were known to him; is that so?

A. I had worked in many organisations with Communists, yes.

Q. And it would be a fair deduction to say that Rose spoke to you because he knew how you stood with regard to the Communist Party?

A. Yes.

Q. Would it also be a proper inference to say that you gave Rose information because of that same communist leaning or sympathy which you had?

A. Yes, I think that is a proper inference.

Q. . . . Dr. Boyer, you have already said that the thing that influenced you in actually giving that information were your communist sympathies, and in so doing you knew at that time that it was the official policy of Canada not to impart that information to unauthorised persons?

A. That is correct.

Q. In fact, you had taken an oath not to do that very thing?

A. That is correct.

Q. So in doing that in that particular instance you were put in a position where you had to act contrary to the interests of Canada as laid down officially?

A. That is correct.

When it was later revealed that a person of Dr. Boyer's prominence was involved, the press took on a tone of distinct shock. "Hitherto spy rings of such magnitude were thought to flourish only in decadent elements of European society where loyalties were transferable for cash, and where government was maintained by tyranny rather than the honest ballot box," reported the Ottawa correspondent of the *New York Times*.¹

To those who were concerned with the safety of the state, the sinister phase of the network was the ease with which intelligent, talented, and well-placed Canadians were willing to betray their country, and to supply the secret information to which they had access. With reference to these developments, Mr. Winston Churchill on June 5, 1946, declared before the Commons:

"Many countries seek information about the affairs of other countries, there is nothing new in that—but the difference between the Soviet system and the others is that in the Communist sect it is a matter of religion to sacrifice one's native land for the sake of the Communist Utopia. People who are infected with this disease will not hesitate for a moment to betray their country of its secrets. It is one of

¹ *New York Times*, March 24, 1946. Section IV, Page 12.

the peculiarities which renders Soviet espionage so dangerous.”²

The investigators sensed this peculiarity both in the type of personality under surveillance and the locale which they frequented. Except in rare instances detectives deal with a fringe of society peopled with thieves, swindlers, pickpockets, and gamblers. When the average detective goes on a shadowing detail he is apt to spend his time making the rounds of slum neighbourhoods, dance halls, and cafes. But in Canada, England, and later in the United States, the investigators working on the complexities of the Soviet espionage net found themselves dealing with men and women of proved scientific and administrative talent, people whose minds had been cultivated by the best of literature, art, and music, whose conversation was witty and sparkling if not profound, to whom monetary motives were of little or no importance, since the sums paid by the Soviets for the information received were but thoughtful tokens to compensate for out-of-pocket expenses. These secret agents frequented no smoke-filled saloons on back streets, but the austere and dignified halls of academic learning and of government itself.

² This viewpoint was also elaborated before the Canadian Parliament by Mr. Mackenzie King, who said: “It is no excuse, as some cynics in this country are suggesting, to say that all nations employ foreign agents. We are not trying a foreign power; we are charging our own nationals with an offense against their fellow-citizens, which, if proven, no right-thinking person can condone. That, I think, should be made abundantly clear because some sections of the press in our country and in the United States have publicised this matter in a way which I believe has tended to complicate a very difficult international situation.” (House of Commons Debates, March 18, 1946. Page 57.)

Chapter Ten

THE BROTHERS-IN-LAW

OF THE HUNDRED documents, eleven dealt with the activities of agent "Gray."

Number one was in that section of Zabotin's notebook which described the Montreal Group:

1—Gray

Head of a section of the Directorate for securing war materials for the Allies. Taken to work on 1.9.42. He works well. Gives materials on shells and cannons (on films).

Number two was a telegram from Zabotin to the "Director," dated April 28, 1944, in which was discussed the possibility of using relatives of "Gray's" wife in Roumania for the secret transmission of letters.

To the Director,

Gray's wife has relatives in Bukovina and Bucharest. Apart from relatives she has many acquaintances among doctors and other specialists. Recently Gray handed over to Davie a reply from the Canadian Red Cross of March, 1942, wherein it was announced that relatives of Gray's wife are in their own places, that is, in Roumania. Gray's wife asked through Gray to advise as to whether it is possible to send them money or other things.

Davie replied that this was a complicated and difficult question, and that therefore I could not promise anything. Would suggest that he secure addresses and letters from Gray's wife with a proposal of contact with a man for these acquaintances. In the letters it could be proposed (i.e. through Gray's wife) that they agree to this.

That they contact with the person who delivers the letter. If you agree to such an idea we shall receive the addresses and letters from the wife of Gray. Roofs—the doctors and other specialists. Letters from Lesovia—there are no suspicions against us.

Grant.

28.4.44.

Gouzenko explained the use of the code words in the foregoing. "Lesovia" meant Canada, and "roofs" was an expression covering illegal activities. Thus it appeared that Colonel Zabotin was scheming to turn to his advantage a simple enquiry concerning the safety of relatives in war-torn Roumania.

The third document was telegram 234 of August 2, 1945:

To the Director,

234

Gray has received a copy of a letter of the Deputy Minister of Munitions and Supplies to all government companies, to government companies which are under private management, and to the principal directors of production branches, May, 1945. I report the contents of the letter.

The letter itself was purely administrative and the text has been omitted for the sake of brevity. In substance it dealt with the procedures to be followed during the closing down of Crown-owned munitions plants.

Document number four consisted of a page from a looseleaf notebook, handwritten in English on both sides. It described the technical features of test firing of shells containing liquid R.D.X. and proved to be a verbatim excerpt of remarks made at a secret meeting of the Ordnance Board.

The fifth document was another Zabotin—"The Director" cable of August 2.

To the Director,

232

We have received from Gray the whole correspondence on the question of the theory of the deformation of the shell in the channel of the barrel. Altogether about 150 pages. We shall send them in rote.

Grant.

2.8.45.

Number six was cable 11295. "The Director"—"Grant," requesting further information as to the methods and technical processes of the production of explosives and chemicals.

The seventh, dated August 14, 1945, was Zabotin's answer to six, advising "The Director" that the assignment had been split up amongst "Gray," "Bacon," and "The Professor," through Fred Rose. It read:

To the Director, with reference to No. 11295 250

The task will be assigned to Gray, to Bacon, and to the Professor through Debouz. The Professor is still away on a business trip. There will be a meeting with Debouz at the end of this month.

Grant.

14.8.45.

Eight was cable 263 to Moscow. It discussed "Gray's" profession and the possibility of setting him up as a secret agent in the post-war period.

To the Director, 263

Gray was earlier assigned the task of taking all measures to remain in his old job. At the last meeting the latter stated that in the near future great reductions will begin. In the event that it will be impossible to remain on the old job, Gray proposes to form a geological-engineering consulting office in Ottawa. Gray is a geological engineer by profession and therefore can head this office. The expenses for organising the office are as follows: rent of premises, \$600 a year; wages for one clerk, \$1,200 a year; office equipment, \$1,000; payment to Gray as director, \$4,200 a year; altogether it will require \$7,000 a year. Gray stated that Canada is entering a "boom" period in the mining industry, and it is therefore very likely that within two years the office will be in a position to support itself. The initial expenditure of the establishment will be repaid in the future. Gray thinks that it is necessary to begin establishing such an office gradually, that is, prior to his completion of work at the old place. I beg to get your decision.

25.8.45

Grant.

The ninth document was a cable of August 25, 1945, regarding modification of plans on production of war materials which Zabotin thought would be of interest to his superiors in the grey building at Znamensky, 19, where the Red Army Intelligence was located. Number ten, also a cable, gave "Gray" credit for information on Torpex, an explosive for depth bombs. Finally, number eleven was the mailing list of January, 1945, on which "Gray" was carried as the source of items 196, 197, and 198, dealing with corrected munitions production schedules.

Faced with the problem of identifying "Gray," Inspector Leopold

jotted on a slip of memo paper: "Geological engineer—salary \$4,200—probably branch chief in Department of Munitions and Supply."

He pinned this to document number four, the page torn from a looseleaf notebook. On the memo he wrote: "Check for handwriting."

An anonymous Royal Canadian Mounted Police plainclothes investigator then waded through the files of the American Branch of the Department of Munitions and Supply, found the original document, No. 31789, in a secret folder of the Ordnance Board. The records showed that this paper had been charged out to one Harold S. Gerson. Gerson's signature matched the handwriting on the pages brought by Gouzenko from the Soviet Embassy.

A check on the civil service personnel records revealed some interesting data on Gerson.

First of all, he was a native-born Canadian of Russian parents. He had held both Bachelor of Science and Master of Science in geology degrees from McGill University and had been a successful geological engineer with numerous mining companies before the war.

In December, 1941, he had applied for employment with the Allied War Supplies Limited, a Crown company which supervised the construction of chemical and explosive plants.

Later he was employed on the staff of the Department of Munitions and Supply in Ottawa and was secretary and chief of the Records Division of the Ammunition Production Branch as Inspector Leopold had surmised. He was paid \$4,200 a year. In the course of his duties he had access to secret information, a great deal of which he had passed on to the Soviets through Fred Rose.

When the investigators went to observe him they found a stocky, pipe-smoking man with curly brown hair, wearing metal-rimmed glasses, who in appearance resembled a kindly-faced university instructor.

As in the case of the others in the ring, it was difficult to associate the pleasant, intelligent, self-assured personality of Gerson with the "Gray" whose record of conspiracy was outlined in the Embassy documents. Yet the link, forged by the handwriting similarities, was made even stronger since the cables discussed matters to which only Gerson had consistent access.

Once more it was a question of quarantining the suspect until such time as the signal was given to crack down. For months afterward Harold S. Gerson was left to brood over the fact that although he

reported for work each day and everyone was as nice as he could be, he was constantly being sent off on laborious and troublesome assignments, the sense of which he was never quite certain.

The next code name to be studied was that of "Foster," whose name also appeared in Zabotin's notebook.

Foster—Englishman. Assistant to the superintendent of the Division of Distributing of War Production at the Ministry of Munitions and Supplies.

Has been giving materials on war supplies: guns and other kinds of supplies.

He obtained different work with promotions. Can better give materials.

He is contacting with Martin.

(Ours).

These notes had been made by Colonel Zabotin sometime after his arrival in Ottawa in June, 1943, and, according to Gouzenko, were based on information received from Major Sokolov "Davie" and Sergei Koudriavtzev "Leon", the First Secretary of the Embassy, who had set up the framework of the espionage group before full diplomatic status had been accorded the Soviet mission to Canada.

"Martin" was the cover name for Zheveinov, one of the Tass representatives in Ottawa, and the parenthical "Ours" meant that "Foster" was a Communist. "In other words," said Gouzenko, "he belongs to us."

On the January 5 mailing list "Foster" was credited as the source of seventy different items which had been put in the diplomatic pouch for study by the Red Army Intelligence experts.

Thanks to the notebook in which "Foster's" official position was clearly defined, all that remained for the investigators to do was to check the personnel roster of the Department of Munitions and Supply.

The name that they found was that of James Scotland Benning.

The records show that at the time of Zabotin's notes he was under consideration for promotion to the Economics and Statistics Branch, and that he had worked in the Department since July, 1942. He had received several promotions and in the spring of 1945 had held the important post of Joint Secretary of the Munitions Assignment Committee where he had access to post-war defence plans.

When the investigators checked a little further they uncovered

something else of interest, namely, that Benning was a brother-in-law of Gerson, and had been recommended for his job by the latter.

In one line of the mailing list, Item 155 had been described as follows: "155—Foster—North American Committee—Report of 23.11.44, 14 pages," and under the last column, "Remarks," had been written: "See who was Secr. Meeting."

The document in question proved to be the minutes of the North American Coordinating Committee held on November 23, 1944, signed by H. S. Gerson, the secretary. Zabotin apparently could not resist calling to the attention of the director in Moscow the fact that he had this meeting sewed up from both ends—from "Foster," who had given him the documents, and from "Gray," who compiled them.

Benning was a tall, oval-faced man with a thin moustache who was very diligent about his work with the Government and had an excellent standing among his associates. Like the others, he was put under observation. Shortly afterward another interesting scrap of information came to light.

One night Mounted Police plainclothesmen made a search of his desk. In an alphabetical list-finder they found this entry: "Fred 3-8605 4394."

The numbers proved to be the telephone extensions of Fred Rose M.P. at his Ottawa flat and his office in the House of Commons.

This was an entry that Benning was to regret. It was largely on the basis of this apparent connection with Rose that the Royal Commission decided to reject Benning's denials. When it came to the criminal proceeding, Benning was convicted in the trial court but the conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeal on April 24, 1947, on the ground that "the evidence did not show Benning did any identifiable act at any identifiable time or in relation to any such act was in communication with anybody."

Chapter Eleven

FRANK

UP TO THIS POINT the investigators had comparatively smooth sailing and had been able to identify and bring under surveillance each of the code names they had come across.

Now they were heading into rougher and deeper waters and it became increasingly difficult to locate the remaining cover names which appeared in the hundred documents.

For example, there were agents in Fred Rose's Montreal Group whose cover names began with "G."

The clues concerning them were:

Green—Works in the administration of the Tank Plant Locomotive in Montreal. A key position. Gives information on the number of tanks being delivered.

Gini—Auxiliary Group. Owner of a chemist's shop. He provided a place for photography. He has a laboratory.

Galya—A housewife. Her husband works as a merchant. Is establishing contact with Fred. After the reorganisation she was a contact with *Gray*.

To this day they have never been located. However, these were small fry compared to the mysterious figure of "Frank," to whom had been entrusted the audacious task of obtaining agents within the very General Staff of the Armed Forces.

A cable from Zabotin to the "Director", dated August 2, 1945, contained menacing implications: "Frank promised to give us several officers from the central administration of the active forces. At present it is a pretty hard thing to do."

There was also a notebook entry which showed that he had been assigned "the task of developing our work in the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry for Air, the Ministry of the Navy, and the military staffs. Also possibilities regarding the selection of people in the

General Staffs of the Armed Forces. At present these fields are of great interest to us and we want to put forth maximum efforts."

Who was the agent to whom had been entrusted the most delicate of all espionage assignments, the penetration of the victim nation's General Staff?

Again it was the files which supplied the answer. A registration card brought by Gouzenko read:

Surname—Sam Carr.

Pseudonym—Frank.

Home—14 Montrose, Tel. LI-7847.

Place of work—Labour Progressive Party—polit. worker.

Financial conditions—Financially secure, but takes money.

It is necessary occasionally to help.

Biographical data—Detailed material on his biography is available in the Centre in the Comintern. Has an excellent knowledge of the Russian language. He graduated from the Lenin school in Moscow.

His photograph pasted to the upper right-hand corner of the card showed him to be a moon-faced, dark-haired man with shell-framed glasses.

Inspector Leopold, who had spent his life in counter-subversive work, knew the face only too well.

Carr, whose proper name was Schmil Kogan, was born at Tomach-pol, in the Russian Ukraine, on July 7, 1906, and landed in Canada on August 29, 1924. He went first to Regina where he worked as a harvester and labourer, and in 1925 went to Montreal where under the name of Sam Cohen he joined the Young Communist League. In 1927 he moved to Toronto and became a member of the Communist Party of Canada. He married a year later, and a son was born in 1934.

In 1929 Carr had gone to Russia for a course of study at the Lenin Institute, and in 1931 was appointed Organising Secretary of the Communist Party. On June 23 of that year he applied for naturalisation, and in November was convicted on three charges under Section 98 of the Criminal Code of Canada, for which he received a ten-year sentence in Kingston Penitentiary.

Upon his release from prison on parole, he immediately resumed his Communist Party activities. In 1935 he was one of the main agitators in the On-to-Ottawa March of the Unemployed. He renewed

his application for naturalisation in 1937 while he was conducting a National Training School for the Communist Party in Toronto and was thought to have visited both Spain and the U.S.S.R. in that year.

In 1938, on being relieved of his organisational work with the Party, he was made responsible for the party publication, *The Clarion*. In 1939, 1940, and 1941 he contributed many articles to Communist Party publications both in America and the United Kingdom, all of which were designed to impede and obstruct Canada's war effort.

Carr disappeared early in 1940 and his literary contributions to the anti-war drive are believed to have been written from a hide-out in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. An order for his detention was signed by the Canadian Minister of Justice in June, 1940, but the warrant went unserved until September 25, 1942, when together with sixteen other wanted leaders of the Communist Party he surrendered to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Toronto. He was held at the Don jail in Toronto while an Advisory Committee met to hear his objections to internment.

The charges, five in number, ranged from "taking an active part in subversive activities of the Communist Party of Canada for several years" to the writing of articles "attacking Canada's war effort."

Carr admitted all of the charges contained in the particulars of his case, stating that while he subscribed to the aims and objects of the Communist Party he had no particular feeling for Russia, as "he had no memories of that country but bitter ones, his father, Samuel Kogan, having been killed before the eyes of his family during the revolution."

He said that he had been exploited in the harvest fields of western Canada and claimed that he was attracted to the Young Communist League by its programme of championing the "underdog." He admitted that some of his writings had been "sharp" and "extravagant," and said that he became ashamed of them when the turn of international political events in 1941 revealed to him that the war had become "just" and "a people's war." He declared that he had no other intention except to see the war concluded quickly with an Allied victory and would exert all his efforts to that end.

The Advisory Committee reported that it was "unanimously of the opinion that the liberation of Sam Carr would no longer prejudice the safety of the state" and recommended release along the same lines that had been suggested for Fred Rose, namely that he refrain from

Party work and propaganda, and that he report to the police once a month.

In his registration under the National Registration Regulations on March 30, 1942, Carr, in answer to the question "If not British to what country do you owe allegiance?" gave the answer "Russia." However, he was granted a naturalisation certificate on March 1, 1945, and a few days later was given a Canadian passport valid for the United States, Mexico, and Cuba. This passport was to serve him in good stead, for when a summons was served on him in April, 1946, to appear before the Royal Commission he was by that time well out of reach in Cuba.

The record of his activities as contained in the Embassy files showed him to be one of the main international links in the spy network. To him had been entrusted the task of facilitating the illegal entry into Canada of professional Soviet agents. This was brought to light by the following entries in his dossier:

ASSIGNMENT No. 3 of "1.8.45"

1. Requirements which a person living as an "illegal" must meet (nationality, citizenship, occupation, education, knowledge of languages, family and financial conditions, etc.).
2. Ways of legalisation (organisation of a commercial undertaking, joining business firm as a partner, what kind of firm, joining as a member any office, joining the army as a volunteer, accepting employment).
3. Documents which an "illegal" must possess (passport, different kinds of certificates, references, recommendation letters, etc.).
4. More expedient methods to slip into the country.
5. To provide for secure living quarters and financial means during the period when the "illegal" gets acquainted with the local set-up and conditions.
6. To reveal the channels of influence of the English Government on the foreign policy of Canada.
7. Conditions of entry into the country and of moving about in the country.
8. Conditions of adaptation and living in the country.
9. Methods of work of the counter-espionage. The organisation of the Federal and provincial counter-espionage services.

also:

Supplement to No. 11438

11436
14.8.45

To Grant

Reference No. 227

1. There can be no further delay in obtaining the passport. Therefore the signature on the new application form should be made by Frank's man himself.

2. Prepare for the next regular mail a short report on the procedure of obtaining and putting into shape of passports and of the other documentation for our objectives, indicating exactly who on Frank's side will be engaging in this work.

10.8.45

Director.

Supplement: The pseudonym Sam has long ago been changed to Frank. In the future use the latter.

Grant 14.8.45.

10.8.

Director.

and:

Assigned personally 16.8.45
The Task

1. To write a report on the technique of making up passports and other documents, indicating precisely who on your side (Frank's) is engaged in this activity.

2. What documents can be made and can be received through you.

In addition there was another of the Zabotin cables to Moscow. But this one was not to "The Director", but to the "Chief of the Main Administration," none other than the war hero Colonel-General Kouznetsov, Chief of the General Intelligence Headquarters of the Red Army. In this cable Zabotin suggested that he be allowed to return to Moscow for a period of from two to three weeks, adding:

I would like to complete the fairly complicated task of obtaining a passport for our man in America (the Director knows about it) and after this to leave for the Centre. The receipt of the passport is expected in the next few days. I will report the receipt of the latter immediately.

Since this was the first indication that the ring had placed an agent in the United States, the investigators sought a clue to his identity.

There were many more references to passport transactions in the notes kept by Colonel Rogov. They showed that negotiations had been in progress between Sam Carr and unknown sub-agents for six months, culminating in a meeting on August 1, described as follows:

COURSE OF MEETINGS

No.	<i>Substance of the Meetings</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
P.		
6.	1.8.45—The regular meeting took place. Everything was normal. The doctor was at the meeting. All the business was transacted in the automobile.	Gave a bottle of whiskey.

Handed over W——'s passport and four snapshots with his wife. Putting it completely into shape may be accomplished in the first half of September.

The idea of the substitution: The former photo of W. (not our man) is removed, in its place is put a photograph of our man with wife, but everything is dated from 1937. This is necessary in order to be watertight. After this the exchange is made for a new passport, for this it is necessary to fill out two questionnaires, which afterwards will be attached to the old one.

Consequently it is necessary for W. to have signatures on four questionnaires, two of which are for the 1937 form and two for the exchange of 1945.

In the case of an exchange it is necessary to find a reason for it. He (Frank) proposes to burn half of the passport, and to leave only the number, but this has not yet been decided; it is possible that it will not be necessary to do this, as the man who is doing the job will do everything himself and not depend on others.

The executor has agreed to everything and is ready for the work.

As to the costs, Frank confirmed once more that it will not be below three.

As the first step in extracting the meaning from the foregoing, Inspector Leopold made a study of the procedures used in the Passport Office. Only then was it possible to understand that the spies had planned on the following steps:

1. The picture of the real W., "not our man," was to be removed from the files of the Passport Office.

2. In its place would be substituted the photograph of Agent W. and his wife, dated from 1937.

3. After this had been done, a new 1945 passport would be issued for Agent W. on the basis that he was the true holder of the earlier 1937 document.

4. Four forms, two for 1937 and two for 1945, would have to bear Agent W.'s signature. The manufactured 1937 form would be submitted for the original 1937 form, and this would be used as a basis for the issue of the new passport whenever a comparison was made.

5. In the event that it might be necessary to surrender the old passport, or at least produce it for inspection, Sam Carr has suggested that it be burned, leaving nothing but the number—and therefore no data for comparison with the old 1937 application then in the file.

The reference to "not less than three" was taken to mean not less than "three thousand dollars," as Gouzenko recalled coding a cable to Moscow on this point.

That the Soviets were willing to expend such a sum for the forgery was taken as an indication of the importance with which the matter was regarded in Moscow.

Who then was this "W." for whom such elaborate measures were being taken to establish his right to a Canadian passport?

Chapter Twelve

TWO IGNACY WITCZAKS

GOUZENKO REMEMBERED that when the assignment was first proposed to Sam Carr the latter had hesitated to act for fear that the original Canadian citizen was still alive.

"There were some cables exchanged on the subject. They referred to a Polish name, Witczak. Moscow said that they were positive that the real man had died in Spain in 1937. They regarded their man in America as a very important worker. In such circumstances three thousand dollars was nothing."

"All right," said Inspector Leopold, "we'll see what the passport people have on this man."

The Passport Office was located at 38 Bank Street, Ottawa. Records more than three years old were stored in the basement of a nearby church. Here the investigators discovered the folder of one Ignacy Witczak and the tricks that had been played with it.

First of all, the file copy of the original 1937 document showed that the man had given his birthdate as October 13, 1906, his occupation as farmer, and his height as 5 feet 9 inches.

On the application, presumably dated 1937, the birthdate was given as October 13, 1910, the occupation as merchant, and the height as 5 feet 8 inches.

To the file copy had been added the name of Bunia Witczak with the following description: "Profession, housewife; place and date of birth, Kurowo, Poland, March 29, 1914; domicile, Canada; height, 5 feet 2 inches; colour of eyes, grey; colour of hair, brown."

This new information had been added by a different typewriter.

It was the practice in connection with an application to require two photographs of the applicant and two of the wife, one photograph of each being certified by a voucher. The certified photographs remained with the application in the file, while the uncertified photos were attached to the issued passport.

In Witczak's file there were photographs of a man and a woman, but neither was certified. The photo of the man showed a neat, rather prissy-looking individual with narrow-set eyes and metal-rimmed glasses. The woman had small, bird-like features, and was unsmiling.

Since a passport passed through a number of divisions, at each step it was initialed by various employees. The applications for Witczak bore no initials at all.

When received, an application was given a file number and when a passport was issued an index card was made. There was no index card for Witczak.

The records show that on August 30, 1945, number 2979-45 had been issued to Ignacy and Bunia Witczak. But the index card and file on this number were not those of Witczak but some other person.

Who had gone to such lengths to muddle the files?

Delving into other records, the detectives found that on May 14, 1945, the Witczak file of 1937, which was numbered 3699-37, and another file in the name of Sheppard, numbered 4019-37, were withdrawn by W. M. Pappin, a clerk in the Passport Office.

It was the function of the section which Pappin headed to enter upon the back of the passport application the amount of the fee received and the manner of payment. These payments and the names are then put on the cash sheets and Pappin signed these sheets each day. Since he did not do this work himself, he did not have personal knowledge of all of the entries on the sheets he signed.

Another set of records maintained informally by the clerk in the storage section, Mrs. Adrienne Souliere, showed further that on August 27, 1945, the Witczak folder and the Sheppard folder were again taken from their place in the church basement by a clerk in the filing section who had daily access to the files.

Since it was on August 30, 1945, that the passport for the false Witczak was issued, the significance of the second withdrawal could not be overlooked. Since the fee for the issue of the passport was entered on the cash sheet for the 31st, which was signed by Pappin, both the file clerk and Pappin were closely questioned.

The clerk had no recollection of having asked for either of the files, nor could she think of any reason why she should have taken them.

Pappin, on questioning, denied receiving the file either on May 14 or August 27. He did not know there was any such record as that kept

by Mrs. Souliere; he was tried and acquitted of charges. To this day the question of who juggled the Witczak records has never been answered.

For the investigators on the spot at the time there was an even more pressing problem to be worked out, namely, the whereabouts of the two Witczaks—the real and the false.

The 1937 file-copy passport, although tampered with by the addition of a wife and new photographs, still bore the original data concerning the applicant. In it his address was given as Stop 31, West Hill, Ontario. To that area Mounted Police investigators now converged. It was a farming community where everyone knew everyone else. Here they found the original Witczak, not only very much alive, but completely bewildered as to why he, a hard-working bachelor farmhand and part-time shoemaker, was suddenly the central figure in an international spy hunt.

It took considerable checking to verify his story, but when the facts were assembled, the following stood out:

Farmhand Witczak had come to Canada from Poland as an immigrant in April, 1930, landing at Halifax from the s.s. *Frederick VIII*. From Halifax he had gone to Toronto and after a short stay had pushed on to the Leamington area where he became a farm labourer. In May, 1935, he applied for naturalisation, which was granted on March 3, 1936. Then came the Spanish Civil War and in February, 1937, he decided that he wanted to fight on the side of the Spanish Republican Government. He applied for a Canadian passport in March, 1937, through the local agent of the French Line at Windsor, Ontario.

In due course this was issued, and he proceeded to Spain as a member of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion of the International Brigade. At the military base of Albacete, he and some others were relieved of their passports by an officer who told them that it was risky to take such important documents into the front line where they might be destroyed.

When his term of service was finished Witczak, in all innocence, had asked for the return of his passport.

He was told that the trucks which had carried them had been bombed and that the documents had "probably" been burned. The same answer was given to the others who had asked for their papers.

Passportless Witczak then returned to Canada, arriving at Halifax

on February 3, 1939. He did not obtain a new passport, but received instead a new naturalisation certificate after he stated that he had lost the original while swimming a river in Helicoursi, Spain.

He returned to Leamington, farming in season, and shoe repairing off season, in an obscure humble role that never would have aroused official interest had not his passport continued on a career of its own.

Search of United States immigration records now revealed that on September 13, 1938, a man and a woman using the names of "Ignacy Witczak" and "Bunia Witczak," giving their nationality as Canadian, had landed in New York on the *s.s. Veendam* from Boulogne, France.

Was this the mystery couple for whose benefit the Canadian files had been turned inside out? If so, where were they and what were they doing?

As the spy hunt jumped across the border to the United States, Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and his corps of G-men, went into action.

To all F.B.I. Field Division offices went urgent teletype messages in which the tricky, hard-to-pronounce Polish name of "Witczak" was featured. Consulting local directories and official records the G-men made the rounds of the various immigration offices where the name "Witczak" might be listed.

They struck their first lead when the alien registration records in Los Angeles, California, showed that on September 19, 1939, one Ignacy Samuel Witczak had described himself as a merchant with no relatives in the United States and had stated that he had arrived at Detroit, Michigan, on September 28, 1939, via railroad from Canada.

On the records for the same date the name of Bunia Witczak also appeared. She reported the same data, and said that she had a husband living in the United States.

The man's declaration gave his birthplace as Korowa, Poland, on October 13, 1910—the same village as the real Witczak but a birth-date later by four years.

At Detroit an immediate search was made of the records to determine if a couple by that name had really entered from Canada. As was to be expected, none was found.

The focus of enquiry now centered on the Los Angeles area. The G-men explored their sources of information and began to get results in short order. What they found was surprising.

At the University of Southern California, the directory showed

that in the autumn of 1938, Ignacy Samuel Witczak had enrolled as a special student and had pursued a course of study in the social sciences. His record showed thirty-one "A's" and a "cum laude" to his credit, in addition to that highest of all scholastic honors—a gold Phi Beta Kappa key.

His photograph in cap and gown in the Southern California year-book revealed a face smooth and expressionless as a wax mask, with narrow-set eyes and primly pursed lips. This Witczak looked more like a fussy schoolmaster than a suspected Soviet agent. It appeared incredible that he could be the individual in question. However, a comparison with the photographs in the Canadian passport files dispelled any doubts. The same face showed on the prints which had been slipped into the folder in place of the farmer-shoemaker.

Guarded enquiries at the University revealed little of the Witczaks' past or present activities. He had occasionally spoken of life in Paris and Shanghai and was fluent in both Chinese and Japanese. He had no visible means of support, but was never known to lack funds. To friends he hinted that he was being taken care of "by relatives in Canada." From time to time he had made trips "to study the archives of the Library of Congress in Washington." He had been on such a trip in September, 1945, shortly after Gouzenko had fled the Soviet Embassy. Fellow students recalled that when Witczak had returned to the University he had been highly nervous and less communicative than usual.

The G-men checked further, and found that he was living with his wife and two-year-old son, Dickie, in a flat at 849 Gramercy Drive. They began a twenty-four-hour a day watch on his comings and goings.

One day he left his house and did not return.

Left behind were his wife and son.

Shortly afterward the latter were seen to board a tramcar near Long Beach. That was the last time that they were seen by their friends and neighbours.

The press concluded that the Witczaks disappeared from surveillance. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has never made a statement on the matter, let alone acknowledge that the case was being looked into. Since the enquiry is still being pressed, the question of the couple's whereabouts is one that cannot be discussed without prejudicing certain phases of the case which are still highly secret.

While it may be tantalising to close the story of the false Witczak at

this point, the requirements of national security are paramount. Some day the full details may be revealed. For the present the incident must be accepted for what it is—a fleeting glimpse of the devious methods of espionage.

Chapter Thirteen

THE DOCTORS

ON A slip of paper pasted to the top of one of the notebooks which had been kept by Lieutenant Colonel Motinov "Lamont" was written:

Urgent call for Sam. Is accomplished through the optical doctor, Harris Henry, residing at 279 College St., Toronto. Lamont calls the doctor by teleph—Midway 95-53. *Password*—"I want to say Hollow to Frank." This is to mean that the meeting will take place in the hospital area, behind the Eaton Store on the corner of Yonge-College St. at 21.30.

There was also a sketch showing the area of Yonge Street, between King and College Streets and Eaton's shop. The particular hospital referred to was not indicated on the sketch, but both the Sick Children's Hospital and the Toronto General Hospital were nearby.

The dossier also contained the following pages in Rogov's handwriting. These indicated that "Brent", cover name for Rogov, had taken over from Motinov "Lamont" on May 7, 1945.

COURSE OF MEETINGS

No. P.	Substance of Meetings	Remarks
1.	Urgent call for Frank (through the doctor): (a) Ring on the telephone Midway-9553. (b) <i>Brent</i> says: "Hallo Dr. Henry. How are you? How is your wife?" (c) <i>The Doctor</i> answers: "Very well, I shall see you later." This means that the meeting shall take place at the corner of <i>Lowther and Admiral Rd. at 21.00.</i>	
	Should, however, the doctor answer: "I am glad to see you again"—it means that the	

meeting shall take place at the above mentioned place and at the same time, *but on the next day.*

Remarks

2. 7.5.45—The meeting took place near the hospital, everything was normal.
3. 15.6.45—The regular meeting took place at the corner of Somerset and the square (Park). Everything was normal. The doctor reported that no progress was made with the passport because of lack of authentic data (see telegram of 16.6.45).
4. Regular meeting—17.7.45 }
Emergency meeting—24.7.45 } T=21.30
The place—by the hospital.
5. 3.7.45—An urgent meeting took place with regard to the passport. Also here, in the flat of the doctor, got acquainted with Frank. Everything was normal (see telegram of 5.7.45).
Regular meeting—17.7.45 }
Emergency meeting—24.7.45 } T=21.30
The place—in the flat of the doctor.

Handed out:

To Frank—200 dol. To the Doctor—100 dol. The meeting took place through the doctor.

There was another reference to Harris in Motinov's notebook. Dated 16.12.44, it read: "Handed over 200 dollars. The passport has been detained. The forms were badly filled in. I made him acquainted with doctor Harris Henry. I set the next meeting for 20.1.45 at 21.00 at the old place near the hospital if doctor Harris does not change it."

The Canadian Government records showed that Henry Harris, an optometrist, had come to Canada twenty-five years before, having been born in New York City of Russian parents. He had a flat at 215 College Street, and an office at 279 College Street, Toronto.

Concerning him, the Royal Commission later reported: "Harris says he has known Sam Carr for about ten years and they are on very friendly if not intimate terms. Harris claims he first knew Carr as a salesman of advertising for communist newspapers. Later Carr became a patient and ultimately contracted the habit of visiting Harris' office, as the latter put it 'possibly every day for the last five or six years anyway.' Carr is the National Organiser of the Labour Progress-

sive Party. We have no difficulty on the evidence in concluding that Harris is either a member of or an active sympathiser with the Party. He displayed the same lack of frankness on this subject as was displayed by a number of other witnesses with regard to this matter.

"He stated that although he had written to Carr more than once since the latter's departure for Cuba in January last and had received two or three letters from him, he had destroyed these and could not remember the address to which he had sent his letters, although his last letter to Carr was within a month of his appearance before us. Harris also told us that notwithstanding his intimacy with Carr he never discussed politics with him. We think this too great a strain on the credulity of any ordinary person."

At the time of the original investigation, however, Harris was tabbed for future arrest, while the second of the doctors in the passport case was studied.¹

In the Witczak dossier in the Passport Office the voucher on the application that had been placed in the file of the false Witczak bore the signature of one John Soboloff, M.D., of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. In this voucher Soboloff declared that he had been acquainted with Ignacy Witczak for three years and believed that the statements made in the declaration were true, and that from personal knowledge he could vouch for him as a satisfactory and proper person to receive a passport.

Soboloff, a medical practitioner, was finally called before the Royal Commission on April 5, 1946. He then admitted that he had not known Witczak, nor the applicant for the passport, at any time and that he had signed the application in April or May of 1945 on the personal request of Sam Carr who, as a friend and patient, had requested it as a favour."

"Carr was a patient of mine and a public figure," said Soboloff. "When he asked me to do it, without questioning it at all and without giving any thought, I did so." He said that Carr gave him to understand that it was a question of helping someone to leave the country or get into the country, he was not sure which.

Apparently what happened in the case of the Witczak passport was a well-settled Soviet practice, for several sources, including the

¹ Although Harris was convicted at the trial held subsequently and sentenced to five years, both the verdict and the sentence were set aside by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that "there is no evidence that he was connected with the obtaining of documents."

late W. G. Krivitsky, former chief of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, have mentioned the high value placed upon Canadian and United States identification documents by Soviet spymasters who sent their agents abroad to pose as their true owners. During the Spanish Civil War, for example, it was a commonplace affair to pick up all of the volunteers' passports upon their arrival in Spain, and only rarely was such a passport returned. It has been estimated that from the United States alone over two thousand genuine passports were sent to Moscow. Nearly every diplomatic pouch that arrived from Spain at secret police headquarters on the Lubianka contained a batch of passports from members of the International Brigade, which were easily made over to fit their new bearers—the Soviet secret agents.

Such skills were a heritage of the revolution, as conditions in Czarist Russia afforded many opportunities for circumventing the elaborate passport regulations established in Europe after 1918. Krivitsky and other observers have reported that secret police experts were able to forge consular signatures and government seals wholly indistinguishable from the genuine.

That there must have been many instances similar to the Witczak case, few who were acquainted with the enquiry had any doubt. But Gouzenko's documents were limited to those which he had been able to carry away in a brief span of time. As such they permitted only a partial exposé of the methods used by the military network headed by Colonel Zabotin.

Chapter Fourteen

PROMETHEUS AND FRIENDS

ONE of the most controversial questions to arise in the course of the exposé was the definition of the precise role played by Naval Lieutenant David Shugar, to whom the Soviets had given the cover name of "Prometheus." It was a case of the Royal Commission saying, "He did," and the courts replying, "Not guilty."

The status of a Royal Commission occupies a special place in British law. While it sits it is a completely independent institution of government, on a par with the Privy Council, the courts, and Parliament. Its findings are subject neither to review nor appeal and its function is to conduct the investigation assigned to it and to report to the Governor in Council. Wide as its privileges are, there is one power which it is denied. It cannot enforce its findings. If, as a consequence of its reports, convictions resulted, well and good. If not—that was a matter for the courts, for they alone had the right to punish.

Unlike a court, a commission is the sole judge of its own procedure. It may receive evidence of any kind, hearsay, circumstantial, or direct, according to its discretion. In this respect, it is sometimes in a better position to ascertain facts than a court bound by rigid rules concerning the admissibility of evidence, rules which have been handed down over the centuries to safeguard the individual against arbitrary punishment.

In the case of Lieutenant Shugar, the Embassy files on Sam Carr contained a "Task" in which he was mentioned by name. It read:

TASK No. 1 of "16.12.45"

To Sam for Shugar

1. Tactical and technical facts of the naval and coastal hydro acoustic stations working in ultra-sound diapason. Common review on the "Caproni's" stability of the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

2. Stability, type of "Asdic" which is used in new submarines and other ships.

3. Sets of the "Sonar's" type, working on the radio direction finding principle so-called hydro location finding sets.

4. Situation of hydrophonic sets in the ships of different classes.

5. Plants, workshops. Scientific Research Institutes, and laboratories in England and in the U.S.A. which are making and planning the hydrophonic apparatus.

6. Passing of the planning and the test of examples of new types of the hydrophonic apparatus.

7. Knowledge of the battle utilisation of the hydrophonic means.

Concerning this Gouzenko testified:

Q. Who is Shugar?

A. That is the real name of an agent suggested by Sam.

Q. Do you know what his initials are?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know what he was doing, who he was?

A. He was working in the Naval Department. He is a specialist in anti-submarine detection; Asdic.

Q. And are you aware that he also had a nickname or a cover name?

A. Later he was given a nickname, Prometheus, or Promety in Russian.

Royal Navy records showed that one David Shugar had entered service on February 4, 1944, as Sub-Lieutenant. He had been born in Poland in 1915, and came to Canada at the age of five. He had received his B.Sc. in physics from McGill University in 1936 and his Ph.D. in 1940. For a short time he had been employed in the University Department of Physiology and then entered the employ of Research Enterprises, Ltd., a Crown company near Toronto, in January, 1941, where he remained until he joined the Navy.

On arrival in Ottawa in March, 1944, Shugar was assigned to the staff of the Director of Electrical Supply. The purpose of this branch was to produce anti-submarine equipment, and one of his first assignments was to eliminate the difficulty being experienced with the paper

used in Asdic equipment. The problem turned out to be one of chemistry, not physics, and Shugar was made liaison officer between the Navy and the University of Toronto research specialists, headed by Dr. Beamish. On this mission he went to England and to the United States and visited a number of Admiralty establishments and commercial firms engaged in secret Navy work.

His name was mentioned in several of the hundred documents. For example, there was an entry in Colonel Rogov's notebook which read: "Inform us where does the matter stand in the execution of the previously assigned tasks for Lieutenant Shugar."

Opposite this, on the left-hand margin in the space usually reserved for remarks, Rogov had written: "He works at present in the Naval Staff. He agreed to work for us but with special precautions. He has been under observation."

Under the cross-reference file for "Prometheus" there was further mention. For instance, on August 2, 1945, Zabotin had cabled the Director:

To the Director

232

1. Have agreed with Sam on handing over to us the connections with Prometheus. At present the latter is in Florida. The handing over will take place in the city of Sam on his return from Florida. I regard it expedient to entrust to Brent the connection with Prometheus.

In the original Russian cable, the name "Shugar" appeared in the first sentence but it was crossed out and the name Prometheus substituted.

In reply, Moscow advised on August 10:

11437

14.8.45

To Grant.

Your telegram No. 232.

1. In my telegram of 19.7. I have advised that until receipt from Prometheus of information material and the establishment of his possibilities in the Navy Department, the contact with him should be maintained through Frank.

Should it prove that Prometheus is a truly valuable man to us, direct contact may then be established with him. However,

it is not desirable to entrust the contact to Brent. If you have no objection it is better to transfer him to Chester for contact.

Wire in full his name and family name, his duties in the Navy Department and the address of his residence. Collect the remaining data and send forward by mail.

2. We are definitely interested in obtaining people from the departments mentioned. Let Frank after the staffs have been set up in final form, recommend one or two candidates for our study.

Director.

10.8.45.

According to Gouzenko, "Chester" was the code for Zabotin's chauffeur, Captain Gorshkov, who had already figured in the waiting-room episode with "Nora." Following the receipt of the above cable, Sam Carr had been assigned the task of obtaining "a complete character outline of Prometheus, indicating his position, the department in which he works in the Navy, and also to write down his basic biographical facts, his home and office addresses and telephones. . . . The proposed place of work of Prometheus in the event of his demobilisation."

So much for the documents. From here the enquiry moved to less sure ground, where the evidence became more of a hearsay variety than the courts could accept. Much of it revolved around the testimony of Dr. Beamish, Director of the Analytical Research Division of the University of Toronto, to whom Lieutenant Shugar was attached for liaison. He said that work on the Asdic paper had reached such a stage that about September, 1944, the Navy suggested that it might be advisable to reveal its composition to Great Britain. He said that Shugar came to him and suggested that he join him in a trip to England, bringing the formula with them to discuss with the naval authorities.

Dr. Beamish said that he did not think he could make the trip but arranged for one of his assistants, a Dr. Currah, to take his place. But a few days before they were to leave Dr. Beamish reported that Shugar had said that he had not been able to arrange for Dr. Currah to go with him, and that when the matter of the Asdic paper came up he would cable for him to come over. Shugar, however, did not cable and Dr. Currah did not go. Shugar was a physicist, not a chemist, and since the Asdic paper was a chemical proposition, Dr. Beamish thought it was

"ridiculous that a man with so little knowledge of the detecting paper should go to England and discuss it."

When Shugar returned to Toronto he called on Dr. Beamish, and after reporting some of the conversations he had in England, he put forward the following proposition:

He said he had made some personal contact—it is difficult to say just how he described it. He said he made a personal contact with a laboratory and he would like from me interim reports so that they could be sent to this laboratory and it would facilitate having the testing made. This was unofficial. I cannot recall what I said to him but I certainly did not agree. I sent a letter then to Ottawa pointing out that this suggestion had been made and objecting to it.

So disturbed was Dr. Beamish by this unofficial request for interim reports on the secret project that he followed up the letter by a personal visit to Naval Headquarters. Beamish's testimony ran:

A. I pointed out that I objected to this kind of behavior. I requested that Shugar be removed from his liaison position, which meant that he could not visit the laboratory. I recall the statement I made was if he could not be removed, that he not be sent to me unless I requested his presence and I would never do that. Therefore, I felt that he should not appear in my laboratory at all.

Q. Why?

A. It is difficult to answer that; it is based on suspicion. I never trusted him after the first few months' experience with him. Little things which were raised. . . . That trip to England confirmed that, at least strengthened the suspicion. From that time on I did not want him around.

Q. Suspicion of what?

A. Suspicion and distrust. That is all. . . . I told the boys when they came to Hull to prepare those papers—on each occasion I warned them that they must not under any circumstances reveal anything whatever to Shugar. . . . I will repeat what I said before. I am not just quite so sure of what he said, but he called to my attention something, and I knew that there was delay in having our papers tested on sea

trials. To avoid that delay he said he had made contacts with certain laboratories, which he did not mention and would not mention, through which reports could be sent and requested interim reports from me, that is, reports having to do with unfinished work which was promising work. Specifically asked for certain formulae which we had never revealed because we felt they were not complete, but they were promising. We refused to give him that. . . .

Q. From then on you did not see Shugar?

A. No, that is not so. We did not see him officially, but he called in at least on two occasions. . . . On both occasions I warned the assistants that he must not get past the office door. The office is set aside from the laboratory and the laboratory is kept locked. They must go into the laboratory through the office and I refused to have him in the laboratory and insisted the door must be kept closed. During that period we had taken over certain branches of the work on the atomic energy project. . . .

Q. Then your suspicion would be that he had in mind something outside his duties?

A. Something outside his duty. I can say that, yes; and that might have involved, in my mind, making use of it to some personal advantage. . . .

Q. Did Shugar ever try to get from you any information about other matters that he should not have had?

A. No. We were on the lookout for that. We rather expected that. I don't know why we expected that, but when we took over the atomic bomb work I did feel like watching out whether or not he would ask for any information; and while he did mention the subject there was no indication of a request for information.

To the Royal Commission Dr. Beamish's testimony, coupled with the entries in the notebooks, seemed strong enough to justify the following conclusions:

"After Dr. Beamish had returned from his visit to Ottawa, Shugar began to realise the change in the atmosphere at the University of Toronto. We have no doubt that the reception accorded Shugar's request to Dr. Beamish and his exclusion thereafter from the laboratory

produced in him the feeling that he was under suspicion and that he reported this in due course to Carr, Dr. Beamish, as he has said, did not suspect what Shugar's real object was. He thought Shugar was proposing to make some use of the information for his personal advantage. Shugar, however, was in fact suspected and realised it. In our opinion, therefore, Shugar did agree to communicate secret information and actually tried to obtain the above information from Dr. Beamish for that purpose."

The photographs of David Shugar in his blue naval uniform and white silk muffler show him to be a very personable-looking young man. Questioned by the Royal Commission concerning the mention of his name in the Embassy files, he said: "My impression of this would be that somebody was presuming that it was possible to get these facts from me." He admitted meeting Sam Carr at various times, and recalled that Carr had asked him what work he was doing, and he had told him in terms of general questions, including the places he was visiting. He denied transmitting secret information.

Concerning his link to the Communists, Shugar said: "I am not a Communist. I have certain ideas about unions, about conditions, current conditions and the need for remedying them which I believe are my right as a Canadian citizen." To the question of whether or not he had communist leanings or sympathies, he made no answer. However, Dr. Boyer testified that he knew Shugar's political ideology to be Labour-Progressive, or Communist, while Lunan said, "His views are not completely known to me but he has communist leanings."

As a result the Commission in its final report stated:

"We think that Shugar is a convinced and ardent Communist and realised, as did other witnesses, that Communism was the stream which furnished the agents which the Russians used in this country. For that reason, in accordance with the course he had determined to follow, he decided to keep his position secret if he could. Shugar was a member of at least three communist study groups, or cells, in Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa. He characterised these as merely studying socialism and trade unions. He refused to give the name of any members of the Toronto group except one.

"In Lunan's office there was found a desk telephone directory containing Shugar's name and number. The diary of Nightingale had the same information. A book kept by Boyer also had Shugar's name and address, and Boyer knew Shugar well. Shugar and Durnford

Smith knew each other from undergraduate days, and they were members of the same cell in Ottawa as was Mazerall. Shugar, Benning, and Gerson were friends and visited back and forth at each other's houses. Shugar also knew Pavlov, the Second Secretary of the Embassy and head of the N.K.V.D. in Canada. He also shared living quarters in Ottawa with Poland."

The courts did not view the matter in the same light. First, Shugar's case was dismissed by the magistrate Mr. Glenn Strike in Toronto as "Not proven" on April 12, 1946. After the Crown finally succeeded in bringing the case up again, an acquittal was handed down in the Ontario Supreme Court on December 7, 1946.

Since both the Royal Commission and the courts are independent and co-equal as institutions of state there is no way of reconciling the opposing views.

Into a somewhat similar category fell the case against Eric Adams of the Foreign Exchange Control Board. According to Gouzenko he was the "Ernst" of the notebooks. The page on which his name appeared was torn, and after being pieced together like a bit of broken pottery there were words missing as shown by the dashes:

Ernst . . . He works on the Joint—————of Military
—————(U.S.A. and Canada). He gives detailed information on all kinds of industries, plans for the future. Supplies detailed accounts of conferences. Has been giving materials weekly.

Good Worker. . . .

Taken to work at the end of January.

On the January 5 mailing list there were twenty-one items credited to "Ernst." These included reviews of munitions shipments and top secret documents covering monetary conferences then in progress between Great Britain and Canada.

Again the courts did not see eye to eye with the Royal Commission, and Adams was acquitted on a charge of conspiracy to communicate information.

Also in the notebooks on the Toronto-Ottawa group was the following:

Squadron Leader

Mat Nantingale, 155 O'Connor St., Apt. 1. Telephone 2-45-34. Sam is known to him as Walter. The first meeting took place on 19.12.44 at 21 o'clock in the apartment.

Possibilities: 1. Network of aerodromes throughout the country (on both coasts). 2. Maps of the coasts.

He has been detached from the Corporants, that is, he has been reserved for the future. He does not work for the Corporation and his contact is only of a control nature twice a year. . . .

At the meeting of 24.2.45 he gave the address Montreal, 1671 Sherbrooke 57 (51) Maps. He will give the coasts R.A.F. and listening-in on the telephone.

Gouzenko explained that "Nantingale" was a misspelling of Nightingale. A check on the latter name revealed that Squadron Leader Matt. S. Nightingale, a telephone engineer by profession, and the officer who had provided the network of land-lines for all of the R.C.A.F. airports, lived at the O'Connor Street address. Although he had completed his war service and was discharged from the R.C.A.F., in his flat were found "Secret" and "Confidential" documents relating to various R.C.A.F. construction and engineering programmes. According to the Royal Commission this "would appear to be a clear violation of the Official Secrets Act."

Nightingale, who was born in Mobile, Alabama, in 1906, was a tall, gangling, bony-faced individual who openly admitted that he had communist sympathies. He told the Royal Commission that he had met Sam Carr in 1944 at a study group meeting in Montreal, and that Carr had been introduced to him under the cover name of Walter. He attended many study groups in Montreal, Pointe-Claire, and Ottawa, and met Durnford Smith, Scott Benning, Shugar, Gerson, and Fred Rose. Speaking of himself and his friends, Nightingale said:

Q. You yourself at that time had communistic leanings?

A. I had communistic sympathies.

Q. Would it be correct to say that all the persons in those groups had communistic leanings?

A. Absolutely, probably, yes.

Q. You knew and understood that at that time?

A. I would say so.

Q. That was what really brought you together?

A. Yes.

Nightingale also told how he had met Rogov, assistant to Colonel Zabotin, at various times, the first occasion on a train between Ottawa and Montreal.

Q. You told us you knew Jan?

A. Yes, as Jean.

Q. That is the cover name for Rogov? Where did you meet him?

A. I met him on a train to Montreal. . . .

Q. Who introduced you?

A. We just sat down together in the same seat. There was no introduction. I used to talk to whoever I sat beside. One or the other of us opened the conversation and we would have a haphazard conversation, about things in general. . . .

Q. Then will you explain the various topics that were discussed during that two-hour trip?

A. The subject of my leaving the Air Force came up somehow. I probably mentioned it, and in fact I did tell him that I was expecting to go back to the telephone company as an engineer. Sometime during the conversation I gathered, or he intimated to me, that his country might want telephone engineers after the war and very vaguely—the whole subject was vague—I gathered he wanted to know if I was interested in such a job. Also, shortly before leaving Montreal he asked me if I would be interested could he see me again.

After that various meetings had taken place on street corners and other places suggested by Rogov, which Nightingale freely admitted. As to the possibility of his furnishing maps of both coasts, he said:

Q. While you were in the Air Force did you have maps of both coasts?

A. I had drawings of the east coast network, the east coast land-lines network, and there were maps of the coasts on the wall of the officer in charge of the land-lines.

Q. You had access to the maps?

A. Oh, yes, we had access to the maps.

Concerning the fact that some of the information he had obtained in the R.C.A.F. was secret, Nightingale said:

Q. So that the knowledge that you acquired while you were with the R.C.A.F. would represent most secret knowledge that you obtained while working there?

A. I would think so, yes. I do not know whether it is most secret, but it was my function in the Air Force to provide those land-lines.

Q. You seem to have some hesitation about most secret. Would you say that the knowledge you had of the network of airdromes on both coasts was not more important than the knowledge that one would have of the airdromes inland as far as the security of the country was concerned?

A. I would say so, yes.

Q. When Motinov wrote this note for Rogov: "*Possibilities: 1. Network of airdromes in the country (both coasts)*" and "*2. Map of the coast,*" that was true?

A. How do you mean true?

Q. As a possibility?

A. Yes, I had that information at the office.

Q. Up to now everything I have read from the beginning of the exhibit has been true?

A. Yes.

After hearing the foregoing and reviewing the exhibits, the Commission concluded that "We are of the opinion that he not only agreed to furnish unauthorised information to the Russians, but actually did so. He admits the improper retention of R.C.A.F. documents."

But the courts found no evidence that Nightingale had actually furnished the information, and although Gouzenko said, "In telegrams wherein he was mentioned it was stated that he gave information concerning the tapping of telephone wires for listening in to conversations," Nightingale was acquitted of the charge of communicating confidential information.

However, the importance of the hundred documents lay not so much in the individuals named or their fate, but in the scope and variety of information and the manner in which it was sought. Whether or not Matt Nightingale, David Shugar, or Eric Adams were

acquitted or convicted seemed less important than the fact that Moscow's interest in maps of the Canadian coasts and airdromes stood clearly revealed.

There was also the case of Squadron Leader F. W. Poland, who was charged with passing maps of air-training schools to the Soviets. In the dossier on Sam Carr's contact was:

Poland. Department of Air Force.

Works in Toronto in the Intelligence Branch. At the moment he has been transferred to Ottawa. He gave a map of the training schools. Is not yet working.

Squadron Leader F. W. Poland was born in the United States, June 20, 1909, of English parentage, and in the spring of 1942 he became an Administrative Intelligence Officer of the R.C.A.F., Ottawa. While in this position his main duties were supervision of security education, advising the Director of Intelligence on security policy, and acting as secretary of the security sub-committee of the Canadian Joint Intelligence.

In the performance of these duties he had access to certain maps indicating all of the R.C.A.F. flying training schools in Canada—two of which corresponded to the description given in Zabotin's notebook, and which were marked "For Official Use Only—Not to Be Published."

According to the Director of Canadian Intelligence, a request from any foreign source for such maps would have been denied, because "these maps could quite easily be the basis from which to enlarge and give further detailed information."

The Royal Commission was unable to find any other evidence to indicate that Poland had given any information or document to the Soviets. However, Gouzenko said that his name was well known to him:

"Poland was described as a clever man and Colonel Zabotin proposed to Moscow to hand him over to the N.K.V.D.—"the Neighbours." Moscow replied that it was not worth while—to wait a while, that he might develop into a good worker."

In Poland's office in Room 309 of the New Post Office Building a calendar pad was found. According to the Royal Commission, on it was the name of Pavlov, secret head of the N.K.V.D. in Ottawa. This

name appeared on pages dated October 30, 1945, November 1, 4, 5, 15, 19, 23, and 26, December 17 and 28th, and January 5, 1946. On the entry for November 15 was the number 5-4351, the telephone extension of the Soviet Embassy at 285 Charlotte Street, Ottawa.

The Royal Commission stated: "Poland was called as a witness and he appeared with counsel. He refused, however, to be sworn or answer any question, and although he was given the fullest opportunity, he persisted in his refusal to testify. . . . We see no reason to doubt the statement contained in the Russian document that Poland gave a map of air training schools."

However, as in the case of Shugar, Nightingale, and Adams, the evidence was not sufficiently strong to warrant a court conviction, and Poland was acquitted of charges on January 16, 1947.

Chapter Fifteen

ARRESTS OF THE BETRAYERS

FOR three months the Mounted Police had explored the maze of clues relating to the spy ring and had uncovered an incredible amount of evidence. As it grew in volume, the Prime Minister Mr. Mackenzie King, with a weather eye to the stormy international scene, wondered how long he could continue to postpone action.

The first sign of trouble came when during the first week of December, 1945, Colonel Nicolai Zabotin of the strong jaw and dimpled cheeks suddenly left Canada. He did not notify the authorities to whom he was accredited, and in New York, the Soviet steamer *Alexander Suworov* was kept at its dock until he had clambered up the gangplank. The U.S. customs guards who saw him go aboard were the last people of record to have seen him alive. Later there was a rumour that he had died of "heart attack" shortly after his return to Moscow. Officially his fate has been cloaked in silence. Since we are dealing with facts it would be idle to speculate on this point.

A few days later the Soviet Ambassador G. N. Zarubin made the rounds of Canadian Government officials. He said that he was returning to Moscow for routine consultations. It was not good-bye, only "au revoir." But he never came back to Ottawa.

Since the night of September 5, 1945, when Gouzenko left the Embassy, the Soviets had maintained business as usual. For three months they had urged the Canadian Government to allow an increase in their consular and commercial attaché staffs despite the fact that the cables showed that this increase was to be used for placing trained espionage agents throughout the Dominion.

But with Zabotin's hasty departure it was apparent that the Soviet officials were aware of the use to which Gouzenko's documents were being put, and this knowledge slowly began to spread beyond the security channels of the Canadian Government.

With the advent of 1946 it was becoming increasingly clear that events were approaching a climax. The Moscow conference of Foreign

Ministers had ended in a stalemate. In January, Fleet Admiral William E. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President of the United States, made a special trip to Ottawa. He discussed with Mr. Mackenzie King the possible international repercussions which the spy revelations might cause. The contents of these talks have never been revealed, but on February 5, 1946, there was promulgated Order in Council No. 411 which placed the spy hunt in the hands of a Royal Commission of Enquiry headed by two justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Hon. Mr. Justice Robert Taschereau and the Hon. Mr. Justice R. L. Kellock. The text of this order was:

TEXT OF ORDER IN COUNCIL P.C. 411 OF
FEBRUARY 5, 1946, ESTABLISHING THE
ROYAL COMMISSION P.S. 411

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 5th February, 1946.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report dated 5th February, 1946, from the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, representing:

That it has been ascertained that secret and confidential information has been communicated directly or indirectly by public officials and other persons in positions of trust to the agents of a Foreign Power to the prejudice of the safety and interests of Canada;

That by Order in Council P.C. 6444 dated the 6th day of October, 1945, the Acting Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice were authorised to make an Order that any such person be interrogated and/or detained in such place and under such conditions as the Minister might from time to time determine if the Minister were satisfied that it was necessary so to do;

That it now seems expedient in the public interest that a full and complete enquiry be made into all the facts relating to and the circumstances surrounding the communication by such public officials and other persons in positions of trust of such secret and confidential information to the agents of a Foreign Power.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the

Prime Minister, advise that the Honourable Robert Taschereau, a Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Honourable R. L. Kellock, a Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, be appointed Commissioners under Part 1 of the Enquiries Act, Chapter 99, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, and any other law thereto enabling, to enquiry into and report upon which public officials and other persons in positions of trust or otherwise have communicated, directly or indirectly, secret and confidential information, the disclosure of which might be inimical to the safety and interests of Canada, to the agents of a Foreign Power and the facts relating to and the circumstances surrounding such communication.

The Committee further advise:

1. That for all such purposes and all purposes properly incidental thereto the said Commissioners shall without limiting the powers conferred upon them by the said Part 1 of the said Enquiries Act, have and possess the power of summoning and that they be empowered to summon before them any person or witness and of requiring them to give evidence on oath or affirmation, orally or in writing, and of requiring them to produce such documents and things as the Commissioners deem requisite to the full investigation of matters into which they are appointed to examine;

2. That the said Commissioners be directed that a record shall be made of all the evidence which shall be given or produced before them as to the matters of the said enquiry and that the oral evidence of witnesses before the said Commissioners shall be taken in shorthand by a shorthand writer, approved and sworn by the said Commissioners or one of them and shall be taken down question and answer and it shall not be necessary for the evidence or deposition of any witness to be read over to or signed by the person examined and said evidence shall be certified by the person or persons taking the same as correct;

3. That the said Commissioners may adopt such procedure and method as they may deem expedient for the conduct of such enquiry and may alter or change the same from time to time;

4. That the said Commissioners be empowered in their discretion from time to time to make interim reports to the

Governor in Council on any matter which in their judgment is the proper subject of such a report together with the evidence then before them and their findings thereon ;

5. That the said Commissioners be authorised to engage the services of such counsel and of such technical officers, and experts, and other experienced clerks, reporters and assistants as they may deem necessary and advisable ; and

6. That all the privileges, immunities and powers given by Order in Council P.C. 1639, passed on 2nd March, 1942, shall apply.

(Sgd.) A. D. P. HEENEY,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Through this order the Commission possessed far greater powers than any court in the land. These powers were made even more sweeping by a secret Order in Council No. 6444 of October 6, 1945, which had been enacted prior to Mr. Mackenzie King's hurried trip to England. As has been noted, this authorised the Minister of Justice to question or detain any persons suspected of having communicated secret or confidential information to an agent of a foreign power to "such place and under such circumstances as he may from time to time determine." It also authorised any member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to enter any premises occupied or used by such persons at any time and to seize any article found.

At Rockliffe Barracks, which had its own private airfield, preparations were begun for the reception of the prisoners, when and if the arrests were ordered. Special rooms were set aside, each with bedstead, chair, table, and lamp, one room for each name on the list. Inspector Leopold and his men had combed through the hundred documents dealing only with code names and paper clues. Now they were to meet the principals face to face.

Secrecy was still the watchword, as the slightest leak might imperil the success of the whole operation.

Yet the longer the delay, the wider grew the circle of knowledge. Finally, Sunday evening, February 3, 1946, Mr. Drew Pearson the American radio commentator scooped the world press and radio with:

Washington—Exclusive:

Prime Minister Mackenzie King has informed President Truman of a very serious situation affecting our relations with

Russia, which I don't like to report. But I think the American public sooner or later must know the truth. A Soviet agent surrendered sometime ago to Canadian authorities and confessed a gigantic Russian espionage network inside the United States and Canada. Some Russian agents had been surveying Canadian lakes and rivers and Alaskan waterways. They had maps of this country, which is next door to Siberia. Perhaps even more important, this Russian told Canadian authorities about a series of agents planted inside the American and Canadian Governments who are working with the Soviets. The revelations given by this man were so amazing that Prime Minister Mackenzie King took a special trip to Washington and spent a night at the White House several weeks ago laying the facts before President Truman.

All this points to the belief on the part of high American officials that a small group of military-minded men near the top in Russia apparently are determined to take over not merely Iran, Turkey, and the Balkans, but perhaps dominate other areas of the world.

As had happened before, Mr. Pearson's scoop set the Washington press corps after the story. They badgered the White House, the War Department, and the State Department. No one would confirm or deny the report, since the matter was still under wraps in Ottawa.

On February 8, the Secretary of State Mr. Byrnes, at his press conference, was asked: "Has this Government in recent months received any reports, oral or otherwise, from the Canadian authorities regarding espionage activities carried on in the United States by agents of a foreign power?"

Mr. Byrnes weighed his words even more cautiously than usual. He said that if Canada or any other foreign power should advise this country of espionage activities he would not comment on it. If he did, the people guilty would escape the punishment they deserved.

The statement was fully reported in the press of the United States and Canada, and it was apparent to all observers that something was in the wind.

Behind the wall of official silence, the ponderous machinery of state was beginning to move.

On the morning of February 14, the counsel of the Royal Com-

mission sent a courier to the Minister of Justice with the following letter:

Ottawa, February 14, 1946.

Dear Sir:

Re: *Royal Commission, P. C. 411*

By reason of the nature of the evidence already submitted to the Royal Commission, the undersigned counsel to the Commission have recommended to the Commissioners that you should be requested to exercise the powers conferred on you by P. C. 6444, 6 October, 1945, and to issue orders for interrogation and, for that purpose, detention of the following persons:

Isadore Halperin
David Shugar
M. S. Nightingale
F. W. Poland
Ned Mazerall
Durnford Smith

Raymond Boyer
James Scotland Benning
H. S. Gerson
Eric Adams
Emma Woikin
Gordon Lunan

The reasons which impel the Commissioners to accept our advice as above is the extremely serious nature of the disclosures so far made and indicated by evidence, the fact that cover names of persons who have not so far been identified also appear in the evidence and indicate that the full extent of the ramifications of the disloyal practices and the persons engaged herein may be even greater than is already known, and may be continuing; in effect that the matter appears to be so serious from the national standpoint that the Commissioners believe that the course we advise should be pursued in these exceptional circumstances.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) E. K. Williams
Gerald Fauteux
D. W. Mundell

The Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent
Minister of Justice
Ottawa

Simultaneously from the office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald sent a secret dispatch in

which he stated: "I understand that it has been decided to detain for interrogation a number of persons in Canadian Government employment. I am authorised by the United Kingdom authorities to request that, in view of the evidence that a member of the staff of my office may be involved . . . she also be detained for interrogation. Her name is Miss K. M. Willsher and her address is known. . . ."

Absent from the list were Fred Rose, Sam Carr, and others connected with the matter of the false passport. Since they were not "public officials in a position of trust," they were to be dealt with later.

Although the facts of the arrests and the names of those arrested were to be kept a secret, Prime Minister King realised that such widespread raids as were being planned by the Mounted Police could not escape notice. A public statement would be necessary. With his aides, he worked far into the night.

To keep the record clear from the standpoint of protocol, the Prime Minister decided to have a talk with the Soviet Chargé at Ottawa, Nicolai Belokhovostikov, who, in Ambassador Zarubin's absence, had taken over the Embassy: "But before giving out this statement I did ask the Chargé d'Affaires of the Russian Embassy to come to my office. I read to him the statement and I told him that the country to which reference was made was the U.S.S.R. . . . I did think at one time of going to Russia myself and of speaking with Generalissimo Stalin in reference to it. . . . However, I did ask myself the question, were I to attempt to convey to the Russian Government what I knew, without documents which I could myself explain and prove, might I not be met with the statement that after all as it was Canadian Government officials who were concerned we had better clean our own house first?"¹

¹ House of Commons Debates, March 18, 1946. Page 56.

Mindful of the charge of anti-liberalism that was being touched off by investigation, Mr. Mackenzie King elaborated his position: "I do not think it necessary for me to say anything about the statements which have been made in reference to myself as being anti-labour and anti-Soviet. . . . As far as the Russian people are concerned I am as sure as I am of anything that the Russian people are just as anxious for friendly relations with Canada and with peoples in other parts of the world as our own people are, but in that country, as in some others, there are persons who for their own selfish ends will do many things which will not be countenanced by the great majority. . . . I intend with whatever little power I have so far as this matter is concerned to unearth whatever may be wrong, and for the remainder of my life to devote my time to trying in every way possible to see that the greatest amount of friendship and harmony and goodwill is promoted between all peoples and between the Russian people and the people of Canada in particular. (*Ibid.*)

While they conferred, the Mounted Police were moving into position. All night long there was an air of excitement pervading Rockcliffe Barracks as special telephone lines were kept open to Montreal, where some of the arrests were to take place. All approaches to the area bristled with guards carrying revolvers and cartridge belts over their heavy buffalo coats. In a last-minute conference with Inspector Leopold, twenty-two plainclothes aides were briefed for their work.

Early in the morning on the fifteenth, they struck.

On McGill University, the University of Montreal, and the University of Toronto, the Foreign Exchange Control Board, and the National Research Council, they descended so rapidly that before anyone had a chance to realise what was afoot, the raids were over.

None of the thirteen who were arrested that day was aware that he had been shadowed for months.

Before an attentive audience in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister gave only a bare outline of what was in progress. "This Government has information of undoubted authenticity which established that there had been disclosures of secret and confidential information to unauthorised persons including some members of a staff of a foreign mission in Canada."

Soviet Russia was not named, but the Embassy on Charlotte Street was deserted.

Across the Atlantic, in London, Colonel Leonard Burt of the Special Branch of Scotland Yard was watching Dr. Allan Nunn May, the "Alek" of the Moscow cables, who had supplied the Soviets with uranium samples and atomic bomb data.

Since the Canadian suspects were being rounded up, Colonel Burt decided to have a talk with Dr. May. He found him working in the nuclear physics laboratories in Shell-Mex House where he was employed on some special government research. Introducing himself, he asked point-blank:

"Are you aware, Dr. May, that there has been a leakage of information from Canada relating to atomic energy?"

Dr. May looked at him steadily. "That is the first I have heard of it," he said quietly.

"Do you realise that we know that you had an appointment with someone in London in that connection and that you failed to keep it?"

Dr. May did not answer.

Colonel Burt and Scotland Yard were not in a hurry to make an arrest, as it was still their hope that he would lead them to a second spy. Therefore, no action was taken at the time.

In Ottawa the smooth efficiency of the Mounted Police concealed feverish activity. The ninth floor of the Justice Building was completely sealed off to outsiders, as the Commissioner Mr. S. T. Wood and his deputy, Mr. H. A. Gagnon, set up their command post.

At the Dorval Airport, Captain Gordon Lunan alighted from an airplane to find himself in the hands of Inspector H. A. Harvison, who whisked him away to Rockcliffe Barracks.

Before the day was out, all on the first list were in custody—yet not one single name had been allowed to leak out.

Much remained to be done. In the words of the Royal Commission: "The extent of the ramifications of the espionage organisation and the identity of all its agents was not known on February 14. There were a number of agents designated in the Embassy records by cover names only, whom Gouzenko could not identify. The provisions of the Order in Council being preventive, it was of the utmost importance that the identity of as many agents as possible should be discovered, together with the method by which each functioned.

"It is merely cold fact to say that if the documents brought in by Gouzenko were found to be authentic, there had been laid bare before us not just the case of a foreign agent having broken into a government department and committed theft, but a malignant growth, the full penetration of which we did not know, but which was alive and expanding, working in secret below ground, directed against the safety and interests of Canada by a foreign power."

The most important phase of the questioning that went on day and night at Rockcliffe dealt with the motives of the suspected agents. Time and time again the investigators sought to discover the "why" behind the case.

Chapter Sixteen

MOTIVES OF THE BETRAYERS

MOST OF THE SUSPECTS were persons with an unusually high degree of education, and had been regarded in their agencies and departments as workers of marked ability and intelligence.

Their motives, as laid bare in the course of the enquiry, were significant, not only to Canada but to the world.

There was no evidence that money played an important part—on the contrary, the evidence was overwhelming that the original motivation was a product of political ideology plus a program of psychological conditioning in “study groups” or communist cells.

The Royal Commission found that “in the great majority of cases the motivation was inextricably linked with the course of psychological development carried on under the guise of a secret section of what is ostensibly a Canadian political movement—the Labour Progressive Party (Communist Party of Canada)—that these secret ‘development’ courses are very much more widespread than the espionage network itself.

“It seems to be the general policy of the Communist Party to discourage certain selected sympathisers among certain categories of the population from joining the Party openly. Instead these sympathisers are invited to join secret cells or study groups. The categories of the population from which secret members were recruited include students, scientific workers, teachers, office and business workers, persons engaged in any type of administrative activity, and any group likely to obtain any type of government employment.

“The object is to accustom young Canadians gradually to an atmosphere and ethic of conspiracy. The general effect on the young man or woman of secret meetings, secret acquaintances, and secret objectives, plans, and policies can easily be imagined. The technique seems calculated to develop the psychology of a double life and double standards.”

Only in view of the foregoing can the real significance of the spy

net and its meaning be appreciated. Otherwise the sudden emergence of gifted intellectuals betraying state secrets does not make sense.

Although money was not important, it was paid out by the members of the Embassy to the Canadian agents. On August 29, 1945, there was a cable sent to Moscow which covered this point:

To the Director, to No. 12293

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1. The Ambassador has agreed to help us by giving us an amount of money from the Embassy and he proposes that the money be sent back in small sums to his address at the Embassy and to the address of the Commercial Counsellor. Small amounts might also be added to the entertainment expenses. If the opportunity arises, part of the amount may be sent by diplomatic mail.

2. As it is known to you, in the past two months we have had to make heavy expenditures and therefore there will be nothing left in the cash box by August 31. For the diplomatic mail alone (July, August) it is necessary to pay \$2,500.00. I therefore beg you to send urgently operational sums of money.
29.8.45.

Grant.

Such evidence as the investigators were able to gather indicated that money payments were broached gradually to the Canadian agents, possibly to supplement, and perhaps eventually to supplant, the original motivation supplied by the psychological development courses of the communist cells.

Care was taken by the espionage recruiting agents not to broach the subject of pecuniary reward at the time when the first assignment or request was put to the selected recruit. Money was not mentioned at first to Lunan by Fred Rose or in the first meeting with Jan. Nor did Lunan raise the point initially with Mazerall, Halperin, or Durnford Smith. It was entirely possible that the spymasters felt that the mention of money at the initial stage would act as a deterrent rather than an inducement to secret Communists faced for the first time with the critical decision of entering into an illegal conspiracy against their government. Mazerall bore out this point in his testimony. When asked whether Lunan had ever offered him money he said:

A. I am positive, knowing myself that the slightest suggestion of it would have discouraged it, as far as I was concerned, entirely.

Q. What do you mean by saying that if you had been offered money you would not be here?

A. I would not have accepted money. If it had been offered to me I would have said no, at the moment, and I know I would have told him to get out of the car and I would have driven away.

However, the Embassy people, once their agents had begun their careers, began to press upon them sums ranging from twenty-five to two hundred dollars for "expenses." This money, like opium, was calculated to hasten the moral corruption of those caught in the net, and to assist in their further "development."

Lunan, upon being questioned, told that:

A. Jan was always bringing up the question of expenses, and he did mention the question of taxi rides, but it was from our point of view a preposterous suggestion and I simply ignored it.

Q. When you say from "our point of view," whose point of view do you refer to?

A. Mine and Smith's and Mazerall's.

Q. Did you discuss that with them?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. With the three of them?

A. No.

Q. With whom?

A. With each one at one time or another and I discussed the question of expenses.

Q. Tell us what you said to them.

A. I told them that if they were involved in any expenses there was an offer for those expenses to be covered. Each one of them, however, said there was no such possibility of expenses, the question did not arise for them.

Q. From what you say, I take it they did not want to take any money.

A. Correct.

Q. Either as a disbursement to cover expenses or otherwise?

A. That is correct.

Q. What was their motive to do what they did?

A. Their motives would be idealistic or political.

Q. What do you mean by political?

A. That they felt they were serving a valid political motive in doing this.

Q. What do you mean by political?

A. I cannot describe for them their motives.

Q. What do you understand they meant by political?

A. I used the word myself.

Q. What did you use the word for?

A. That certainly there would be some motivation for doing this type of work, and it would have to be one involving ideals.

Q. Party sympathy?

A. Yes, that would be fair.

Q. When we say "party" there is only one Party that is meant, the Communist Party?

A. That is correct.

Emma Woikin, although denying that she had ever been paid, recalled that Major Sokolov had made her a "gift" of \$50 while Kathleen Willsher remembered that on one occasion she had been given \$25 by a go-between. Various documents showed other money payments to "B" Group, \$200 in a whiskey bottle to Dr. Allan Nunn May, \$100 to Dr. Henry Harris, and \$600 to Fred Rose.

The documents also showed that the Director in Moscow and Colonel Zabotin were prepared to spend much greater sums where prospective agents were not communist sympathizers, as when three thousand dollars was paid out in the matter of the passport to the "executor" who was no adherent of the communist cause. Similarly, there were notes dealing with plans whereby it was hoped to induce "Jack" and "Dick," two colonels in the headquarters of the Canadian Army, in no sense Communists, to work as agents. These notes dealing with psychological methods of approach contained the following:

Financial conditions, inclinations toward establishing material security for his family (intentions to engage in business, to own a car, a home of his own and what hinders the fulfillment of this plan).

Programme for future (ideological or financial requires to be determined).

Although in terms of big money the sums paid out by the Soviets were chicken feed, the fact remains that the Soviets had hit upon a relatively cheap method of inducing new recruits to join the network—that of non-monetary motivations provided by communist study groups.

These courses included the study of political and philosophical works selected to develop in the students a critical attitude toward Western democratic society. In this phase of preparation discussions of current affairs were used to further a critical attitude toward the ideals of democratic society. Although outwardly designed to promote social reform, in practice this type of curriculum weakened the loyalty of the group member toward current society as such.

Along with the criticism there was discussion of the official Russian and communist publications, which in some cases inculcated a sense of divided loyalties, and in extreme cases transferred loyalty. In the words of the Royal Commission: "Thus it seems to happen that through these study groups some adherents, who begin by feeling that Canadian society is not democratic or equalitarian enough for their taste, are gradually led to transfer a part or most of their loyalties to another country, apparently without reference to whether that other country is in actual fact more or less democratic or equalitarian than Canada. Indeed, a sense of internationalism seems in many cases to play a definite role in one stage of these courses. In these cases the Canadian sympathiser is first encouraged to develop a sense of loyalty, not directly, to a foreign state, but to what he conceives to be an international ideal. This subjective internationalism is then usually linked, through the indoctrination courses, with the current conception of the national interests of that foreign state and with the current doctrines and policies of Communist Parties throughout the world."

In many cases prolonged membership in the Communist Party appeared to have induced a high degree of discipline and to have resulted in prompt obedience to orders and Party policy.

"It appears to be an established principle of at least the secret cells section of the Communist Party," reported the Royal Commission, "that rejection of party orders entails automatic resignation or expulsion. This principle in itself assists in inducing obedience from members who might otherwise be inclined to waver, but who have become habituated over a period of months or years to membership.

"Thus the leaders of the Fifth Column solved what would appear at first sight to be their most difficult problem—that of motivation, or finding capable and well-placed Canadians who would be willing to engage in espionage against Canada for a foreign power."

Most significant, however, was the fact that not a single one of the several Canadians who were asked to engage in espionage activity reported this approach to the authorities.

At each stage of development the recruits were kept in ignorance of the wider objectives and the complete ramifications of the organisation. Many of those who joined the study groups did not at first realise that they were secret cells of the Communist Party. Mazerall testified that when he was first invited to join an informal discussion group, "he did not for a considerable period" recognise that it was in reality a secret communist cell, "although he knew it later to be such."

Lunan, who had been told by Fred Rose that the only persons engaged in the work would be the members of his "B" Group and Jan, told the commission:

"I would also like to say that I had no idea of the scope and extent of this work. I was amazed when it became clear to me during my interrogation. I never thought of myself as being more than one person in a small group of five people. I do not offer this in any sense as an excuse for my work but I was striving to square myself with my ideals without a full knowledge of the position in which I really found myself."

Like the man who has just shot his best friend, Lunan "didn't know it was loaded."

With respect to the original attraction which the study groups had for the various Canadians, the Commission found itself on less sure ground. "It is difficult to speak with certainty," they reported, "but in some cases it apparently lay in the highly systematised metaphysical concepts used by the Communist Party in its propaganda directed to certain types of intellectuals and students. Thus, Durnford Smith, when asked what it was that attracted him to the movement, replied: 'The logic of it.'"

Others, like Gerson, believed that through the study groups he could fight against the social evils of anti-semitism and racial intolerance. In other cases a desire for companionship and intellectual discussion seems to have played a part. To some types there was an appeal of glamour and adventure in the conspiratorial meetings of the groups.

To others it was the vigorous communist propaganda for social reform which blinded them to the more sinister and illegal aspects of their recruitment.

Even Emma Woikin felt the tug of ideology. Although never a member of a study group, she had formed a view of life in Russia from what she had read and heard. She looked to Russia "for security, and would like to live there." Her own life was a bitter personal tragedy of near starvation during the depression of the early thirties, and the loss of both husband and baby son to disease and malnutrition as an aftermath.

As for Kathleen Willsher, she testified that through the study groups, whose primary qualification for membership was "an interest in communist writings and teachings," she met Fred Rose.

Q. Is he the first who suggested to you that you could contribute to the promotion of the Soviet Government by giving him in general terms information of value which passed through your hands in the office, the High Commissioner's office?

A. He didn't say "Soviet Government." He said the Canadian Communist Party.

Q. Just what did he say to you?

A. That the Party would be very glad to have some information sometimes in order that their policy—to affect public opinion—the sort of facts they could have. That is all I know. . . .

Q. So then, to be quite clear about it, you understood Mr. Rose quite clearly at the time to suggest to you that he or his Party would be glad to have from you information which you might obtain from the High Commissioner's office in the course of your employment?

A. Yes. . . .

Q. Miss Willsher, you recognised, I suppose, when Mr. Rose made that suggestion to you that he was suggesting an improper thing for you to do?

A. Well, I did, but I felt that I should contrive to contribute something towards the helping of this policy [the united front], because I was very interested in it. I found it very difficult, and yet I felt I should try to help.

Q. Then you appreciated from the standpoint of your rela-

tionship to your employer that it was an improper suggestion. That is right?

A. Yes. I also felt I had something I should contribute.

Q. Would it be right to put it this way—that you felt there was a higher law, owing to your, let us say, political convictions?

A. Yes, it was a struggle, it always is a struggle. . . .

Q. This information that you were able to give him, how did you get that, from things that you copied in the course of your work, or typed?

A. Things I am bound to read in the course of my work. They are not things—there was no record—just things I happened to remember. . . .

Q. You would be typing telegrams and letters at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. And it would be things arising out of the documents that you actually typed, such as telegrams and letters?

A. Probably would be.

Q. Anything else?

A. No, there was no other source.

Q. What about the files in your office?

A. I was not doing the files.

Q. Were you reading the files, the things that were in the files?

A. Only the files with the letters, not general.

Q. Were you reading the letter files?

A. I might have a file if I was doing a letter on that file.

Q. Would you read that file?

A. Not necessarily; I might. . . .

Q. For the purpose of seeing if there was anything you could pass on to Mr. Rose?

A. I had that in view.

Q. And you would make notes?

A. No.

Q. You just charged your mind with it?

A. Charged my mind.

Q. And you reported to him orally?

A. Yes.

Q. On all occasions?

A. Yes.

Questioned as to the entry of her code name "Elli" as the source of the Lord Keynes report mentioned on the mailing list, she said that she had no recollection of the report. Since it developed that the document had never been sent to the Office of the High Commissioner, it was apparent that Zabotin had erroneously credited her with the letters dealing with the subject. Despite this, however, her long association with Fred Rose at the study groups and her own statements that she passed information along to him prompted the Royal Commission to declare: "We have no doubt that the ultimate destination of these communications was the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, nor do we doubt that Willsher knew that fact."

The interrogation did not pass without one bit of byplay, which, although reported in formal question and answer style, offers a brief insight into the mentality of a party dupe:

Q. You were ready to do anything the Party asked you to?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose even in 1935 you knew it was an improper thing to do?

A. Yes.

Q. That is what caused this struggle in your mind?

A. Yes. I know I can be shot quite easily, if necessary.

Q. You know you can be what?

A. Shot, if necessary.

Q. Where?

A. The provisions are very strict. . . .

Q. What are you speaking about, what are you referring to?

A. *The Official Secrets Act*—do not they execute people?

COMMISSIONER: I had not heard of that myself in this country.

Chapter Seventeen

THE DIPLOMATIC PROTEST OF THE U.S.S.R.

IN THE CAPITAL of the Soviet Union at ten fifteen P.M. on February 20, 1946, Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Solomon Lozovski invited Mr. Leon Mayrand, Chargé d'Affaires of the Canadian Embassy, to call at his office. When Mr. Mayrand arrived, the Soviet official read to him a two-page statement. The text, as sent in a cable to Ottawa, was:

On February 15 of this year the Canadian Government published a statement about the delivery in Canada of secret information to persons not having the right of access to the information, including certain members of the staff of a foreign mission in Ottawa. On handing this statement to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires N. D. Belokhovostikov, the Prime Minister Mr. King stated that the reference in the Canadian Government's statement to certain members of the staff of a foreign mission referred to members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

In this connection, after appropriate investigation, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to make the following statement:

Soviet organisations have become aware that in the latter periods of the war certain members of the staff of the Soviet Military Attaché in Canada received from Canadian nationals with whom they were acquainted certain information of a secret character which did not, however, present great interest for the Soviet organisations. It has transpired that this information referred to technical data of which Soviet organisations had no need in view of more advanced technical attainment in the U.S.S.R.; the information in question could be found in published works on radio location, etc., and also in the well-known brochure of the American, J. D. Smith, "Atomic Energy."

It would, therefore, be ridiculous to affirm that delivery of insignificant secret data of this kind could create any threat to the security of Canada.

None the less, as soon as the Soviet Government became aware that the above-mentioned acts of certain members of the staff of the Military Attaché in Canada, the Soviet Military Attaché, in view of the inadmissibility of acts of members of his staff in question, was recalled from Canada. On the other hand, it must also be borne in mind that the Soviet Ambassador and other members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Canada had no connection with this.

At the same time the Soviet Government finds it necessary to draw attention to the unbridled anti-Soviet campaign which began in the Canadian press and on the Canadian radio simultaneously with the publication of the Canadian Government's statement. In spite of the complete lack of significance and importance of the circumstances which gave rise to the Canadian Government's statement of February 15, this anti-Soviet campaign is being supported by many Canadian organisations, and at the same time the position taken up by the Canadian Government is directly aimed at encouragement of this anti-Soviet press and radio campaign which is incompatible with normal relations between the two countries.

In this connection, surprise is occasioned by the unusual fact that the Canadian Government published its statement on February 15 instead of, as is customary between countries in normal relations, previously asking for an explanation from the Soviet Government. Inasmuch as the Canadian Government did not consider it necessary to approach the Soviet Government for a previous explanation, it must be admitted that the Canadian Government herein was pursuing some other ends having no relation to the security interests of Canada.

It must be admitted that the above-mentioned unbridled anti-Soviet campaign formed part of the Canadian Government's plan aimed at causing the Soviet Union political harm. It cannot be considered a mere chance that Mr. King's statement was made to coincide with the ending of the session of the Assembly of the United Nations where the Soviet Delegate spoke in defence of the principle of democracy and independ-

ence of small countries. Evidently Mr. King's statement and the anti-Soviet campaign in Canada which has been developed in connection with it are something in the nature of an answer to the unpleasantness caused to Mr. King's friends by the Soviet Delegate at the session of the Assembly.

Although there were certain portions of the Soviet statement which were open to argument, one thing was clear—the military staff of the Embassy had certainly been recalled.

In addition to Colonel Zabotin, those who departed from Ottawa were:

1. Lieutenant Colonel Motinov, Assistant Military Attaché, the "Lamont" of the spy plot.

2. Major Rogov, Air Attaché, and the "Brent" of the spy documents.

3. Lieutenant Angelov, Commercial Counsellor, code name "Davie," who took delivery of two uranium samples from Dr. Allan Nunn May for express by air to Moscow.

4. Nicholas Zheveinov, former Tass News Agency correspondent in the Ottawa press gallery and the "Martin" of the spy reports.

5. Lieutenant Gouzev, "Henry," one of the husky doormen who did the strong-arm work for the N.K.V.D.

6. Lieutenant Koulakov, who replaced Gouzenko as cypher clerk.

7. Sergei Koudriavtzev, the Embassy First Secretary, "Leon" of the codes, and one of the early organisers of the espionage crew.

The Soviet statement contained significant admissions as well as omissions.

Although Zabotin's activities were labeled "inadmissible," the attempt to minimise the importance of the information received was interesting. Disregarding the debatable point of whether there was a "more advanced technical attainment in the U.S.S.R.," the fact was that an elaborate organisation had been set up to obtain information and its agents were prepared to go remarkable lengths to fulfil their tasks.

Despite the claim that the information on atomic energy could be found in published works, none of the secret information had been

printed at the time it was handed over. For if it was published it would not be secret. The fact that the information was considered of such great importance by the Soviet espionage chiefs is probably a fair test of its value.

In intelligence work, information is sometimes received which is of little value—but this does not mean that it is valueless. The documents indicated that there were Soviet agents working along the same lines in Great Britain, the United States, and elsewhere. The Soviets knew from their agents in Canada that information was being pooled. By getting some data in Canada and some in the United States and some in Great Britain, and by assembling it, a large body of data could be obtained. Therefore, nothing, no matter how trivial it might appear by itself, was in fact valueless—for it could be used to check and evaluate the information obtained in one country against that obtained in another.

Many documents in the case were never released for publication, for the Royal Commission found that "much secret and valuable information was handed over. Some of it is so secret still that it can only be referred to obliquely and with the greatest care."

Next to the atomic bomb, the most vital work accomplished by the Western Allies in the technical field was radar. Many of the improvements are still in the top secret category and information of the greatest importance in this field was communicated by Soviet agents. Asdic—anti-submarine detection devices—were another equally important item, both from the standpoint of development and secrecy. The Royal Commission found that "much and very possibly all of the information available in Canada on this subject has been compromised."

Explosives and propellants were still another field in which the Soviets had exhibited great interest, and Canadian scientists had been given information on work being done along parallel lines in the United States and England. The very names of many formulae were secret and the production methods even more so. The names and much of the secret information were given to the Russians, as well as continuing information about trial experiments and proposed future research.

Another item of this type was the "V.T." fuse, the fuse that knocked the Japanese Air Force out of the air. The wiring details and manufacture are still secret and, although the fuse was first developed in Canada in 1943, the details of its manufacture are known only to

the United States. This fuse is the "electro bomb" referred to in some of the Soviet documents, and one of the agents had passed along its wiring diagram.

Since the operations of the ring had been going on much longer than the few months' period of time covered by Gouzenko's documents, it was impossible to estimate the full extent of the plot, yet, even at that, one thing stood clear—a great deal of the information sought related to the post-war defence of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The information found by the Royal Commission to have been handed over by such agents as Benning and Gerson falls into this category—production data, location of industries, transportation and planning, fiscal matters, international trade, and commercial policy. Said the Royal Commission: "Regarding evaluation of this material, we will say only that this appears to have been such as would be designed to facilitate detailed estimates of Canada's post-war economic and military potential. Part of this information could also be useful in connection with possible sabotage operations.

"In addition, Canadian citizenship documents such as passports, naturalisation certificates, marriage or birth certificates were sought for illegal purposes, for use not only in Canada but, as in the case of Witczak, in the United States. In 1945 Sam Carr accepted an assignment to obtain the entry of planted agents into Canada. Such agents could, of course, be useful not only for espionage but sabotage and leadership of subversive political groups."

Chapter Eighteen

FURTHER ARRESTS OF AGENTS

ON MARCH 2, 1946, the Royal Commission issued its first interim report, which lifted the curtain of secrecy long enough to describe some of the activities of Colonel Zabotin, Emma Woikin, Kathleen Willsher, Gordon Lunan, and Edward Mazerall. Three days later, in London, Inspector Whitehead of Special Branch, took a spin up the Strand to King's College. He arrived at half past three in the afternoon, just as Dr. Allan Nunn May was concluding a lecture on the nuclear theory.

When he had finished, Inspector Whitehead, who was waiting at the door, nodded to him.

"I have in my possession a warrant for your arrest," he said. "I will read it to you in a moment."

Dr. May pursed his lips. "Very well," he said. "I was expecting something like this."

In the police car outside, the inspector read the warrant. Dr. May listened without a word. An hour later he was in the iron-girded prisoner's dock of Bow Street Police Court. He had been preceded that day by seventeen thieves, beggars and streetwalkers, and the court room was packed for the novel appearance of a university lecturer in such surroundings. The proceedings themselves were not sensational. A few words between the various counsel, and the matter was passed to the Central Criminal Courts. For a moment the short, bald figure of Dr. May stood in the cone of light which streamed down from the skylight. Then someone touched his arm and he followed his guards to a side door.

During the months that had passed since his cover name "Alek" had first been linked with the traffic in atom-bomb secrets, the investigation had come upon some other activities of his. For example, there was the cable to Moscow which read:

To the Director

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On our task Alek has reported brief data concerning electronic shells. In particular these are being used by the American Navy against Japanese suicide-fliers. . . . The bomb explodes in the proximity of an aeroplane from the action of the reflected waves. . . . The basic difficulties were the preparations of a tube. . . . The Americans have achieved this, but have not handed this over to the English. . . . Grant.

9-7-45.

Confronted with these and other documents, Dr. May found himself in the tragic plight of the intellectual who has suddenly discovered the falseness of the gods to which he has sworn allegiance. In his case there was exhibited the dilemma of the thinking man, frightened by the awful potentials of super-destructive weapons, who had tried to do something about it. As a nuclear physicist he may very well have acquired a guilt complex arising from his own participation in the project. In seeking to purge himself he had placed his knowledge at the disposal of a social group which, in his eyes at least, was more sincerely devoted to international idealism.

At any rate, his statement which he finally reduced to writing is an epic of its kind, for behind its quiet, restrained language may be detected a certain bitter awareness that he had placed in jeopardy both his professional career and personal well-being for what he wrongly considered to be "a contribution . . . to the safety of mankind." In its entirety it read:

About a year ago whilst in Canada, I was contacted by an individual whose identity I decline to divulge. He called on me at my private apartment in Swail Avenue, Montreal. He apparently knew I was employed by the Montreal laboratory and he sought information from me concerning atomic research.

I gave and had given very careful consideration to correctness of making sure that development of atomic energy was not confined to U.S.A. I took the very painful decision that it was necessary to convey general information on atomic energy and make sure it was taken seriously. For this reason I decided to entertain the proposition made to me by the individual who called on me.

After this preliminary meeting I met the individual on several subsequent occasions whilst in Canada. He made specific requests for information, which were just nonsense to me—I mean by this that they were difficult for me to comprehend. But he did request samples of uranium from me and information generally on atomic energy.

At one meeting I gave the man microscopic amounts of U.233 and U.235 (one of each). The U.235 was a slightly enriched sample and was in a small glass tube and consisted of about a milligram of oxide. The U.233 was about a tenth of a milligram and was a very thin deposit on a platinum foil and was wrapped in a piece of paper.

I also gave the man a written report on atomic research as known to me. This information was mostly of a character which has since been published or is about to be published.

The man also asked me for information about the U.S. electronically controlled A.A. shells. I knew very little about these and so could give only very little information.

He also asked me for introductions to people employed in the laboratory. . . .

The man gave me some dollars (I forget how many) in a bottle of whiskey and I accepted these against my will.

Before I left Canada it was arranged that on my return to London I was to keep an appointment with somebody I did not know. I was given precise details as to making contact but I forget them now. I did not keep the appointment because I had decided that this clandestine procedure was no longer appropriate in view of the official release of information and the possibility of satisfactory international control of atomic energy.

The whole affair was extremely painful to me and I only embarked on it because I felt that this was a contribution I could make to the safety of mankind. I certainly did not do it for gain.

Although Dr. May pointed out that “almost” everything he had passed on had been published, the facts were that it was precisely the material that was not published and which was still secret which was prized so highly by the Soviets. His statement of humanitarian motives

elicited little sympathy from Mr. Justice Oliver, when, passing sentence, he said:

"Allan Nunn May, I have listened with some slight surprise to the picture of you as a man of honour who has done only what you believed to be right. I do not take that view of you at all.

"How any man in your position could have had the crass conceit, let alone the wickedness, to arrogate to himself the decision of a matter of this sort, when you yourself had given the written undertaking not to do it, and knew it was one of your country's most precious secrets, when you yourself had drawn and were drawing pay for years to keep your own bargain with your country—that you could have done this is a dreadful thing. I think that you acted not as an honourable but a dishonourable man. I think that you acted with degradation. Whether money was the object of what you did, in fact you did get money for what you did. It is a very bad case indeed. The sentence upon you is one of ten years' penal servitude."

For a little while the conspirators had moved, unaware that the pitiless light of official scrutiny was upon them. Even the observers must have felt that there was something humiliating in the way these private individuals had set themselves against their native states, acting clandestinely under the cloak of assumed secrecy. The communist sympathizers reached by Colonel Zabotin never could have dreamed that one day they would be uncovered by political ambush within the walls of the Soviet mission itself. They could not foresee that the slow agony of their self-persuasion to treason could ever become a matter of cold public record.

Dr. May is a symbolic figure in this tragedy of betrayals. He was not a vicious man, not a criminal, mountebank, charlatan, or adventurer. He had little appetite for conspiracy. He was a sober citizen whose passion for public honour led him to moral destruction and physical imprisonment.

Read again May's apology: "This was a contribution I could make to the safety of mankind."

He, May, nuclear physicist, had presumed to decide in what direction lay the safety of mankind. No specialist in politics, he felt he knew better than the democratic governments where that safety lay. He did not act for profit. "The whole affair was extremely painful to me." Undoubtedly it was painful. No man violates his pledged oath,

infringes the laws of his nation, violates his loyalties, save for good cause.

What was May's good cause? "The safety of mankind." Such an ideal is above reproach. When men die in modern times for their nation's welfare, they feel that there is something higher involved than the mere defence of strategic points or the crossing of frontiers. So it was with May. Over and against the Canadian and British Governments, he claimed his higher right as a private citizen to determine ". . . the safety of mankind."

In such a dissection of betrayal, the source of the crime is revealed.

The betrayal of the Soviet Union by Gouzenko was based on his belief that the human race would better endure under free democratic government than under the Stalinist dictatorship.

The betrayal of Canada and the United Kingdom by Dr. Allan Nunn May was based on his belief that the human race would better survive if the Soviet Union had information concerning atomic energy. He did not consult the man in the street, or the editors, statesmen, and the clergy. He did not propound the matter for open democratic discussion. He did not seek a public-opinion poll on the question:

"Are the secrecy laws of the Realm such that patriotic and far-seeing men should for the safety of mankind betray them?"

Had he done so, he may well have hesitated before his treason.

But betray he did.

His progress was not without sorrow. No one will ever know what torments are hidden behind the simple phrase ". . . extremely painful to me." He was no reckless criminal, dissipating every available hour in vice and corruption, stealing and betraying in order to appease the appetites which had become his master. He was no terror-stricken blackmail victim, apprehensive, fearful, and ashamed. He was no zealot, shouting new-found loyalty to the Soviets from a soap box in the public square, defying the police to silence him. He was "a charming, shy little man with a dry sense of humour."

Yet he betrayed Canada, Great Britain, and the United States of America.

He betrayed them because he thought he knew better.

This need to betray was not a lowly inspired thing. He acted from the same motives which sent martyrs to the burning, explorers to the icy wastes, patriots to sacrifice. He acted, so he thought, for the safety

of mankind. But he accepted the word of the Soviets, of strangers, as to what such safety comprised. He changed over from a democratic man into an agent of a police state.

And there was no outward evidence of this change.

That is the dangerous part. The appeal of such a conversion is not to crime, adventure, perversion, wilfulness, or open rebellion. The appeal is to the highest ideals of modern man—the love of peace, love of mankind, willingness to undergo danger for the sake of a good ideal.

A good ideal—interpreted by the Soviet spy ring.

May himself seems to have realised the contradiction. When he was arrested, he made no scene, showed no defiance. Nor did he proudly accept and endure the glorious and noble sufferings which have long been celebrated as the fitting reward of the martyr.

No. He behaved like a quiet scientist in a ready-made suit. He tried to think—think his way out of the snare of errors and misdeeds to which he had been so hopelessly committed. It was not mere disgrace or reproof which threatened his life. It was a real prison, with iron bars, stone walls, and rigid discipline perfectly tangible to the man of flesh and blood.

He tried to think his way out of the situation, and came to a final decision, so commonplace that in the crazy-quilt of betrayal it stands out as a rather old patch of common sense.

He decided that he had been wrong.

He decided that the Canadian, British, and United States Governments were right. He decided that their proposals for international controls were perhaps just proposals, and therefore two hundred million citizens of the Western democracies may have been right and he, the one man all by himself, had been wrong.

Dr. Allan Nunn May pleaded guilty and is now in prison. He will remain imprisoned for long years to come, long after this book is read and, perhaps, forgotten. In the morning he will awake, sometimes surprised to find work and freedom changed to idleness and restriction. He will feel himself grow older, and perhaps may dwell upon the thought of the scientific work he could have accomplished if he had remained outside. He will be undergoing punishment, but the worst punishment of all will be the question:

“Why did I do it?”

He will not even have the consolation of thinking of himself as an

innocent democratic citizen imprisoned by "fascists." He will not be able to pretend he is a martyr, even to himself. He is just a man who made a mistake.

The others may not feel quite the same. Perhaps their faith in communist doctrines will sustain them across the years of shame and punishment. But not Dr. Allan Nunn May.

The lesson is a real one. When men are in doubt, when they are fed up with delay, with uncertainty, with the bewildering choice offered by open discussion, they are sometimes receptive to a faith which says: "I am history. I am sure. I know. Do this. You will be saved." Such a faith offers the pleasures of obedience, the certainty of unfailing righteousness, even though a continent be drenched with blood and a language shot through with lies and falsifications. Such a faith demands absolute loyalty. The price—absolute betrayal.

Perhaps May needed some cure for the horrors which his scientific work had helped to cast out upon the world. Perhaps there was not enough loyalty, not enough thrill from the promises and procedures of free governments, which offered little but common sense. The Soviets promised decisive action and a share in a heroic mission. He accepted the Soviet faith—just a part of it, just for a little while. But enough to break the security of the atomic energy project and to ruin his own life.

Then, his life ruined, he changed his mind. He rejected the Soviet theories. He declared that he agreed with the British-United States-Canadian point of view. He "decided that clandestine procedure was no longer appropriate in view of . . . the possibility of satisfactory international control of atomic energy." He believed in real democracy. He came back—to prison.

The next to fall into the dragnet was Fred Rose, M.P. A few minutes past eleven on the evening of March 14, Inspector René J. Noel of the R.C.M.P. knocked on the door of his Beechwood Avenue flat in Ottawa.

Rose was at the telephone talking to Mr. Robert Taylor, legislative correspondent of a Toronto paper, who was asking whether he had been arrested yet, and who quite by accident found himself an ear-witness to the occasion!

"No," Rose was saying, "I have not. If I am supposed to be the one who gave away the information on the last secret session of

Parliament on reinforcements, they are certainly being ridiculous. It did not come from me."

Before he hung up, however, he answered the knock on the door, and Taylor heard the muffled voices of the police taking Rose into custody.

The front of the building swarmed with R.C.M.P. plainclothesmen and alerted newspaper correspondents, according to an anonymous reporter of the *Ottawa Citizen*. Powerful floodlights, set up to illuminate the area in the event that a search was necessary, lent a Hollywood touch to the scene. Flanked by husky escorts, Rose, hatless, wearing a blue overcoat, grey suit, and maroon tie, called out to the newsmen, "I want to say right now they haven't got a thing on me. I am an innocent man."¹

Documentary and oral evidence linked Rose with ten individuals in the network—yet he refused to testify before the Royal Commission or make any explanation of his connection with the case.

Sam Carr was a fugitive and could not be located, but the others whose names had cropped up in connection with the false passport were questioned—namely, Henry Harris and Dr. John Soboloff. Their reactions have been noted elsewhere in these pages.

From February until June, 1946, the Commission was in session, investigating "the facts relating to and the circumstances surrounding the communication by public officials and other persons in a position of trust of secret and confidential information to agents of a foreign power."

By June 27, after hearing scores of witnesses and reviewing thousands of pages of testimony, their findings were made public. Summarised they were:

1. Fourteen public officials and other persons in a position of trust had communicated to agents of a foreign power information, the disclosure of which was against the safety and interests of Canada.

¹ British justice has erected special safeguards around members of Parliament and the decision to arrest the Hon. Member for Cartier was not lightly taken. However, a study of the rules of Parliamentary procedure disclosed that "the privilege has always held to protect Members from arrest and imprisonment under civil processes, whether the suit be at the action of an individual or the public; but it is not claimable for treasons, felony, breach of peace, or 'any indictable offence.'" The Government therefore moved to arrest Fred Rose. (House of Commons Debates, Friday, March 15, 1946. Page 7.)

2. The following cover names which appeared in the documents, and which were definitely members of Zabotin's ring, were unidentified:

Galya
Gini
Golia
Green

3. The following facts related to such communications :

a. There existed in Canada a Fifth Column organised and directed by Russian agents in Canada and in Russia.

b. Within the Fifth Column there were several spy rings.

c. Membership in communist organisations or a sympathy toward communistic ideologies was the primary force motivating the agents.

d. Without documents such as Gouzenko obtained it was impossible to identify any non-Russian members of other rings.

e. There was an organisation whose duty it was to procure false Canadian passports and other citizenship documents for the use of agents engaged in Fifth Column activities in Canada or elsewhere.

f. Zabotin and his assistants were helping to supervise and finance the work of an organisation of agents operating in certain European countries.

4. The following persons who, although not within the category of "public officials and other persons in a position of trust," were members of Zabotin's organisation and took an active part in recruiting agents, acting as contacts and securing and transmitting such secret and confidential information :

Sam Carr
Fred Rose

5. The following were active in procuring a false Canadian passport for a Russian agent who was operating in the United States:

Sam Carr
Henry Harris
John Soboloff, M.D.

6. The names of certain other persons were mentioned in the documents merely because Moscow desired the names of all members of certain government staffs.

7. The names of a number of persons in government service and otherwise who were members of secret communist cells were disclosed by the enquiry. As there was no evidence that these persons were implicated in, or aware of, the espionage networks, it was not necessary to mention them.

At the same time, the Commission recommended that:

1. The top secret, secret, confidential, and restricted matters which had appeared in the exhibits be withheld from publication.

2. The authorities in each government department set up further safeguards against unauthorised transmission of information.

3. That consideration be given to security measures to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust of persons likely to commit such acts in the future.

4. That the procedure of issuing Canadian passports be revised.

In conclusion the Commission pointed out that "We have seen only the small selection of Zabotin's espionage documents which Gouzenko was able to collect immediately before he left the Embassy; among these the telegrams in which 'the Director' listed his instructions were all dated within the last week of July and the month of August, 1945. The Military Intelligence network had been functioning since 1942."

Chapter Nineteen

PARALLEL LINES

"WHAT YOU HAVE," said Gouzenko, "is only a modest, small part of all that is really here. It still leaves a dangerous situation because there are other groups and other people working under every consul in each place where there is a consulate. It is just like a number of small circles. There are parallel systems of spies or potential agents."

The evidence showed that, in its early stages, the Soviet Military Intelligence network in Canada, in existence as early as 1942, had been reorganised by Major Sokolov "Davie" after his arrival in Ottawa in 1942, when he had come to Canada ostensibly as a munitions inspector in connection with the Canadian Mutual Aid Program to the U.S.S.R. The first head of the system in Canada was Sergei N. Koudriavtzev "Leon", who in June, 1943, handed over the organisation to Colonel Zabolotin "Grant."¹ It was this group for which Gouzenko functioned as code clerk. Because it was the only branch of the Embassy to which he had documents, its network was the only one that could be exposed.

However, Gouzenko, of his own knowledge, was aware that several parallel systems existed in Canada. He knew, for example, that there was a five-man committee in Moscow which passed upon Soviet officials sent to foreign countries. This committee consisted of representatives of the N.K.V.D., the Military Intelligence, the Naval Service, the Commercial Service, and the Diplomatic Service. "Each of

¹ "One other thing which is being said is that the action of the detained persons was due to the secrecy with respect to the atomic bomb. I had a letter only yesterday from the secretary of one of the councils of Soviet-Canadian friendship, stating that all this had grown out of the fact that Russia was being denied information which the United States, Great Britain, and Canada had with respect to the atomic bomb. May I impress this fact upon the house that the disclosures of which I have been speaking tonight go back to 1943 and 1944. The organisation for the purpose of espionage of which I have been speaking has been in existence for three or four years in this country and the greater part of the information which it obtained was secured before anyone knew anything about the atomic bomb." (Prime Minister King, House of Commons Debates, March 18, 1946.)

them sends their own men," said Gouzenko, "and they try to put on more of their own men. Intelligence tries to put more of their own men, Commercial Service tries to put more than the Diplomatic, and so on with the other representatives.

"According to conversations between Sokolov and Zabolin, I think that they suspected that there existed a parallel military intelligence system. The same thing was true in the United States, according to a telegram I saw. The chief of the Technical Bureau is the head of one parallel system; Military Intelligence has another system."

According to the code clerk, it was only by accident that Colonel Zabolin learned that he had competition in Canada, although he knew that Pavlov, head of the N.K.V.D., was running a network of his own.

Said Gouzenko:

"There was another case when two members of the Commercial Counsellor's Office went to the Canadian Patent Office and asked for information about the secret invention of radar. They spoke bad English and the Canadian authorities thought that they were German agents and called the police. They were held, and they were checked up and then released."

Q. Who went to the Canadian Patent Office?

A. Two employees of the Commercial Counsellor's office.

Q. What purpose did they go there for?

A. They asked about the invention of radar, and because what they asked for was secret they were under suspicion. They were arrested but were released immediately. Of course, this was mentioned to Sokolov, and Sokolov immediately told it to Zabolin. Zabolin became very angry and he wrote a big telegram to Moscow. He said that the Neighbour should not work with such hooligan methods. He described what happened and he said that these were the Neighbour's people—Pavlov's people. . . . He said that such careless work would attract the attention of the Canadian authorities to the Military Attaché, but they would not suspect Pavlov or anybody else.

There had been several previous instances of friction between the systems and Gouzenko said that this was not uncommon in other countries as he had learned during his year at Intelligence Headquarters in Moscow. Finally both Zabolin and Pavlov received simul-

taneous instructions that all disputes must be settled and that there should be no quarrel between the various networks operating in Canada.

While the evidence in the documents clearly pointed to the existence of the N.K.V.D. spy system, there was, of course, no way of ascertaining the extent of its infiltration and the identity of its agents. Gouzenko, however, thought that its system was even larger than Zabotin's. On this point he testified:

Q. So the N.K.V.D. system, started at least as early as 1942, has been operating continuously here and is operating at the present time apart from Zabotin?

A. Yes.

Q. And you think the N.K.V.D. system is much larger than Zabotin's?

A. Yes.

Q. And both are working actually?

A. Yes.

In addition to the Military Intelligence and the Secret Police systems, there was also the beginnings of a Naval Intelligence system. In 1944, Naval Captain Pantzerney, who had been in New York as a naval engineer with the Soviet Commercial Counsellor, arrived in Ottawa. He had obtained certain information about ship construction in Halifax which he passed on to Zabotin, telling him that he had obtained it in the course of conversations with naval officers and engineers. Two Russian naval officers working in a commercial organisation in Vancouver came to Ottawa, had a conference with Zabotin and Motinov, and read a two-hundred-page report on the naval forces of Canada. Gouzenko said that "Commercial representatives are interested in naval forces not from the point of view of commerce but from the point of view of intelligence work."

In 1943 the Canadian Government gave permission for a Soviet consulate to be opened at Halifax, which is still in existence. Gouzenko said that a junior official was a worker in the Military Intelligence system and had made a trip to discuss questions with Zabotin in 1943.

Concerning the secret Political System, the code clerk stated that the Second Secretary Goussarov was its chief.

"Officially he was supposed to be working in the Textile Institute. Then he came to Canada. Goussarov is only the Second Secretary, but

his authority is on the level of the Ambassador. He has direct contact with the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He is a Party organiser in the Embassy.

"Then there was Patonya, the doorman. Officially he is one of the doormen in the Embassy. To my surprise, when I went back one night I found that he was working in my room. I went back at one o'clock because Colonel Zabotin had told me that he had a telegram to send. I saw Patonya working in my room. Nobody in the Embassy knew that he was working in the secret division. I always saw him at night. I never saw him working in the day, when I was either sleeping or working. Together with him I saw Goussarov."

Goussarov, as head of the group made up of Communist Party members in the Embassy, had a cover name "Trade Union" and he was responsible for supervising the political orthodoxy of the Embassy staff. Gouzenko said that he had reason to believe that Goussarov also transmitted political directives from Moscow to the leaders of the Canadian Communist movement. These directives would include not only general political lines to be followed in propaganda, but also operational instructions covering such matters as labour, unions, professional societies, youth movements, and friendship councils.

This group was also responsible for the Comintern Intelligence System, which dealt not in espionage but in biographical material on Canadian Communists and their sympathisers.

In summing up this phase of the enquiry, the Royal Commission stated: "We must report that we have no corroboration, in any of the Russian documents placed before us, for this part of Gouzenko's testimony regarding the transmission of political directives. It must at the same time be borne in mind that from the nature of this system, as described by Gouzenko, no such corroboration could be expected from documents prepared by the military espionage agents. We are therefore reporting Gouzenko's testimony on these matters only as his informed opinion, based on his experiences as a member of one of the 'secret sections' of the Soviet Embassy.

"At first sight we find it difficult to credit that the leaders of any Canadian political party would take instructions regarding the political activities which they directed, from agents of any foreign power. However, it would be still more difficult for us to believe that such men as Sam Carr and Fred Rose, who have been shown to have acted for many years as key members of an espionage network headed by

agents of a foreign power, and directed against Canada, would not also be prepared to accept from agents of that same foreign power political instructions regarding the organisation which they directed. We would be less than frank, therefore, if we did not report this opinion."

In Colonel Zabotin's notebooks the Russian word "Nash" appeared in parenthesis after the names of certain key agents. The literal translation of this word is "Ours," and wherever it was used it developed that the agent was a member of the "Corporation" or the Communist Party.

When Zabotin came to Canada he found already in existence in Ottawa, Montreal, and Toronto numerous study groups where communist philosophy and techniques were read and discussed. On the surface these groups appeared as social gatherings, music-listening groups, and coteries for the discussion of international politics and economics. Occasionally dues were collected and the money used for various purposes, including assistance to Communist Party leaders and the purchase of communist literature. There was ample evidence in the testimony of Mazerall, Lunan, and Boyer to prove that these study groups were in fact party cells and were the principal recruiting centres for agents whose minds had been developed to serve the Soviet Union in ways more practical than political theorising.

As revealed by the hundred documents, the technique of obtaining agents was well systematised. A senior organiser of the Communist Party, such as Sam Carr or Fred Rose, would propose certain prospects to one of Zabotin's colleagues. Zabotin would obtain the details about the candidate, including his possibilities—whether his kind of work or the information he could furnish were valuable—and send this to Moscow. Moscow, after an independent check through N.K.V.D. or Comintern systems, would then cable its decision. In addition, Moscow would sometimes take the initiative in suggesting to Zabotin that some Communist in Canada be contacted and enlisted for the work. Apparently these suggestions were made from lists of non-Russian Communists whose names and dossiers were kept on file in the Soviet capital.

Psychological reports, prepared as part of the routine of the secret cell organisation of the Party, were also useful in espionage recruiting. Apparently these reports were prepared on various individual Communists by Party members who watched them develop in the study group system. These reports, passed along the pyramid of cells, were

made available to senior members of the Party and helped to select those who would be most willing to participate in the undercover work. A preliminary feeling-out of the selected recruit, before the latter realised the true purpose of the approach, could also be made within the framework of normal Party activities. As the documents relating to "B" Group showed, this proved to be an important factor in the recruiting technique.

While most of the recruiting was done through the communist cells, Moscow did not always look with favour on using anyone who was so outspoken in his convictions that he had come to be known as a "Red." More preferred was the secret Communist about whose ideology little or nothing was suspected. This preference was well indicated in a series of documents dealing with one Norman Veall of Montreal, Membership Secretary of the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers, who testified before the Royal Commission that "for any definition as far as you are concerned, you can call me a Communist." In Colonel Rogov's instructions for "Frank", under the heading of "Task No. 2 of 15.6.45" we find:

Frank: On the ground of data previously communicated with respect to A. N. Veall (an Englishman) it is known to us that up to 1942 he worked in the meteo service of the Royal Air Force in Cambridge. Following this he went to Canada on a scientific mission. Before leaving, Veall allegedly received instructions from his director to get in touch with your corporation.

At present we would like to know more details about Veall and therefore it is desired that for the forthcoming meeting (15.7.45) you should in written form enlighten us on the following questions:

(a) Did Veall really work in the meteo service of the Royal Air Force in Cambridge and has his mission (stay) in Canada a direct connection with his service in England?

(b) If these facts are confirmed, you should try to draw Veall into a frank discussion and put the question straight to him, what he wants from you.

(c) However, should Veall in the course of conversation refer to his corporation membership and to the instructions of his director in England to get connected with the Canadian

corporation, then let him give the name of the person who gave him these instructions.

(d) Do not take from Veall any material and do not show any interest in any information whatever.

Veall, through his position in the Canadian Scientific Workers' Association, met Dr. Allan Nunn May, though, as Veall testified, "May was rather a senior man and I am a junior man in the lab, and we do not move in the same social circles." Nevertheless, amongst the hundred documents, there was the following cable from Zabotin:

To the Director

243

Alek reported to us that he met Norman Veall (he was at his home). Veall works in the Montreal Branch of the Scientific Research Council where he is responsible for the making of testing utensils and other glass work. He came from England in 1943, where he was a member of the Party for several years. He worked on meteorology in the British R.A.F. He takes part in the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers and works there as a foreign correspondent. In connection with this he visited our Embassy and talked with one of our Press Attachés who is in charge of the press, distribution of periodicals, etc. He asked the opinion of Alek: Is it worth while for him (Veall) to hand over information on the atomic bomb?

Alek expressed himself in the negative. Alek stated that Veall occupies a fairly low position and knows very little. He is inclined to be careless, as he began this conversation in the presence of his wife. He is pretty well known in the laboratory as a "Red." His age is about 25 years. He is married and has one child. His address is: 2870 Van Horne, Apartment 5, Telephone Atlantic 2084. We gave Alek no tasks concerning Veall. The possibility is not excluded that he may have already tied up with the Neighbour. I consider it necessary to warn the Neighbour. Please correct.

Grant.

9.8.45.

If Zabotin was alarmed at the goings-on, the Director was equally upset. His cable in reply read:

11924

22.8.45

To Grant

Your 243

We have here no compromising data against Veall, nevertheless the fact that he has in his hands a letter of recommendation from a corporant who was arrested in England (which he did not take care to destroy) compels us to refuse to have any contact with him whatsoever, the more so that many already call him a "Red."

To the Neighbour he must surely be known; if not, inform him of the break in my instructions.

Warn Alek that he should have no conversations whatever with him about our work.

Questioned at a later date by the Royal Commission, Veall denied his Communist Party affiliations, but expressed communist sympathies. He said that several people, including Dr. May, had told him that he was "rather foolish to be so outspoken in my political opinions."

Q. As a matter of fact, you were pretty outspoken, were you not, in your political opinions?

A. Yes.

Q. And those political opinions were ones which, without a great deal of difficulty, could be designated as Red?

A. Well, to put it this way, I would not be offended if anybody called me a Red.

Q. Would you be offended if anybody called you a Communist?

A. No, in fact, except that I do believe that it is an undesirable label on a person. . . . I think it would be fair to say in general that I am. I would say that a Communist would closely correspond with my political sympathies, at least the basis of Marxism.

In summing up this phase of the case, the Royal Commission found no proof that Veall had communicated secret information, and Veall himself stated that he would not have done so if asked.

While the Soviet representatives thus steered clear of association with persons who were known leftists, they did make every effort to

exploit their social relationships and diplomatic contacts with non-communist members of the Canadian Government. This was illustrated in the November, 1944, report by Lieutenant Colonel Motinov for Colonel Zabotin. On it Zabotin had written: "I confirm." It was headed, "Questions required to be clarified through 'Lamont' (Motinov) and 'Brent' (Rogov) concerning 'Jack' and 'Dick.'" It had been prepared in answer to certain questions posed by Moscow where there appeared to be confusion concerning the identities of "Jack" and "Dick" with another person who had been reported by Zabotin. Although the document refers to only two men, it is an interesting example of the system by which it was hoped to obtain information from non-communist prospects. Excerpts from it are:

Both the first, as well as the second, work in responsible positions, consequently they gave their signatures not to divulge military secrets. Therefore the character of the work must be the usual one—a personal touch in conversations on various subjects, beginning with oneself, one's own biography, work and daily life, at times asking them, as if for comparison of this or that situation, etc.

For Both

1. *To clarify basic service data:*

- (a) Present position, where did he work previously;
- (b) Prospects of remaining in the service after the war and where;
- (c) From what year in the army, does he like the service;
- (d) Relations with his immediate superiors.

2. *To elucidate brief biographical data:*

- (a) Age, parents, family conditions;
- (b) Education, principal pre-war specialty;
- (c) Party affiliation, attitude toward the politics of King;
- (d) Financial conditions, inclinations toward establishing material security for his family (intentions to engage in business, to own a car, a home of his own, and what hinders the fulfilment of this plan);
- (e) Attitude toward our country and her politics;

(f) Wherein does he see the prosperity of Canada (in friendship with America or retaining English influence).

3. *Personal positive and negative sides:*

- (a) Inclination to drink, good family man;
- (b) Lover of good times, inclination for solitude and quietness;
- (c) Influence of his wife on his actions, independence in making decisions;
- (d) Circle of acquaintances and brief character sketches of them.

4. *Programme for future (ideological or financial required to be determined).*

It developed that one of the cover names referred to a Canadian army colonel who had met Zabotin, Rogov, and Motinov socially. Without his knowledge the latter were using a cover name for him. When heard as a witness before the Royal Commission, the colonel dispelled any doubts or suspicions that might have existed toward him and said: "They have misinterpreted our sincere endeavour, both my wife's and mine, to make them feel at home in Canada, and to show them something of Canadian life, but I am cured."

In addition to the recruiting drive among members of the Party cells, and the attempt to exploit social contacts, Gouzenko pointed out that there was a plan to extend the Fifth Column base by a third method:

"Russians or Ukrainians who came from the territory which is now occupied by Russia—Ukraine or Eastern Poland—are paid serious attention by Soviet officials. These officials have taken a lesson from this war. They learned what the Germans did. They know that years ago the Germans established very close contact with every German resident in other countries. They organised their consulates and embassies and obtained the use of relatives or relations of people who were living in other countries. They got in contact with all persons of German origin and if they considered it necessary they asked them to work in a general way. Sometimes they did not consider it necessary that they should work for them, but they just kept in touch with them.

"In the same way Soviet officials are working with Canadians of

Russian or Ukrainian origin. They try to develop these people as a communist-minded population. If they consider it is necessary to develop some of them, they can use the fear that their relatives will be persecuted in the home country. That is no joke. It is the real thing. They may say to a man, "If you do not agree to work, your brother or sister may be liquidated."

While there was no evidence to bear out the testimony that the Soviets had any such ulterior motive when their consuls began in 1945 to carry out a registration of persons living in Canada who had originated in former Polish territory which had been incorporated after the war into the U.S.S.R., it was a matter of record that the person on the Embassy staff who was in charge of this work was Vitali Pavlov—the secret head of the N.K.V.D. in Canada.

Besides the agents mentioned elsewhere in these pages, the documents pointed to two others who had been utilised for international links in the network. The first of these was a stoutish middle-aged woman afflicted with lameness, which made it necessary for her to walk with the aid of two canes. Her name was Hermina Rabinowich and she was an employee of the International Labour Organisation of the League of Nations. Born in Kaunas, Lithuania, on October 5, 1901, she was educated in Moscow, Paris, Geneva, and Heidelberg, held a degree of Ph.D. in Economics and Social Science, and spoke Russian, English, French, Italian, and German. She joined the I.L.O. at its headquarters in Geneva in 1929, and in 1940 was transferred to the temporary headquarters of the I.L.O. in Montreal. Of the hundred documents, five dealt with her activities.

The first, consisting of four pages in Russian, written by Motinov, bore the heading "Germina" and the marginal note "History," ending with "I await instructions about next meeting, also money," together with her addresses and telephone numbers. The second, a typewritten letter in English, was addressed "Dear Hermina" and was signed "Gisel," which, according to Gouzenko, was the code name for Red Army Military Intelligence. The third, a report in Russian of an interview between "Leon" and Hermina on May 5, 1944, ending with "I request your further directives. Lamont." The fourth, a report in Russian of other meetings between Leon and Hermina and the tasks assigned to her, while the fifth was a letter typewritten in English, dated August 28, 1944, signed Hermina Rabinowich.

Together these showed that she was the instrumentality whereby

\$10,000 was transferred through a commercial firm in New York City to a group of Soviet secret agents operating on the European continent out of Geneva, Switzerland.

Although her position in the I.L.O. entitled her to diplomatic immunity, the privileged status was waived by her superiors. Miss Rabinowich was brought before the Royal Commission for questioning. After a lengthy session she finally admitted the genuineness of the documents brought by Gouzenko and the facts they contained. The statement which she made in explanation of her actions reflects the manner in which the Soviets exploited family ties abroad:

"I would like to say first of all that whatever I did was very careless; I admit it, and I am very sorry for it. It was never done in any way to harm anybody or any country. I was very happy about being in Canada, and I never had the slightest thought or act to do anything against the hospitality which I received here, or which could do any harm to this country. . . .

"When I had certain contacts with the Soviet Embassy, there were certain ideas behind it which have nothing to do with being an agent or no agent.

"As I said before, I had seen my family at that time in Russia, and I once already had a visa for them to come to this continent; and because of the Russians they were not released out of Lithuania and perished there later on. But at that time I still had reason to hope they were still there and still alive. . . .

"I had perhaps the foolish idea that with rendering service . . . I might have some kind of possibilities in helping my parents, who were in very great danger there in Lithuania. My parents were already old at that time, and also some younger people; but of course I thought mainly of my father and mother.

"As I said before, this whole business, I was used just like a tool, and was foolish enough to let myself into that business. I did not get anything from them, because the small service I asked for they did not render me, even when I asked for my parents.

"The other thing is that I did not do anything disloyal to the I.L.O., nor to the United States, either. I should like to say that I feel very sorry about being so careless, but at that time that was the whole attitude during the war still. I didn't feel I was doing any harm in contacting these people. Only later, when I saw all this secrecy and all that business, I disliked it very much . . . and I hope never to see

them any more, and I don't know their names and I didn't care to know their names."

Another international link in the Zabotin network was indicated by draft cablegrams concerning one B——. One cable which Gouzenko recalled having coded and dispatched was found in Motinov's notebook. It read:

To the Director, on N.

I am communicating to you the arrangements for B——'s meeting in London. The meeting will take place two weeks after B——'s departure, counting the first Sunday after his departure as the date of his departure, even if he should have left on a Wednesday. The meeting will take place at 15 o'clock on Sunday, in front of the office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, S.W.1 (Canada House, Trafalgar Square). If on the first Sunday it does not take place, it will be transferred to the next Sunday at the same hour and so on until contact is established. B—— will be in civilian clothes—brown suit (tweed), checked, without a hat, with a newspaper in his right hand.

Password: "How's Elsie?"

B—— will reply: "She's fine."

Thereupon our man will hand over to him a letter signed "Frank."

If the meeting at the designated place should prove impossible or inconvenient for us, B—— will send his address to his wife, the latter will give it to Debouz, and the latter to us and it may be possible to undertake the meeting at the address of his living quarters. When you will advise us that the meeting will be more convenient at the apartment, then we will tell Debouz and he will tell B——'s wife. B——'s wife will write him a letter with the following sentence: "Ben has not been feeling too well." After that he will await the meeting at his apartment.

Supplementary data.

He joined the Party in 1938. Worked as an insurance agent. His wife joined the Party in 1939. During the illegal period he worked in the central apparatus of the Party on organisational work.

Since there was no evidence to indicate that this London meeting was ever carried out and nothing to show that secret information was communicated, the cable is reported only as it highlights the clandestine nature of the Soviet Embassy-Canadian Communist link, and the use of communist sympathisers as exchange points in the international espionage traffic.

Like the other documents in the case, it bore out Gouzenko's description of the spymaster's philosophy: "They would not use just one method; they use a combination of all methods. They are always saying never to put all your aspirations and hopes on one method. Combine methods. They say that life is very complicated, so use everything possible. They would combine this method of infiltration, outside help, sympathisers, and others."

Chapter Twenty

FINALE OR PRELUDE?

IN A SENSE the cases of the Canadian spy ring are closed. The Royal Commission of Enquiry, after completing its final report on June 27, 1946, bowed out of existence, leaving the matter of individual punishment for the courts to decide. To ensure the utmost respect for the civil rights of each defendant, the Canadian authorities proceeded with separate trials of each of the accused. At the time of going to press, the box score was:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Trial</i>	<i>Sentence</i>	<i>Appeal</i>
Dr. Allan Nunn May	Alek	Pleaded guilty, May 1, 1946.	10 years	
Fred Rose	Debouz	Found guilty, June 20, 1946.	6 years	Rejected
Emma Woikin	Nora	Pleaded guilty, April 12, 1946.	3 years	
Kathleen Willsher	Elli	Pleaded guilty, May 3, 1946.	3 years	
H. S. Gerson	Gray	Found guilty, Oct. 12, 1946 2nd trial 9.10.47, Found guilty.	5 years 4 years	Retrial ordered
J. S. Benning	Foster	Found guilty, Oct. 30, 1946.	5 years annulled	Appeal successful
D. G. Lunan	Back	Found guilty, Nov. 18, 1946	5 years	Rejected
E. W. Mazerall	Bagley	Found guilty, May 22, 1946.	4 years	Rejected
John Soboloff		Found guilty, Sept. 14, 1946.	\$500 fine, or 3 mos.	
Eric Adams	Ernst	Acquitted, Oct. 23, 1946.		
M. S. Nightingale		Acquitted, Nov. 8, 1946.		
W. M. Pappin		Acquitted, Oct. 19, 1946.		

<i>Name</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Trial</i>	<i>Sentence</i>	<i>Appeal</i>
Raymond Boyer	Professor	Found guilty, Dec. 6, 1947	2 years	Pending
Israel Halperin	Bacon	Acquitted, March 4, 1947.		
Durnford Smith	Badeau	Found guilty, Dec. 27, 1946.	5 years	Rejected
David Shugar	Prometheus	Acquitted, Dec. 7, 1946.		
Henry Harris		Found guilty, Jan. 27, 1947.	5 years	Appeal
F. W. Poland		Acquitted, Jan. 16, 1947.	annulled	successful

So stands the matter of prosecutions. Only time will reveal whether the hundred documents will cause a change in the Soviet tactics of using a diplomatic establishment to recruit a Fifth Column among the citizens of a friendly state.

It may be noted in passing that while the Canadian Government had established an organisation in the Department of National Defence to supply the Soviets officially with all authorised information which they might seek, this channel was never used by Colonel Zabotin for anything but the most innocuous requests for training pamphlets, pictures of army uniforms, and insignia of rank. The records showed that no such formal request for information was ever refused, and in the light of the spy exposé the reason for this was obvious. As the officer in charge of liaison with the Soviet attachés indicated, "It brings out the point which we had often discussed among ourselves, and that is not how futile but how reasonable were their official requests. We see the reason now."

When this same officer was asked whether any of the official requests indicated that the Soviets were in possession of information which they could not have obtained through proper sources, he replied, "No, as far as we were concerned we were absolute fools, had no idea at all."

The evidence also showed that Zabotin at no time ever indicated a desire to exchange information. The Canadian intelligence officers reported that all they obtained from him were bundles of pamphlets and magazines which he would bring in every few months.

In fact, one cable showed that Zabotin was embarrassed by an official invitation from the Canadian General Staff to lecture on the organisation of the Red Army before the Royal Military College at

Kingston. Apparently he was afraid that any misleading information which he might give would not tally with the handouts made in Moscow to the foreign military attachés. As a way out of this he decided to limit himself to material which had been published in Soviet magazines, and on August 22 sent a cable to Moscow which, since it did not concern espionage, was signed with his real name instead of Grant.

To the Director:

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A letter was received from the General Staff, signed by Colonel Jenkins, asking us to give a lecture on the organisation of the Red Army at the Military College at Kingston. I visited that place in the spring of this year. I consider that no lecture on that subject should be given. There is a plan at the General Staff whereby all military attachés were requested to make reports. A number of attachés have already made these reports. I therefore find myself in a disadvantageous position. I think it expedient to make a report along the lines of two articles from No. 3 of the magazine *Military Thought*, namely, the article by Marshal Rotsmisterov of the tank troops, and the one by Colonel General Samsonov. After this I will be able to press Jenkins and get a series of materials to fulfil your tasks for 1945.

A somewhat similar report to be made by Rogov on the materials from the magazine *Air Force News* and to make use of the occasion. I should, together with him, visit the Staff College of the Air Force in Toronto. I beg you to make the desired corrections.

Zabotin.

22.8.45.

From the cold dispassionate viewpoint of global strategy and the geographical foundations of national power, the interest of the U.S.S.R. in Canada is obvious. The thinly populated Dominion lies on the forefront of the transpolar air route between the land mass of the Soviet Union and the industrial heart of the United States, the invasion path of any future war. Therefore, Gouzenko's statement that "the last telegram asked about the mobilisation of resources in Canada . . . natural resources that Canada could mobilise in case of war, her coal, oil, rare metals, and so on," is fraught with significance. Only the ostrich-minded could ignore its significance in the face of a widespread conspiracy whose principal recruiting base was the secret auxiliary of the Communist Party.

The lesson of the Canadian spy ring holds a deep and vital meaning for all freedom-loving peoples. Whether that lesson will be heeded is one which the citizens of the Western democracies will be called upon to decide. To inhibit the growth of a communist Fifth Column is not a task that can be accomplished overnight. It cannot be done by ill-organised witch hunts or by indiscriminate application of the "communist" label to every movement of social reform. In the broader sense the misuse of such terms constitutes a problem of semantics far beyond the scope of this writing. However, the spotlight of publicity might well be turned on the secret adherents of the Communist Party who, by disguising their true political views, have obtained positions of public trust and confidence. It is possible that such a sun-cure meted out to those who are afflicted with political photophobia will provide a deterrent to whatever infiltration of fellow-travellers may be found to exist.

In Canada the proceedings attendant upon the exposé of the network have not passed without a storm of criticism. The Royal Commission has been dubbed a "Star Chamber proceeding," the detention of witnesses at Rockcliffe Barracks was attacked as "a violation of civil liberties," and every accusation has been levelled against the Canadian Government except one of outright forgery. No attempt has been made in these pages to report the controversy which arose in the conduct of the enquiry as it concerned individual defendants or their trials. The story of the spy ring is the story of the documents. What they have said is incontrovertible. Their meaning can neither be argued nor explained away.

Whether the motives of the agents were idealistic or mercenary is beside the point. Each of the agents felt the tug of ideology that was all but irresistible in sweeping them toward a course of action desired by the spymasters. Some will be moved to sympathy for their plight—others will be scornful. Whatever the emotions, the facts remain, as do the inferences which can be reasonably drawn from them.

That the Soviet police and espionage systems exist throughout the world is one such inference. Louis Budenz, former editor of the *New York Daily Worker*, turned anti-communist, in a public address before the Executives' Club in Chicago on December 21, 1946, stated: "For three years I was assigned to confer with the N.K.V.D. Soviet secret police in the United States. From this experience I can state that the apparatus for espionage exists in this country on a rather generous

scale." Budenz stated that when called upon he would "under oath reveal the nature of these conferences."

If the revelations of the Canadian spy trials prove anything, they show that true security lies not in physical possession of documents, but in the minds and motives of the men who work with them. Thus, ultimate security lies in the basic soundness of our way of life. As a corollary we need a realistic appraisal of Soviet claims to be a richer, better, juster, wiser society than our own. Alongside these goals the remainder of security consists of mere mechanical interference with outside attempts to penetrate the screen.

Practically, the problem has three aspects: First, there is the need for a political awakening to faith in our own system. Secondly, there must be erected a psychological defence against the lure of Soviet absolutism and its appeal to unhappy, impatient, or ultra conscientious individuals of Dr. May's type. Thirdly, we need an effective counter-intelligence to impede the actual transmission of classified data.

Witch hunting won't work. Shouting against "the Reds," without helping honest people to defend themselves against disguised communist lures, will serve no purpose. Bluff and bluster serves only to drive men of good will into opposition, and discredits sincere attempts to deal with the problem. Yet the need for a dispassionate analysis and public airing of communist infiltration tactics in the West has never been more pressing.

This has been a study in betrayals. Betrayals that have worked both ways. So long as flags fly and nations endure they will continue to occur. But by practical, realistic steps they can be kept to a minimum. Unless such steps are taken, both as nations and as individuals, we will awake, too late, to learn the irreparable harm that has been done.

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